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III
Resume et mots ele en francais
Les droits issus des brevets d'invention sur les produits pharmaceutiques empechent
souvent la realisation pleine et entiere du droit ala sante, plus specialement dans les pays
en voie de developpement ayant des ressources plus limitees. Ce memoire de recherche
retrace d'abord les accords internationaux ayant etabli Ie droit a la sante en droit
international, les obligations et les violations qui en decoulent, la problematique quant a
la mise en reuvre des droits de l'homme sur Ie terrain, en comparaison avec la mise en
reuvre et les sanctions pour Ie non-respect de droits economiques dans Ie cadre
reglementaire de l'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce (OMC). Ensuite, une etude
comparative des cadres legislatifs de pays developpes et de pays en developpement
revelera dans queUe mesure Ie Canada, les Etats-Unis, l'Union Europeenne, Ie Bresil,
l'Inde, et l'Afrique du Sud se sont conformes aux exceptions aux regles de protection
issues du droit international des brevets pour cause de sante publique. L'auteur identifie
finalement les points de premiere importance qu'il considere primordial de considerer
afin d'evaluer si une approche conforme au droit a la sante a ete respectee dans Ie
commerce de medicaments essentiels, avant de souligner l'aspect temporaire des mesures
courantes prevues dans l'OMC et des futurs enjeux quant a l'accroissement de l'acces
aux medicaments essentiels.
Mots cles: accord de libre-echange, brevets, commerce international, droits humains,
droit international, licence obligatoire, medicaments generiques, OMC, propriete
inteUectueUe, VIH/SIDA.
IV
Resume et mots ele en anglais
The privileges arising from patent protection on pharmaceutical products often prevent the
full realization of the right to health, especially in developing countries with scarce
resources. This thesis first identifies the international agreements that have established the
right to health in international law, obligations and violations associated with it, the
problems encountered in the implementation of human rights on the field, compared with
the implementation and sanctions associated with economic rights from the World Trade
Organization regulatory framework. A comparative study of the legislative frameworks of
both developed and developing countries will reveal to what extent Canada, the United
States, the European Union, Brazil, India, and South Africa conformed with patent
protection exceptions arising from international patent law to protect public health.
Finally, the author identifies the crucial indicators that need to be considered in order to
assess the conformity of a given approach with the right to health, before he underscores
the temporary character of the relevant WTO measures, and the future stakes concerning an
increased access to essential medicines.
Key words: compulsory license, free-trade agreement, generic drug, mY/AIDS, human
rights, intellectual property, international law, international trade, patent, WTO.
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PART 1- INTRODUCTION
The human right to health, being fundamental for the exercise of other human rights, is
universally recognized in numerous international legal instruments, such as the
Universal Declaration on Human Right/, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Righti, many international conventions on specific rights3 and
several human rights instruments4. Moreover, the right to health has also been
proclaimed by the Commission on Human Rights ofthe United Nations in 19895 and in
the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action6, which is meant to foster the
implementation of diverse human rights around the world. A large range of
international texts recognizes the right to health, but very few of them are legally
binding. The 'right to health' is intimately related to numerous fields of other human
rights, and is usually described as «the right to the highest attainable standard of
health>/. In fact, according to this latter definition, equal access to health care, access
to safe drinking water, equal distribution of food, an adequate standard of living and an
adequate housing, a safe and healthy workplace and living environment, as well as the
right to education regarding sanitary measures may all be regrouped under its scope.
The dimension of the right to health that will be at stake in this memoire is the right to
access to medicines in developing countries.
In spite of this large international recognition of the right to health, many problems
have been raised regarding access to health care issues. On the one hand, in
developing countries, national governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and United Nations (UN) institutions claim that several drug companies, by abusing
their dominant position conferred by their intellectual property rights (IPRs), prevent
millions of ill people from getting treated as a result of high prices. On the other hand,
1 Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly 217 A (III), 10 December 1948, section 25(1)
(Hereafter quoted as "Declaration on human rights").
2 Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly 2200 A (XXI), 16 December 1966, section 12. It
entered into force on 3 January 1976, in accordance with article 27 (Hereafter quoted as "ICESCR").
3 International Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms ofRacial Discrimination, 1965, section 5, II
and 12; and the Convention on the Rights ofthe Child, 1989, section 24.
4 European Social Charter of1961, as revised, section II; the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights, 1981, section 16; and the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in
the Area ofEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1988, section 10.
5 Resolution 89/11 ofthe Commission on Human Rights ofthe United Nations, 1989.
6 A/CONF.l57/23, 12 July 1993.
7 ICESCR, OR. cit., note 2, section 12.
2the drug companies are within their economic rights considering international law
when they prevent generic companies anywhere in the world to produce, use, offer for
sale, sell or import generic drugs in a market where it is patented in accordance with
the TRIPS agreement The 20-year monopoly conferred when a patent application is
granted in a national jurisdiction is meant to cover research and development (R&D)
costs and to encourage private investment in innovation. The best example showing
the clash between the individual right to receive treatment and the global need to
maintain private investment in innovation are the difficulties incurred in containing the
AIDS pandemic in Africa (an example which will be referred to throughout the text).
Obviously, IPRs also increase the cost of medicines in developed countries. The effect
on the treatment of the population in these countries is less however, since they often
have a strong public health care system. Yet, there are growing concerns that the
patent system fails to achieve, even in developed countries, the two main goals that
justified initially its entry into force: provide an incentive for R&D in all sector of
technology and disseminate the resulting information in the public domain. Indeed,
recent concerns over the patentability of human genes are an example of potential
flaws in a strong patent system regarding R&D in the health systems of developed
countries9. However, the scope of this analysis will be limited to issues arising from
the application of international patent law in developing countries.
Are human rights and economic interests irreconcilable? The right to access to health
care for those suffering from mY/AIDS in Africa and other developing countries may,
at first glance, seem to enter into direct conflict with patent rights, which have been set
up to encourage investment in R&D to find better treatments for the global public
good. If so, does this mean that we should let millions of people in poor countries die
every year from lack of treatment and let life expectancy in some developing countries
plunge to around 30 years old by the end of the decade lO, in order that pharmaceutical
8 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property Rights, Marrakech Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed in Marrakech, Morocco on 15 April 1994, article 28
(hereafter quoted "TRIPS").
9 Michael A. HELLER and Rebecca S. EISENBERG, "Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research", (1998), Science, 280, 698-701.
10 KAISERNETWORK.ORG, "Life Expectancy in 51 Nations to Decline Due to AIDS, U.S. Census
Bureau Report States", (2002), Daily HlV/AIDS Report, July 8th , available at:
http://www.kaisernetworkorg/dailyreports/repindex.cfin?DR ID= 12166.
3manufacturers make billions of dollars of profits and find R&D in health care
appealing? Clearly, if one considers this question taking the interests of the majority
of the world's population and not only the richest segment of it, this makes no sense at
all. Thus, we strongly believe that both human and intellectual property rights are
essential features of the globalization process.
Traditionally, human rights law and trade law have been regrouped into different kind
of agreements, with very few links between each other)). Even trade and intellectual
property rights (IPRs) used to be governed by separate agreements prior to the advent
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), i.e. the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Thus,
by integrating trade and IPRs in the same legal framework, the WTO introduced a new
mechanism for regulating public health, i.e. the market forces 12.
This is in line with the central assumption of this analysis. In the current globalization
context where more and more variables are interdependent, it is shortsighted to
consider only one field at a time when it comes to policy and law making. Nowadays,
international legal frameworks should formulate the right balance between numerous
interests from different fields; in our case, trade law and human rights law. One of the
main goals of this analysis is to show that human right concepts have an increasing
influence in the formulation of international trade law; this through the example of the
interrelations between the right to access to health care and the international trade of
pharmaceutical products and restrictions to traditional patent rules. Although very few
other interests than economic ones have been taken into account in the early nineties
when globalization had its biggest impulse, we think that the tide might be turning
slowly. On the one hand, we believe that the inclusion of human right concepts in the
international trade framework will strongly contribute to the recognition and the
implementation of human rights since 'one of the distinguishing features of the WTO
is its dispute resolution mechanism, as established in the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) 13. Human/social right international tools do not provide any
sanctions or dispute resolution mechanism other than political sanctions through public
II Infra, Part II, chapter c).
12 Andrea M. CURTI, "The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: An Unlikely Weapon in the Fight
Against AIDS", (2001), American Journal ofLaw & Medicine, 27, 471.
13 Id., 473.
4opinion, which make them hard to monitor and to enforce. On the other hand, the
WTO will see its image, credibility and legitimacy greatly improved by advocating the
interests of the majority of human beings instead of favoring the interests of powerful
worldwide economic entities controlled by very few individuals.
Thus, although IPRs and especially patents are a crucial element in the right to access
to health care formula, this analysis is not intended to cover all aspects of patent law.
In fact, what will be further analyzed here regarding patent law will be the means of
exception in the implementation of patent rules to support a broader access to
treatment for HIV/AIDS and other diseases in developing countries. Currently,
compulsory licenses, coupled with parallel imports in some cases, seem to be the
favorite means of expanding access to treatment for HIVIAIDS in developing countries
at both national and international levels. However, further patent amendments have
been proposed in international or national bodies to expand access to essential drugs.
They will be exposed at the end of this analysis.
Compulsory licensing is key to the safeguard of public health interests. This important
tool, whereby a government temporarily overrides a patent in the public interest and
authorizes the production of cheap generic versions of patented products, is a feature of
most intellectual property systems l4 . It is an essential way of helping balance the
rights of inventors and the broader public interests. However, since a compulsory
license can be authorized only for the territory within the jurisdiction where it has been
issued, a country that would not have the required technical or financial resources to
build its own pharmaceutical manufacture would not find much help in compulsory
licensing provisions. This is where compulsory licensing shall be discussed along with
parallel imports.
Parallel importation refers to the importation of a patented product that has been placed
on markets both abroad and domestically but is sold more cheaply elsewhere. It can be
an important tool for developing countries to save money by importing patented drugs
14 Canada: Patent Act, R.S., c.P-4, sections 65 to 71, and 19 to 19.3; United States: Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act), Bayh-Dole Act - 35 USC
201, sect. 28 USC 1498; Brazil: Law 9279/86 on Intellectual Property Law, effective as of May 15th,
1997; India: Patent Act no. 39 of1970, section 84; South Africa: Medicines and Related Substances Act
No. 90 of1997, section 15C; and North America: North American Free Trade Agreement: section 31 b).
5approved for domestic sale from other countries where they may be sold at a lower
price. Generally, parallel importation is possible when patents have been 'exhausted',
meaning that once a patented product is placed on a market in the world, the patent
holders' control over what can be done with that product in the jurisdictions where it is
not patented has ended. Parallel importation may also be possible for some countries,
in exceptional circumstances provided by the WTO where the patent is not
'exhausted', as it will be examined further on.
Although compulsory licensing regimes may have r~semblances, the conditions on
which they may be granted, the scope of these conditions and the extent of their
interpretation by national courts will vary significantly from one jurisdiction to
another.
The way patentability criteria are applied in each jurisdiction is also an important
variable to the access to essential medicines issue. In order to be granted a patent, an
inventor must show that his or her invention is novel, involves an "inventive step" (or
non-obviousness), and that his of her invention is industrially applicable. Whether the
interpretation of these criteria is strict or flexible will be a crucial determinant of the
pool of knowledge that is taken out of the public domain, especially concerning
pharmaceuticals15 . The application of these criteria will determine the extent to which
free competition prevails. On the one hand, technologically developed countries
investing substantial amounts in R&D will often favor permissive patentability
standards, although these policies are increasingly controversial "given the importance
of incremental innovation in some sectors and the growing number of patents that
protect trivial developments,,16. On the other hand, countries that are less developed
technologically will prefer to set higher patentability standards in order to preserve and
enhance competition without violating minimum international standards. This
comparison expresses well the need for flexibility in the implementation of the TRIPS
Agreement:
15 Carlos M. CORREA, "Integrating Public Health Concerns into Patent Legislation in Developing
Countries", (2000), South Centre, Geneva, p.37.
16 Id., p.39.
6"The way in which such options are implemented should be consistent with the level of
development of each country and, in particular, with its research and manufacturing capabilities
in the pharmaceutical sector17".
The next chapter following this introduction will seek to demonstrate that the right to
health is a well-established principle of international law. It will demonstrate the
constant evolution of the right to health since the advent of the contemporary
international legal framework linked to the United Nations system from a simple
intention to a legal/policy principle that has become increasingly present in the
formulation of international agreements on all topics, in our case free-trade
agreements.
Then, we will next examine two different national legislations, as well as the European
Union's legislation, to find out to what extent sovereign governments of developed
countries recognize the existence of the right to health and what measures they have
taken to ensure its implementation within their jurisdiction. The legislation of these
countries or entities have been chosen because of their involvement in new legal
developments regarding the right to access to health care and the international trade of
pharmaceuticals. Canada and the European Union were among the first to formulate
legal regimes allowing the issuance of a compulsory license for the export of generic
pharmaceuticals to developing countries at cheaper prices, following the WTO
Decision WTIV540 on the implementation ofparagraph 6 ofthe Doha Declaration on
TRIPS Agreement and public healthJ8 (along with Norway)19. The United States, the
country with the most influence on the international scene, happens also to have the
most developed and powerful brand-name pharmaceutical industry around the world.
Therefore, the analysis of its legislation seems rather relevant, although it does not
seem to favor a broad access to essential medicines for the majority of the population
not only around the globe, but also within its own borders.
17 Id., 9.
18 WTO GENERAL COUNCIL, WT/L/540, I September 2003 (Hereafter quoted as "August 30th
Decision").
19 Richard ELIOTT, "Generics for the developing world: a comparison of three approaches to
implementing the WTO Decision", World Pharmaceutical News, 24 November 2004, accessible at:
www.scrippharma.com.
7Then follows an examination of the laws of three developing countries that were
determined to take appropriate measures to favor access to essential medicines to their
large poor population basin. Brazil and South Africa, when they attempted to adopt
measures of health safeguards which they claim to be consistent with the TRIPS
Agreemenro to increase the access to treatment for HIV/AIDS, were sued by many
brand-name pharmaceutical companies as well as the government of the United States
in front of the WTO, stating that they were in breach of their obligations related to
patent protection arising also from the TRIPS Agreement. And India, which was until
recently a major provider of cheap generic pharmaceuticals to the developing world as
a result of its policies of non-patentability of pharmaceutical products, had to update its
patent system to WTO standards, since it had to comply with the TRIPS Agreement
from the year 200521 .
This comparative study will allow us to distinguish trends in these six jurisdictions
enumerated above, and help us to circumscribe the implementation of the right to
health at the national level. Such a comparison will help us to overview how countries
have reacted to recent WTO developments regarding the access to essential medicines.
"Countries will be most successful in meeting their own needs if they are able to draw on the
varied experience of national systems worldwide, which means that a good knowledge of
comparative law is valuable',22.
The strengths and weaknesses of these different approaches will be underscored in
order to propose blueprints for the formulation of a legal framework taking its roots in
both human rights and trade law traditions. Before concluding, we will stress the
importance of striking the right balance between trade rights and human rights in
international relations, considering the growing interdependence between most
different sociologic, cultural, intellectual and political backgrounds in the globalization
process.
20 TRIPS, article 3 I b).
21 Donald G. MCNEIL Jr., "Selling Cheap Generic Drugs, India's Copycats Irk Industry", (2000), New
York Times, December 1st•
22 Carlos M. CORREA, loc. cit., note IS, p.5.
8PART 11- THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AS A PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Chapter a) First benchmarks ofthe right to health
Although largely recognized, one should be aware that for millions of people
throughout the world, the full enjoyment of the right to health is an objective that is far
from being achieved. For most populations, this goal is becoming increasingly remote.
Many of the obstacles standing in the way of the achievement of this objective are in
fact beyond the reach of many national governments. The right to health has evolved
through several international tools. It was first recognized in 1946, in the World
Health Organization's Constitution:
«The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of
every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social
conditions»23.
And then in 1948, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which also states
that:
Article 25.
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health of himself and of his
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services.
However, the right to health took a more definite and tangible form, one that was more
likely to lead to international obligations for UN Member States regarding their own
population in 1976, with the entry into force of the article 12 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which was formulated as follows:
23 Preamble to the Constitution o/the World Health Organization as adopted by the International Health
Conference, New York, 19-22 June, 1946; signed on 22 July 1946 by the representatives of 61 States
(Official Records of the World Health Organization, no. 2, p. 100) and entered into force on 7 April
1948.
9Article 12.
I. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full
realization of this right shall include those necessary for:
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the
healthy development of the child;
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene;
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other
diseases;
(d) The creation of conditions that would assure to all medical service and medical attention in
the event of sickness.
It must be underlined that the right to health does not mean that there is a right to be
healthy. The right to health should be read as containing both rights and entitlements.
One should have the right to control one's health and body, to be free from
interference, such as the right to be free from torture and from non-consensual medical
treatment and research24. In contrast, entitlements include the right to a health care
system that provides equality of opportunities for people to enjoy the highest attainable
standard of health25 .
This "highest attainable standard of health" will be expressed through an individual's
biological and socio-economic characteristics as well as the available resources of a
country. A country cannot ensure that its population. is healthy as many factors weigh
in the balance, such as lifestyle, the environment and genetics. Thus the right to health
must be understood as a right to the enjoyment of a variety of facilities, goods, services
and conditions necessary for the realization of the highest attainable standard of
health.26
24 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NAnONS, The right to the highest
attainable standard ofhealth, substantive issues arising from the implementation of the international
covenant on economic, social and cultural rights, E/C 12/2000/4, II August 2000, paragraph 8.
25 Id., paragraph 8.
26 Id., paragraph 9.
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It is important to mention that the right to health not only creates obligations on a state
towards its population but also towards other states. It can be inferred from the article
12 of the Covenant that all States must take steps, whether individually or through
international cooperation, towards the full realization of the right to health. This level
of accountability will be particularly relevant in this report in further sections. The
State parties to the Covenant should refer to the Alma-Ata Declaration which states
that the enormous gap between the health status of different people and within
countries is politically, socially and economically unacceptable and of common
concern to all countries27. The State parties to that conference held in Alma-Ata,
U.S.S.R. in 1978, meant to express the need for urgent action by states, health workers
and the international community to protect and promote the health of all people of the
world. It had asserted the necessity for the State to provide accessible, affordable, and
comprehensive health care services to all their citizens.
In order for the State parties to comply with their obligations arising from article 12,
they have to respect the enjoyment of the right to health in other countries. They can
also prevent third parties from violating this right if they can influence them by way of
legal or political means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
applicable international law28 . State parties should also ensure that the right to health
receives due consideration in the formulation and the· implementation of other
international agreements in other fields, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Treaty, the TRIPS agreemenf9, and especially in bilateral or regional trade agreements.
There may be violations of the right to health through direct actions or through
omissions. Direct actions may emanate from the State itself or through entities not
properly regulated by it. The adoption of retrogressive measures incompatible with the
core obligations under the right to health constitutes a violation of the right to health.
Violations through acts of commission include the formal repeal or suspension of
legislation necessary for the continued enjoyment of the right to health or the adoption
27 Alma-Ata Declaration, Report of the International Conference on Primary Health Care, Alma-Ata, 6-
12 September 1978, artivle II.
28 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, op cit., note 24, paragraph
39.
29 Infra, Part III.
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of legislation or policies that are manifestly incompatible with pre-existing domestic or
international legal obligations in relation to the right to health30. The other types of
violations occur through the omission or the failure to adopt measures compatible with
the legal obligations of the State to provide for the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health. The failure to have a national policy on
occupational safety and health as well as occupational health services, and the failure
to enforce relevant laws also fall in this category3l.
A State will have three different types of legal obligations emanating from the right to
health: the obligation to respect, the obligation to protect, and the obligation to fulfill.
Under the obligation to respect, the State must adopt laws and policies compatible with
the article 12 of the Covenant. These should decrease unnecessary morbidity and
preventable mortality. According tothis obligation, when a State enters a bilateral or a
multilateral agreement with another State, international organization or another entity
such as a multinational corporation, it will have to respect the different components of
the right to health32.
The obligation to protect implies that a State shall take all necessary measures to
safeguard persons within their jurisdiction from infringements of the right to health by
third parties. The protection of the population shall be carried on by the adoption of
adequate rules regarding the health of the population within the State's jurisdiction,
including those that apply to drug manufacturers33 .
The obligation to fulfill signifies that the State parties shall ensure that the necessary
steps are taken towards the realization of the right to health. This foresees the field of
practice, such as the equitable distribution of medicines or facilities among the
population, the adoption .of health policies and the effective monitoring of the
realization of the right to health at the national level. Examples of failures to the
obligation to fulfill
30 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 0p. cit., note 24, paragraph
48.
31 Id., paragraph 49.
32 Id., paragraph 50.
33 Id., paragraph 51.
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"include the failure to adopt or implement a national health policy designed to ensure the right
to health for everyone; insufficient expenditure or misallocation of public resources which
results in the non-enjoyment of the right to health by individuals or groups, particularly the
vulnerable or marginalized; the failure to monitor the realization of the right to health at the
national level, for example by identifying right to health indicators and benchmarks; the failure
to take measures to reduce the inequitable distribution of health facilities, goods and services;
the failure to adopt a gender-sensitive approach to health; and the failure to reduce infant and
maternal mortality rates,,34.
Chapter b) Issues involving the right to health and its enforceability in developing
countries
At the international level, even though States have agreed to be bound by the
international texts mentioned, sanctions for non-compliance are hard to impose. This
is because there are no established central legislatures comparable to those existing in
national systems, no compulsory or even widely used judicial system, and no effective
machinery to enforce international law eithe?5. Neither of these texts provides a
procedure to follow in case of non-compliance. However, this does not mean that the
state parties are not liable to their commitment to human rights legal texts. The
absence of a control mechanism do not affect the liability of the state-parties, it only
affects the efficiency of their implementation on the field. Most importantly, it is not
because these instruments are harder to enforce that they are irrelevant in international
law, and this for different reasons.
In order to assess the enforceability of an international rule, it must be given a status to
find out to what extent the parties to an international agreement are legally or
politically bound. This status will often depend of the formulation of the rule and the
extent of its recognition. As mentioned above, the right to health was included half a
century ago in the WHO Constitution and in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and then in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights in the late sixties. According to Alexandre Kiss, the constant reaffirmation of
an international legal principle tends to confirm it as an international legal rule that is
34 Id., paragraph 52.
3S David FREESTONE, "The road from Rio: International environmental law after the earth summit",
(I 994) 6 Journal a/Environmental Law, No.2, p.I95.
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more and more generally accepted as customary law36. And even if a legal principle is
too novel to qualifY as a customary law rule, its recognition in one or several major
international instruments will contribute to give it the status of an emerging
international rule. The right to health has been reaffirmed or at least has had influence
in all kinds of contemporary texts, which will be enumerated below. This ongoing
international recognition since the creation of the UN system works significantly
towards the improvement of its credibility. However, since the right to health has been
reaffirmed in important human rights conventions, thus constituting a well established
conventional right, the recognition of the right to health as a customary law rule will
not be at stake in this analysis.
The objective of reaching better access to health care for all, although not mentioned in
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development37, was however part of the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) negotiations.
Agenda 21, the plan of implementation of the principles and guidelines agreed by the
State parties in Rio, in 1992, stresses the importance of access to health care in
reaching sound and sustainable development. Its chapter 6 is wholly devoted to the
protection and promotion of human health. Particular attention should be given,
among other things, to the provision of immunization and essential drugs to a1l38 ,
including rural populations. An objective specifically concerning access to health care
and AIDS in this chapter of Agenda 21 is to mobilize and unifY national and
international efforts against AIDS to prevent infection and to reduce the personal and
social impact of mv infection39.
UNCED took place on the 20th anniversary of the 1972 United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment. That meeting in Stockholm, Sweden, was the first
contemporary, global diplomatic gathering to address human activities in relation to
the environment. Then, it will be eventually followed 10 years later by the World
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), held in Johannesburg, South Africa, in
August and September 2002. UNCED and WSSD were separated by a number of
36 Alexandre KISS, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, International Environmental
Law and Policy Series, London, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994, p.56.
37 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio de Janeiro, June 1992.
38 Agenda 21, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio de Janeiro,
June 1992, paragraph 6.3.
39 Id., paragraph 6.12 j).
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conferences to ensure the follow-up of the commitments taken in Rio, including the
International Conference on Financing for Development, which will be discussed
further on in this chapter.
The negotiations that led to the establishment of WTO and TRIPS Agreements in 1994
brought provisions that are reconcilable with these ideals. Under TRIPS, it is allowed
to use a patented subject matter without the authorization of the right holder when the
law of that country allows it. In this case, article 31 provides some conditions that
must be respected by national lawmakers:
Article 31. Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder
(b) Such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made efforts to
obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and
that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time. This requirement
may be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use. In situations of national emergency
or other circumstances of extreme urgency, the right holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as
soon as reasonably practicable. In the case of public non-commercial use, where the
government or contractor, without making a patent search, knows or has demonstrable grounds
to know that a valid patent is or will be used by or for the government, the right holder shall be
informed promptllo.
This provision, depending on how it is interpreted and who interprets it, may be key to
universal access to essential medicines. The acknowledgement that intellectual
property may negatively affect public health in the TRIPS Agreement is crucial since it
provides official sanctions, as opposed to human/social right agreements that usually
do not provide sanctions in case of infringement. This issue will be examined in
further detail in the next chapter. Moreover, the TRIPS Agreement also provides more
general provisions that will guide its interpretation; specifically article 7, which
contains some general objectives, and article 8, which contains general principles for
the implementation of the agreement. Both of these provisions also implicitly support
the recognition of the right to access to essential medicines:
40 TRIPS, article 31 (b).
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Article 7. Objectives
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to
the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
Article 8. Principles
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures
necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of
vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that such
measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders
or the resort to practices that unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international
transfer of technology.
Following the Uruguay Round negotiations, developing countries did not immediately
take advantage of the flexibilities provided by the TRIPS Agreement, often because of
the pressure exercised by developed countries with a strong brand-name
pharmaceutical industry through legal proceedings, alleging that such measures were
in breach of their intellectual property rights41 . UN member States then reaffirmed the
objectives and principles included in the TRIPS Agreement, by supporting many
initiatives that aimed to provide a response to the global HIV/AIDS crisis. In June
2001, UN member States unanimously adopted a Declaration of Commitment on
HIVIAIDS, which stated:
"By 2003 ... in an urgent manner make every effort to provide progressively and in a
sustainable manner, the highest attainable standard of treatment for HIV/AIDS, including the
prevention and treatment of opportunistic infections and effective use of quality-controlled
anti-retroviral therapy in a careful and monitored manner to improve adherence and
effectiveness and reduce the risk of developing resistance ... ,,42
41 Infra, Part V, chapters a) and c).
42 Declaration o/Commitment on HIVIAIDS, United nations General Assembly, UN General
Assembly's special session on HIV/AIDS, June 2001, article 55.
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There also have been many several unanimous resolutions from the UN Commission
on Human Rights, in which the Commission recognized that, in the context of
pandemics such as HIV/AIDS,
"access to medication... is one fundamental element for achieving progressively the full
realization of the right to everyone to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health,,43.
The Doha Ministerial Declaration44, issued from the WTO negotiations held in Doha
in November 2001, reinforces this commitment of the international community
towards an increased access to essential drugs:
17. We stress the importance we attach to implementation and interpretation of the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) in a manner
supportive of public health, by promoting both access to existing medicines and research and
development into new medicines and, in this connection, are adopting a separate declaration.
This separate Declaration adopted by the WTO Members is the Declaration on the
TRIPS agreement and public health45• It recognizes that the TRIPS Agreement should
not prevent States from taking measures to protect public health, and that the members
should fully use the tools contained in the TRIPS agreement as they provide enough
flexibility to cope with emergency situations. More specifically, this Declaration states
that «each member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to
determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted»46. It also maintains that
«...each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health crises, including those
relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency»47.
Such guidance in the interpretation of article 31 b) of the TRIPS Agreement clearly
establishes that universal access to essential drugs has prevalence over intellectual
43 CANADIAN HlV/AIDS LEGAL NETWORK, Global Access to Medicines: Will Canada Meet the
Challenge?, February 26th, 2004, p.lO, available at: http://www.aidslaw.ca.
44 WT/MIN (Ol)/DEC/I, Doha, 14 November 2001.
45 WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, Doha, 14 November 2001 (Hereafter quoted "Doha Declaration").
46 Id., article 5 b).
47 Id., article 5 c).
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property rights in the WTO. However, these provisions are not going to be of any help
if the country subjected to the emergency situation does not have the proper
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector.
The Council of TRIPS was mandated to find further solutions to that matter and report
it to the WTO General Council before the end of 200248 . The WTO General Council
released an official decision on 30 August 2003 about compulsory licenses for the
export of patented drugs to an eligible importing Member, as we will see below.
Developed countries are also encouraged to provide incentives to their pharmaceutical
industry to promote technology transfers to least-developed country members49,
pursuant to article 66(2) of the TRIPS Agreement:
«Developed country Members shaH provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their
territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed
country Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base».
During the negotiations of the International Conference on Financing for
Development, the State members also acknowledge some issues are of particular
concern to developing countries and countries with economies in transition, including
the implementation and the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement in a manner
supportive of public health50 .
The Decision of the WTO General Council on the Implementation ofparagraph 6 of
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health51 was adopted to
allow especially the least developed countries but also the developing countries facing
a national or an extreme emergency situation, to import generic drugs when they do
not have the manufacturing capacities to produce these drugs, or when these current
capacities are insufficient to meet their needs52 . The countries with proper
manufacturing capacities can be granted a compulsory license for the provision of
48 Id., article 6.
49 Id., article 7.
50 International Conference on Financingfor Development, Secretariat of the United Nations,
Monterrey, March 2002, article 28.
51 WTO Decision WTIU540 on the implementation ofparagraph 6 ofthe Doha Declaration on TRIPS
Agreement andpublic health,~ note 18.
52 Id., annex, Assessment of Manufacturing Capacities in the Pharmaceutical Sector.
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generic drugs to an eligible Member, but only for non-commercial purposes and to the
extent needed for public health purposes.
The month of September 2002 saw many new initiatives intended to improve the full
realization of the right to health. The plan of action of the World Summit on
Sustainable Development devoted its whole Chapter VI on health and sustainable
development issues. It supports the strengthening of health care systems to deliver
basic health services to all in an efficient, accessible, and affordable manner aimed at
preventing diseases and other health threats, in conformity with human rights and
fundamental freedoms53 . Paragraph 54 (b), stresses that an equitable and improved
access to affordable and efficient health care services be promoted, as well as safe
drugs at affordable prices, immunization services and safe vaccines and medical
technology. Paragraph 100 reaffirms the importance of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS agreement and public health and its provisions mentioned above, and of the
right to promote access to medicines for all.
Moreover, the guideline 6 of the H!VIAIDS and Human Rights: International
Guidelines, was amended to take account of these developments. Following the recent
developments in international law regarding better access to health care for the
population, it provides that:
"States should enact legislation to provide for the regulation of the HIV-related goods, services
and information, so as to ensure widespread availability of quality prevention measures and
services, adequate HIV-prevention and care-information, and safe and effective medication at
an affordable price.
States should also take measures necessary to ensure for all persons, on a sustainable and equal
basis, the availability and accessibility of quality goods, services and in formations for
HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, care and support, including antiretroviral and other safe and
effective medicines, diagnostics and related technologies for preventive, curative and palliative
care of HIV/AIDS and related opportunistic infections and conditions.
53 Report ofthe World Summit for Sustainable Development, United Nations Secretariat,
NCONF.199/20, Johannesburg, August-September 2002, paragraph 54.
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States should take such measures at both the domestic and international levels, with particular
attention to vulnerable individuals and populations54".
Finally, the first Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the right
the health, Professor Paul Hunt, was nominated also in September 200255 . In an
addendum to a report on his mission to the World Trade Organization, he affirms that:
"Intellectual property protection can affect the enjoyment of the right to health, and related
human rights, in a number of ways custom,,56.
He further establishes a link between the right to health and the right to essential
medicines by stating that:
"Given that the right to health includes an obligations on States to provide affordable medicines
according to the WHO essential drugs list, intellectual property protection can lead to negative
effects on the enjoyment of the right to health57".
And then, he extends this State obligation to other states when he reaffirms that:
" ...protracted negotiations that led to [the Decision on Implementation of paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health] should have been informed by
the human rights responsibility of rich States to engage in international assistance and
cooperation in relation to the right to health. The Special Rapporteur underlines the
effectiveness of the Decision will depend on the extent to which it actually does lead to
increased access to medicines for the poor,,58.
Considering its increased recent recognition in all kinds of international forums, it
seems that the right to health reached the threshold of a well-established international
legal rule. From now on, it is more accurate to use 'the right to access to essential
drugs', instead of 'the right to health', the first being an aspect of the other more likely
to qualify as a formal legal obligation.
54 UNAIDS and UNOHCR, HIVIAIDS and Human Rights: International Guidelines - Revisedguideline
6: Access to prevention, treatment, care and support, New York and Geneva, September 2002.
55 OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONNER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Special Procedures ofthe
Commission on Human Rights - Thematic Mandates, CHR res. 2002/31.
56 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NAnONS, Addendum to the Report of
the Special Rapporteur, Paul Hunt - Mission to the World Trade Organization, Commission on Human
Rights, Sixtieth session, item IO of the provisional agenda, E/CNA/2003/58, I3 February 2003, parA2.
57 Id., par. 43.
58 Id., par. 43.
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Chapter c) Integrating human right concepts in the WTO
As discussed earlier, when the right to health was first mentioned in the instruments of
international law, it was closer to a policy than a legal principle. Such statements as
"enjoying the highest attainable standard of health is a fundamental right of every
human being"S9, or that "everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health of himself and of his family,,60, can hardly create legal obligations enforceable
in court. However, such recognition had opened up a large debate on who should
benefit from the right to health? What is its content? And who should ensure its
implementation? These questions had to be raised when the right to health became a
fundamental right for every human being. The right to health provided benchmarks for
member States to adopt national policies and legislations concerning health care
among other things61 , and debates and discussions did eventually lead to further
international legal principles.
We wish to distinguish two general categories of contemporary international legal
agreements. In the first category, Agenda 21, the WSSD Plan of Action, the
Declaration of Commitment on HIVIAIDS and the International Guidelines for
HIVIAIDS mentioned previously reinforce the establishment of the right to access to
health care, as these give a further indication of its contents by providing actions that
need to be undertaken, by both developed and developing countries. They do not
provide traditional legal obligations though, and that for two reasons. First, they are
meant to be plans of action, formulated to respect the sustainable development
objectives established in various international declarations under the United Nations
umbrella, and not traditional -legal texts per se. Secondly, it seems that many member
States did not wish to be bound legally by such texts in case of non-compliance,
because of a lack of resources. This is why such plans of action do not provide any
sanctions or legal authority to ensure compliance. Usually, it is international legal
instruments on environmental and social rights that do not provide provisions for
sanctions in case of non-compliance, opposed to international agreements of an
59 ICESCR, op. cit, note 2, section 12.
60 Declaration on Human rights, op. cit., note I, article 25.
61 See South Africa, Part V, chapter c), which included a right to health in its Constitution very similar to
the one described in the ICESCR.
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economic nature, such as WTO agreements for example. However, a breach in the
obligations arising from UN conventions and resolutions can involve economic
sanctions by the General Assembly or military actions by the Security Council62 .
The second general category includes the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Ministerial
Declaration, the Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health, and the
Decision of the WTO General Council on the implementation ofparagraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health. If these are fully used,
they will be key to the enforceability of the right to access to essential medicines at the
international level, because the WTO provides a Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU) along with applicable sanctions. Detailed measures arising from the right to
health are strongly supporting an increased access to health care for the population;
these are now included in the WTO legal agreements, and this even though these
measures go against the economic interests of the pharmaceutical transnational
corporations. For those who believe that international trade is a means to achieve
something rather than an end itself, and that globalization be grounded on human
rights, as well as social and cultural values, this is an important achievement.
Developing countries that declare themselves under a national or extreme emergency
situation will be able to either produce generic drugs while paying reasonable royalties
to the right holder, or import them from another jurisdiction if they lack the sufficient
manufacturing capacity to produce enough of these drugs to deal with their emergency
situation. If the right holder alleges infringement of intellectual property rights, the
developing countries will have solid legal grounds to defend themselves from
infringement procedures. Similarly, the developed countries will have more latitude to
authorize the issuance of a compulsory license if the right holder of a research tool
does not agree to grant a license for the use of this tool upon reasonable terms.
However, it should be mentioned that only national governments are allowed to use the
legal provisions of the WTO agreements, contrary to individuals and corporations.
It is interesting to note that the legal provisions supporting the right to access to
essential medicines, one of the fundamental components of the human right to health63 ,
62 Stephen P. MARKS, "Economic Sanctions as Human Rights Violations: Reconciling Political and
Public Health Imperatives", in Sofia GRUSHIN, Michael A. GRODIN, Georges J. ANNAS, and
Stephen P. MARKS, Perspectives on Health and Human Rights, Taylor and Francis Group, New York,
2005, p.367.
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have been included in a trade agreement which was first intended to cover economic
interests. The mention of the right to access to essential medicines in the international
trade framework happened not even 10 years after intellectual property rights
themselves were included in the WTO.
"Before the WTO, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) governed IP rights.
The 1947 GATT mentioned intellectual property rights only in passing. However, as the WTO
Agreement was being negotiated, the U.S. and other developed nations insisted that the new
trade institution link IP rights to the terms of trade for goods and services. As a result, the
WTO Final Act included the new TRIPS Agreement as part of a newly conceptualized trade
regime64".
Thus, instead of establishing a central authority involving sanctions for the non-
compliance of human/social rights, not an easy task to carry out, social considerations
were included into the international trade framework. Therefore, as mentioned under
the article 23 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), countries will need to
submit trade disputes to the DSU before imposing sanctions65 . Since the DSU
provides a comprehensive mechanism for resolving complex trade disputes, it will take
specific notice of the particular trading context of the least-developed countries66 . This
seems more realistic than eventually creating parallel international panels on human
and environmental rights, as the UN Members can agree step by step to which social
consideration should be included in international trade agreements, as these social
rights will become at the same time legally-binding for all parties. It also avoids the
multiplication of international courts.
In fact, it seems that the human right to health has become a subject that raises much
debate at the international level, as shown at the Doha ministerial conference of the
WTO in 2001. Although the problem of access to drugs regarding HIVIAIDS needs to
be urgently resolved considering the amplitude of the disease, it is a general concern in
almost all of the developing countries. According to Mr. Philippe Cullet, there are two
63 Philippe CULLET, "Patents and Medicines: The Relationship between TRIPS and the Human Right
to Health", in Sofia GRUSHIN, Michael A. GRODIN, Georges J. ANNAS, and Stephen P. MARKS,
Perspectives on Health and Human Rights, Taylor and Francis Group, New York, 2005, p.182.
64A.M. CURTI, loco cit., note 12, pp. 469-485.
65 Id., p.475.
66 Id., p.475.
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main areas of law that are specifically relevant to the debate on access to drugs; human
rights law and the patentability of medicines:
"Intellectual property law and human rights law have largely evolved independently. However,
with the broadening scope of patents in areas related to basic needs such as health, and recent
development in the health sector itself, the links between the two fields are becoming
increasingly obvious and direct, necessitating further consideration of the relationship between
the right to health and patents on medicines, in particular in the case of developing countries.
While human rights documents have given some consideration to the position of intellectual
property in relation to human rights, there has been no similar efforts in the field of intellectual
property67".
Since the main goals of patent law are to encourage innovation and to spread new
technologies, it has not traditionally been linked with socioeconomic concerns.
However, with the improvement of new technologies, the scope of patentability of new
inventions was extended to sectors directly linked to the fulfillment of basic needs,
such as health68 . Therefore, we submit that the scope of application of human rights,
and especially the right to access to health care, should also be extended to other
sectors such as trade in case of essential medicines, as it was the case for intellectual
property with the fulfillment of essential needs.
The right to access to health care is increasingly recognized around the world, as seen
in the numerous documents reaffirming it, and is considered as a crucial issue for
sustainable development. Moreover, one author affirmed that "public health advocates
welcomed the Doha declaration as an important achievement because it gave primacy
to public health over intellectual property, and clarified WTO Members' rights to use
TRIPS safeguards,,69. However, access to health care in developing countries and
access to knowledge that could arguably be within the public domain are two
objectives that are far from achievement. The next section will further analyze the
international law provisions on the protection intellectual property and its effect on the
realization of the right to access to essential medicines.
67 P. CULLET, loc. cit., note 63, pp.179-180.
68 Id., p.186.
69 Ellen 't HOEN, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way
From Seattle to Doha", in Sofia GRUSHIN, Michael A. GRODIN, Georges J. ANNAS, and Stephen P.
MARKS, Perspectives on Health and Human Rights, Taylor and Francis Group, New York, 2005,
p.203.
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PART 111- WHERE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NEGATIVELY AFFECTS
THE ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The global community is at crossroads in expanding access to HIV treatment and care.
In fact, the conditions for spreading treatment have hardly been as good as now:
unprecedented political will in many countries; unprecedented resources to fund
treatment, care and support; and unprecedented affordability of medicines and
diagnostics.
Important commitments have been taken by the international community, especially
developed countries, towards combating the spreading of the HIV/AIDS pandemic,
certainly in international texts of a social nature, but also in free trade agreements: the
best example being the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health 70 and its further amendments71 • Three recently created multi-billion-dollar
programs to supply life saving antiretroviral drugs to poor countries are also expected
to get going very soon: the multilateral global fund; President Georges W. Bush
PREPFAR (President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) for 15 selected countries;
and the World Health Organization "3 by 5 Initiative" (3 million people on
antiretroviral therapy by 2005)72. And moreover, due to the generic production of
antiretroviral and the increase of their overall production, the cost of treatment per
patient per year decreased from about 10 000 US$ to about 265 US$, if the medicines
are bought from generic producers such as India's Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd73 • Still,
more people than ever are dying of AIDS. In 2003, three million people died and five
million became infected74. There are a number of reasons for this, and this chapter will
focus on how some national governments from developed countries have acted to
comply with international law provisions supporting wider access to treatment for
mY/AIDS victims. Some of the provisions seen in the previous section will be
70 Doha Declaration, op. cit., note 45.
71 August 30th Decision, op. cit., note 18.
n Anne V. REELER and Joseph SABA, "Needless Battle of Brands vs. Generics", International Herald
Tribune, July 9th, 2004.
73 Mark SCHOOFS, "At Zimbabwe Clinic, Wait Is Long And Us. Drug Cupboard Is Bare", Wall
Street Journal, I July 2004, p.A8.
74 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZAnON, "Unprecedented opportunity to fight HIV/AIDS and change
the course of history", WHO Press release, May 11 th, 2004, accessible at: www.who.org.
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analyzed in relation with patent protection provisions and from a more balanced
perspective taking account of economic interests protected by intellectual property.
States Members who ratified the Agreement Establishing the WTO in Marrakech in
1994, must reform their legislation to comply with their new legal obligations.
Regarding the patentability of the subject matters, member States must adopt national
legislation in line with the article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement:
Article 27
Patentable Subject Matter
1. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve
an inventive step and are capable of industrial application. Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65,
paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be available and patent
rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and
whether products are imported or locally produced.
2. Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of
the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including
to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment,
provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their
law.
3. Members may also exclude from patentability:
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals;
(b) plants and animals other than microorganisms, and essentially biological processes for the
production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes.
However, Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an
effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof. The provisions of this subparagraph
shall be reviewed four years after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.
The rights conferred by patents are stated in the article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement:
1. A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights:
(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having the
owner's consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for
these purposes that product;
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(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not having the
owner's consent from the act of using the process, and from the acts of: using, offering for sale,
selling, or importing for these purposes at least the product obtained directly by that process.
2. Patent owners shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and to
conclude licensing contracts.
The patent system is a distortion of the free market rules established to encourage
innovation. It makes R&D investments more appealing by conferring a 20-year
monopoly75 as a reward for creating a subject matter that is new, involves an inventive
step and is capable of industrial application.
"Patents constitute a derogation from the principle of free trade by offering exclusive rights to
an inventor to exploit the invention and stop others from using it without his consent. The
rationale for granting patents is the need to reward an inventor76".
This system has been in general very efficient to stimulate R&D, as the expectation of
profits for a marketable invention is high. However, there are limits to patentability.
WTO Member States are allowed to exclude from patentability inventions that would
go against morality or the ordre public in a particular jurisdiction77. Moreover, there
are some patentable subject matters that can hardly be associated with common
commodities, as it is the case for essential drugs and other health care devices. The
international community realized this and formulated exceptions to monopolies in case
of national or extreme emergencies, including taking measures to protect public health,
in case of a potential abuse of a dominant position by a right holder78, as mentioned in
the previous chapter on the right to health79.
According to these provisions, a country that qualifies under a national emergency or
an extreme urgency situation (which explicitly include public health crisis, such as
mY/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other epidemics8o) will be able to allow the
75 TRIPS, op. cit., note 8, article 30.
76 P. CULLET, loc. cit., note 63, p.180.
77 TRIPS, op. cit., note 8, article 27 (2).
78 Id., article 31 (b).
79 Supra, Part II.
80 Alma-Ata Declaration, article 5 c).
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production of generic drugs in its jurisdiction81 . These measures will help the
developing countries with the required pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities to
produce pharmaceutical products, but the problem remained for the countries without
such infrastructures, until the General Council of the TRIPS Agreement will issue a
decision to solve this problem. Now, a state Member will be allowed to export generic
drugs to an eligible importing member under specific conditions, which will be
analysed further on. The eligible importing member must be a state that does not have
sufficient or no capacity at all in the pharmaceutical sector to cope with an epidemic
within its borders82 .
However, the application of these international provisions, even if agreed in theory by
all state Members of WTO, is often delayed due to complex, wide-ranging trade talks
between nations. Despite the gravity of the HIV/AIDS situation, the affected countries
continue to face considerable pressure not to use the flexibilities provided by the
TRIPS Agreement that allow WTO members to set their own balance between
protecting private patent rights and pursuing important public policy objectives such as
protecting public health. Even very powerful or rich countries, such as the United
States and Canada, face considerable pressure from the brand-name industry when they
are considering limiting patent rights for the health of their own people. This was the
case when large quantities of Cipro, a powerful antibiotic against anthrax, needed to be
bought resulting from serious threats of large-scale bioterrorism in United States and
Canada83 .
Moreover, bilateral or regional free-trade agreements can also be used to significantly
tighten patent rules, although this is not exactly in line with the interpretation of TRIPS
made in Doha. Countries with a strong brand-name pharmaceutical industry defend
their national companies from foreign copycats; and according to public-interest
groups, when it comes to essential drugs, these efforts are keeping the prices too high
for poor countries84 . These countries, especially the United States, will not indefinitely
81 Id., article 4; ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NAnONS, op. cit., note 24,
article 17; and TRIPS, section 31 b).
82 August 30th Decision, article 2 a).
83 Infra, Part IV, chapter b).
84 Marilyn CHASE and Sarah LUECK, "In New Trade Pacts, U.S. Seeks To Limit Reach of Generic
Drugs", Wall Street Journal, July 6th, 2004, p. AI.
28
seek to deny the availability of generic drugs. But they do seek to delay their
introduction. These delays are often imposed by bilateral trade agreements containing
provisions restricting trading partners from approving for five years a generic drug
application if it relies on test data compiled by the original drug manufacturer85. This
seems to be intended to protect brand-name products from the new WTO health
safeguards enumerated above, and also to seek protection in developing countries who
were given until 2016 to implement a patent system which would efficiently protect
intellectual property rights, as laid down in the TRIPS Agreemenf6.
So far, the United States have reached agreements including 'TRIPS-plus' protections
with Jordan, Chile, Singapore, Australia, Bahrain, Morocco, as well as the six Central
American countries part of the Central American Free Trade Agreement: Costa Rica,
EI Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. Other
'TRIPS-plus' provisions may be included in current FTA negotiations with Oman and
Panama, as well as the five countries part of the South African Customs Union: South
Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, and the four Andean countries:
Peru, Bolivia, Columbia and Ecuador87. Intentionally or not, such agreements are, in
some cases, either pushing up prices or preventing them from faIling88. In Jordan for
example, AIDS drugs purchased with the Global Fund for Aids monies cost an average
of 7 000$ per patient per year, compared to an average of 250$ to 400$ in other
countries supported with Global Fund grants89. In return, Jordan is now cited as a solid
example of free trade benefits, as its exports went up 30%, it had thirty new drug
introductions in the market, and its trade relationship increased significantly90.
But many countries may be caught between opposing needs. On the one hand one
needs to respect U.S. patent law or risk jeopardizing the U.S. market for its main
products. On the other hand, if it is hard-hit by HIV/AIDS, it needs to produce or
import generic drugs for patients who cannot pay U.S. drug prices. The newer brand-
name treatments would likely be off-limits to generic copies under such free trade
85 Id., p. AI.
86 TRIPS, op. cit., note 8, article 66.
87 UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR), section on trade agreements, available at:
http://www.ustr.gov/.
88 M. CHASE and S. LUECK, lac. cit., note 84.
89Id.
90Id.
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pacts. This makes it quite difficult for a developing country affected by an epidemic to
ensure its access to the American markets and to provide accessible treatments to most
of its population. Some countries, such as Bahrain and Morocco, have signed side
letters in which it is claimed that both parties will be entitled to take appropriate
measures in case of a public health emergency91, but these documents are not part of
the agreement, they only help in its interpretation.
When developed and developing countries are facing such a difficult dilemma, they
will have to make 'choices of society' that will be expressed through their national
legislation. The next chapter will provide a comparative study of Canadian, United
States and European Union' legislations to see how human rights and WTO
mechanisms supporting a better access to essential medicines for the poor are
implemented at the national level in developed countries, and how they assume their
responsibility towards other states regarding the full realization of the right to health,
which is now well-established in human rights law.
PART IV - COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CANADIAN, UNITED STATES AND
EUROPEAN UNION LEGISLATIONS SUPPORTING AN INCREASED
ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES IN POOR COUNTRIES
Chapter a) Canada
1) Canada's background in trying to prevent abusive pricing ofmedicines
The Doha ministerial declaration92 and the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health93 have binding effects on WTO Members, and therefore must guide the
interpretation and implementation of the TRIPS Agreemenr4 . Subsequent texts
adopted by WTO members that are modifying the agreement, such as the WTO
General Council Decision of30 August 200395, will also bind WTO Members, and in
fact are the basis for Canada's Act to amend the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs
91 USTR, loco cit., note 87.
92 Doha Ministerial Declaration, op. cit., note 44.
93 Doha Declaration, op. cit., note 45.
94 Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, section 31(3), and TRIPS, op. cit., note 8.
95 August 30th Decision, op. cit., note 18.
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Act96, also called 'The Jean Chretien Pledge to Africa'. The main purpose of this Act
is to 'give effect to Canada's pledge to Africa by facilitating access to pharmaceutical
products to address public health problems afflicting many developing and least-
developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria
and other epidemics' as stated in article 21.01. The Act should provide amendments to
the Patent Acr that fully reflects the obligation to take steps leading toward the full
realization of the human right to health, including the promotion of the access to
affordable medicines for all. In fact, the Canadian HIVIAIDS Legal Network is of the
opinion that:
"Bill C-9 is Canada's legislation to implement the WTO General Council Decision of 30
August 2003. The Bill should, therefore, fully reflect the flexibility that the WTO Decision
creates for countries to use compulsory licensing to import cheaper, generic pharmaceutical
products.,,98
Canada is one of the developed countries with the most extensive experience in using
compulsory licensing for balancing patent protection and universal access to
medicines.
"From 1969 to 1992, Canada issued more than 600 compulsory licenses on medicines. In
nearly every case, the compensation to the patent owner was a standard 4% royalty applied to
the generic competitor's sale price.,,99
In fact, it was Canada's policy until 1993 not only to grant patents to encourage
inventive efforts and investments, but also to ensure that new inventions should, as far
as possible, be worked on a commercial scale in Canada with undue delaylOO. The
96 An Act to Amend the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act, Bill C-9, sanctioned on May 14th, 2004,
Third Session, Thirty-seventh Parliament, 52-53 Elizabeth II, 2004, section 21.04, (Hereafter quoted as
"Bill C-9").
97 Patent Act, R.S., c. P-4.
98 CANADIAN HlV/AIDS LEGAL NETWORK, loc. cit., note 43, p.6.
99 Id., p.ll, with further references to: F.M. SHERER (2003) "The Economic of Compulsory Drug
Patent Licensing"; Jerome H. REICHMAN and Catherine HASENZAHL, (2002) "Non-voluntary
licensing of patented inventions: The Canadian experience", UNCTADIICTSD Capacity-building
Project on Intellectual Property Rights and Sustainable Development; Joel LEXCHIN (1993)
"Pharmaceuticals, patents and politics: Canada and bill C-22", 23 International Journal ofHealth
Services, 47-60; Joel LEXCHlN, (1997) "After compulsory licensing: coming issues in Canadian
pharmaceutical policy and politics", 40 Health Policy, 69-80.
100 Id., REICHMAN & HASENZAHL, p.8.
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relevant provisions of the Patent Act prior 1993 allowing the issuance of a compulsory
license 'as of right' were formulated as follows:
" .. .if the patented invention (being one capable of being worked in Canada) is not being
worked within Canada on a commercial scale, and no satisfactory reason can be given," and the
non-working is not excusable and for good causelOI ;
"if the working of the invention within Canada on a commercial scale is being prevented or
hindered by the importation from abroad of the patented article" by the patentee or other
related parties including unprosecuted infringers lO2 •
At that time, in some cases, the courts have agreed on lower royalties in the case of
compulsory licenses for medicines. In Beecham Group Ltd. v. Franck W. Homer
Ltd. 103, the Federal Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the Commissioner's decision
to award a 1% royalty on the selling price of a pharmaceutical product. Of course,
Canadian consumers have largely benefited from compulsory license practices. In
fact, the Eastman Commission, a Royal Commission of Inquiry on the Pharmaceutical
Industry, came to the conclusion that compulsory licensing practices have saved the
consumers $200 million in the year of 1983 alone, this without negatively affecting the
research-based Canadian pharmaceutical industry104. More recently, it was estimated
by the United Nations Development Program that Canadian consumers saved $US 171
million because of compulsory 1icenses105.
The national courts taking account that the Canadian market is relatively a rich one,
have established this standard practice of the 4% royalty being paid by the generic
company to the brand-name companyl06. When the production of generic drugs would
be intended to supply developing countries and especially least developing countries
with essential drugs, it would be appropriate that a rate certainly lower than the one
being used in Canada be established.
101 See Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.P-4, section 65(2)(a); Patent Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.P-4, sections
67(l)(d),67(2)(a).
102 See Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, section 65(2)(b); Patent Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.P-4, section
67(2)(b).
103 [1974] I F.C. 9.
104 Harry C. EASTMAN, Report o/the Commission o/Inquiry on the Pharmaceutical Industry, Ottawa,
Supply and Services Canada, 1985.
105 UNITED NATIONS DEYELOPMENT PROGRAMME, Human Development Report 2001: Making
New Technologies Work/or Human Development, p.1 07, available at: http://www.undp.org.
106 CANADIAN HIY/AIDS LEGAL NETWORK, loc. cit., note 43, p.12.
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While the 'duty to work' provisions mentioned above 107 were repealed in 1993,
Canada has kept other means to prevent excessive pricing of medicines within its
jurisdiction. These mechanisms may be regrouped within four categories, which
recognize that patent rights may sometimes be limited in light of other public policy
concerns:
• "Canada's Patent Act continues to provide the opportunity of compulsory
licensing, for the purposes of supplying the domestic market, in cases where the
patentee abuses his exclusive rights under a patent (sections 65 to 71);
• Canada's Patent Act continues to include provisions authorizing government
use of patented inventions (sections 19 to 19.3). All that is required in such
cases is notification to the patentee by the Commissioner and the payment of
such amount as the Commissioner considers to be adequate consideration in the
circumstances, taking into account the economic value of the authorization;
• Under Canada's Competition Act, if a patent holder uses his patents rights in a
manner that unduly prevents or lessens competition, the Federal Court may
grant a compulsory license to use a patented invention on terms that it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, it may revoke the patent entirely (section 32);
• Under the Patent Act, Canada aims to contain the prices of patented medicines
through the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board (PMPRB), and in
recognition of the significant cost savings for public health insurance programs,
Canadian jurisdictions have long pursued politics that promote generic
substitution where this is feasible,,108.
Although the Canadian courts did not take the opportunity to link BRCA-l and BRCA-
2 cases with abusive pricing, the fact that the Canadian government has a strong
tradition of adopting means and mechanisms to prevent abusive pricing of medicines in
its own territory might have led to its predominant role following the Doha
negotiations in providing developing countries with much needed medicines when
107 Patent Act, op. cit., note 101 and note 102.
108 CANADIAN HIV/AIDS LEGAL NETWORK, lac. cit., note 43, p.B.
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these countries do not have the capacity to manufacture these drugs themselves.
Canada is the first G8 country to formulate rules and regulations to comply with its
new international obligations arising from Doha, setting a global precedent with its Bill
C-9 amending the Patent Actl09 and the Food and Drugs ActllO, which was generally
welcomed by most of the international community. This initiative was said as being
"the right way to address the global crisis posed by HIV/AIDS, and particularly that
the same World Health Organization has recently declared as a public health
emergency""'.
2) Main characteristics ofbill C-9
On 14 May 2005, Bill C-9, An Act to Amend the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs
Act (the Jean Chretien Pledge to Africa), along with its accompanying regulations,
have entered into force ll2. Bill C-9 received royal assent on 14 May 2004 but its entry
into force was delayed for one year in order to finalize its regulations. Bill C-9
modified two important legislations in Canada to allow the furniture of cheaper drugs
to developing countries; namely the Patent ActJJ3 and the Food and Drugs Actll4.
The changes brought to the Patent Act will make it possible for third parties to use
patented inventions to address public health problems afflicting developing countries,
especially those arising from epidemics such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis.
Canadian generic pharmaceutical companies, through compulsory licenses issued by
the Canadian Government, are now able to manufacture patented pharmaceuticals, for
the purpose of exporting them to developing countries that do not have the required
infrastructures and technical knowledge to produce themselves the pharmaceuticals
needed to respond to their public health problems 115. The Honorable David L.
Emerson, Minister of Industry declared that the ball is now in the hands of the private
sector and NGOs:
109 Patent Act, op. cit., note 97.
110 Food and Drugs Act, S.R., ch. F-27 (Hereafter quoted as "FDA").
III EUROPEAN AIDS TREATMENT GROUP, Letter sent to Paul Martin, Prime Minister ofCanada,
10 March 2004, available at: http://www.cptech.org/ip/health.
112 INDUSTRY CANADA, "Coming into Force of the Jean Chretien Pledge to Africa", Ottawa, 13 May
2005, available at: www.innovationstrategy.gc.ca.
IlJ Patent Act, op. cit., note 97.
114 FDA, op. cit., note 110.
I ISBill C-9, op. cit., note 96.
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"With the coming into force of the' Jean Chretien Pledge to Africa', the government of Canada
has established a legal framework allowing lower-cost versions of patented pharmaceutical
products to be exported to less fortunate countries unable to manufacture their own such
products. It now falls to the private sector and non-governmental organizations to identify
opportunities to assist these countries. This groundbreaking initiative is the end result of
extensive consultation with pharmaceutical industry stakeholders, NOOs and
Parliamentarians116".
These amendments were elaborated after the Doha negotiations, arising from some
concerns of the Canadian authorities to simultaneously deal with the protection of the
intellectual property rights of patent holders and their new responsibility towards
developing countries regarding access to essential medicines.
The new version of the Patent Act will specify the pharmaceutical products (Schedule
1) and the eligible countries (Schedules 2 to 4) that will be targeted by this new
compulsory license regime. The countries automatically covered by Bill C-9 are the
countries that were identified as least-developed countries by the United Nations 11 ?
(Schedule 2), whether they belong to WTO or not, and the developing countries
members of WTO ll8 (Schedule 3). As for the less vulnerable non-WTO Members,
they will have to state that they are facing urgent circumstances and that they do not
have a sufficient manufacturing capacity to face these circumstances; these conditions
are substantially the same than those that apply to mid-income WTO Members l19
which do not qualify as developing countries (Schedule 4). To benefit from Bill C-9,
they need to notify the WTO with the name and the quantity of the required product,
and indicate the Member's intention to grant authorization to use the invention
pertaining to the product if that product is protected by a patent, as well as a
declaration stating that they have insufficient manufacturing capacity for the required
product120.
116 INDUSTRY CANADA, loco cit., note 112.
117 Bill C-9, 21.03(I)b).
118 CANADIAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, "Use of Patents for International
Humanitarian Purposes to Address Public Health Problems", available at:
http://strategis.ic.gc.calsc mrksv/cipo/jcpalpl-e.html#elig.
119 Id.
12° Id.
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When Canada adhered to the Doha agreements, it acknowledged that its new
compulsory license regime will not be covering all pharmaceutical products, but only
those characterized as medicines needed to treat public health problems121 . This list of
eligible medicines has been inspired by the Model List ofEssential Medicines, which
provides the most efficacious, safe, and cost-effective medicines for priority conditions
in a basic health-care system122. This list was used as a main guide to establish the
initial 46 eligible products that are currently subjected to a patent in the Canadian
jurisdiction.
To remain flexible and face the evolution of global epidemics, the amendments
provide a regulatory mechanism to add to or delete from the schedules as the needs
arise or as international consensus emerges123. Moreover, an expert advisory
committee may be created by the Ministers of Health and Industry, composed of
experts in different relevant fields, which "may be asked to provide advice on
amending the schedule of pharmaceutical products,,124.
A dubious rule brought at first with the amendments was the right to a "first refusal"
from the brand-name companies, which basically give them the opportunity to be the
first supplier of a requested pharmaceutical product, following a notice of intent by a
generic pharmaceutical company seeking a compulsory license under the regime of
Bill C-9. The patent holder would have 30 days to decide whether he intends to fulfill
the demand or not at a price adapted to the local market where the request is coming
from l25 . In case the patent holder decides not to fulfill the market opportunity, the
compulsory license would be subjected to the following conditions:
• "Use of the phannaceutical must be limited to a specific quantity and for use in a specific
country (article 21.05(2));
• A website must be established disclosing the information relating to the license (article
21.06);
121 See Bill C-9, article 2 1.03( I)a).
122 INDUSTRY CANADA, "Government of Canada reinstates legislative proposals to enable exports of
low-cost phannaceutical products to least-developed and developing countries", News Releases, Ottawa,
12 February 2004.
123 Bill C-9, sections 21.03(1) to 21.03(4).
124 INDUSTRY CANADA, loc. cit., note 122, and Bill C-9, section 21.18.
125 Bill C-9, section 21.04(3)c).
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• The licensee must pay a royalty of 2% of the value to the importing country of the
exported pharmaceutical product (article 21.08);
• The license shall have an effective period of two years from date of grant (article 21.09);
and
• Health Canada must notify the Commissioner of Patents that the pharmaceutical product
meets the requirement of the Food and Drug Regulations, including that it be
distinguishable from the domestic brand product (e.g., by labelling, packaging, marking,
embossing, etc.) in order to discourage re-importation and diversion I26".
Bill C-9 also modified the Food and Drugs Actl27 and the Food and Drugs
Regulations128• Since the countries that will usually benefit from the new regime of
the Bill C-9 will rarely have the institutional capacity to carry out scientific
assessments of the generic drugs imported from Canada, Health Canada will make sure
that these medical devices are manufactured as if they were intended for the Canadian
market, including the same scientific assessment.
The subsequent changes brought to the Food and Drugs Regulations deal with the
requirements for Health Canada to notify the Commissioner of patents on products that
meet the Canadian standards and "that they carry distinguishing markings as compared
to those available on the Canadian Market,,129.
c) Identified issues andjlaws in Bill C-9
Although Bill C-9 was most welcomed as the first initiative from a 08 country
following the Doha negotiations, WHO, UNAIDS as well as many NOOs have
identified five important flaws that needed to be addressed prior to its adoption.
i) Requirement to first seek a voluntary license from patent-holder
In previous drafts of Bill C-9, a 'right of refusal' for a brand-name manufacturer was
contained in section 21.04(3)c). By the said right of refusal, the patent holder was
126 INDUSTRY CANADA, loc. cit., note 122.
127 FDA, op. cit., note 110.
128 C.R.C., ch. 870.
129 INDUSTRY CANADA, loc. cit, note 122, and FDA, section 37(2).
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entitled to replace the generic company in the drug-supplying contract, even if this
generic manufacturer conducted all the negotiations with the supplier in a developing
country. In order for the brand-name company to replace the generic manufacturer, it
had to be done within 30 days after the patent holder has received a notice about the
intention to provide the patented drug at lower cost in such a market. The brand-name
company will have to notify the Commissioner of Patents that it will prevail itself of
the terms of the contract negotiated with the generic company.
Mr. Stephen Lewis, UN Secretary-General's special envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa,
has expressed serious doubts over the opportunity of the inclusion of the right of
refusal in Bill C-9:
"That is a very serious flaw in the bill, and it has to come out; it is important that it comes out,
because it does compromise the integrity of the legislation,,130.
Of course, in a case where a generic company seeks a compulsory license to deal with
a medicine supplier in a developing country, the consumer would receive the product
at a lower cost even if the innovative company moves in and uses its right of refusal,
since the terms of the contract would be those negotiated with the generic company.
However, by allowing brand-name companies to substitute themselves to the generic
companies that conducted the negotiations with a potential buyer from the developing
world, few incentives would be left to negotiate these contracts in first place, since
they would face the certainty or the very real possibility of being blocked from
obtaining the Canadian licenses they need to follow through and, indeed, could lose the
contract to the originator company13l. It follows that the Canadian generic
pharmaceutical industry would have been significantly blocked from making business
with developing countries. Incentives for prices to go down would have been strongly
diminished in countries in which Canada should favor access to essential medicines
considering its international obligations regarding the right to health, and also
regarding public health safeguards allowed in WTO rules. Moreover, the section 21.09
of bill C-9 would have reinforced the advantage that brand-name companies have over
130 Globe & Mail, February 14th, 2004.
131 CANADIAN HIY/AIDS LEGAL NETWORK, loc. cit., note 43, p.IS.
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generic ones, since the compulsory license has to be renewed every two years, giving
an opportunity for the right of refusal to be exercised at the same time.
"In very short order, therefore, bill C-9 will amount to very little, if the 'right of refusal' remain
in the bill, frustrating the very objective of improving access to very affordable medicines.
These provisions must be deleted in their entirety or the system will become a globally
embarrassing example of how not to implement the WTO Decision of 30 August 2003 to assist
countries in making effective use of compulsory licensing to obtain more affordable
medicines 132".
Fortunately, important amendments have been brought to modify the article
21.03(3)c), which abandoned the 'right of refusal' and requires the generic
manufacturer to negotiate at least for 30 days in order to get a license from the brand-
name manufacturer:
"The Commissioner shall authorize the use of the patented invention only if
(c) The applicant provides the Commissioner with a solemn or statutory declaration in the
prescribed form stating that the applicant had, at least thirty days before filing the application,
(i) Sought from the patentee or, if there is more than one, from each of the patentees, by
certified or registered mail, a licence to manufacture and sell the pharmaceutical product for
export to the country or WTO Member named in the application on reasonable terms and
conditions and that such efforts have not been successful, and
(ii) Provided the patentee, or each of the patentees, as the case may be, by certified or registered
mail, in the written request for a licence, with the information that is in all material respects
identical to the information referred to in paragraphs (2)(a) to (g)".
Under WTO rules, the generic producer must seek to negotiate a voluntary licence
'within a reasonable period of time,i33 before a compulsory licence may be issued.
The newest version of article 21.03(3)c) is in line with the TRIPS obligations and is no
longer stricter than what is required by the TRIPS Agreement.
132 Id., p.IS.
133 TRIPS, article 31 (b).
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ii) Limited list of pharmaceutical products in schedule 1
Another important criticism of Bill C-9 is the inclusion of a limited list of
pharmaceutical products covered by Bill C-9, included in the schedule 1 of the Bill.
This position is partially grounded in the Statement of the World Health Organization
on WTO Access to Medicines Decision, 1 September 2003 where it is stated that:
"The agreement covers all medicines."
And;
"For the agreement to have the intended impact on public health, countries will need to review
the full range of medicines required from multiple suppliers, including generic producers when
making purchasing decisions".
As seen in the Doha agreements, each country should determine the grounds on which
the decision of whether a compulsory license should be granted or not is to be based.
This legal principle provides some benchmarks defining the extent of importing
countries' national sovereignty in the delicate situation where the economic interests of
the countries hosting the medicine providers are affected. However, Bill C-9 reflects
that some economic control concerns of the medicine exporting countries should have
prevalence over the urgent needs for affordable medicines of the importing countries.
This will obviously raise criticisms. Moreover, the definition of 'pharmaceutical
product,134 does not limit the scope of these products that could be covered by the
Doha Declaration or any other eventual legislation adopted by a WTO-Member.
"Paragraph I of the Doha Declaration does not in any manner qualify 'public health' in
paragraph 4; neither does it limit the scope of diseases that may be addressed when finding an
expeditious solution to the problem referred to in paragraph 6. There must therefore be no a
priori exclusions regarding diseases that may be addressed by importing and exporting
Members or the products in the pharmaceutical sectors used to address public health. It is
neither practicable nor desirable to predict the pharmaceutical products needs of members
desiring to protect the public health by promoting access to medicines for all" 135.
134 Doha Declaration, article Ia).
135 CANADIAN HIV/AIDS LEGAL NETWORK, loco cit., note 43, p.I9.
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The Canadian authorities claim that schedule 1 has been fonnulated taking account of
the WHO Model List of Essential Medicines, which should include the most
efficacious, safe, and cost-effective medicines for priority conditions in a basic health
care system. All of the 46 products chosen to be included in schedule 1 were taken
from this listl36 . But still, there are numerous anti-retroviral drugs available on the
Canadian market missing from schedule 1. The Canadian HIVIAIDS Legal Network
thinks that the approach of fonnulating a list of phannaceutical products which may be
manufactured under this regime would be a mistake, since this list was drafted
considering specific needs of developing countries and may not have considered all the
interests at stake of all the countries susceptible of taking advantage of the regime for
the health of their populations. Moreover, the words 'essential medicines' clearly
point out the products that are medically necessary, therefore not comprehensive of all
health needs137. The WHO Model List was not created to work as the 'gatekeeper' of
the innovative phannaceutical industry in Canada or anywhere else; limiting the
manufacture of generic drugs under the compulsory license scheme to the WHO Model
List would be a misinterpretation of WHO's intentions, especially if the list has been
fonnulated considering cost-effectiveness factors. The more a drug will be costly, the
less chances it has to be placed on the WHO list. However, some other factors might
outweigh the higher price of a drug, especially if the regime's very aim is to decrease
the price of HIVIAIDS treatments for those who cannot afford it.
Clearly, the limitations included in schedule 1 were fonnulated to prevent any abuse of
the new regime by potential importing countries that would be tempted to import
phannaceutical products for other ends than treating health problems within their
jurisdiction. Although we think that a restrictive definition of 'phannaceutical
product' is not appropriate considering the main objectives of Bill C-9's regime, we
trust that the article 21.03(I)a)i) will be used as often as possible to expand the scope
of schedule 1. So far, it has been used once already on 14 May 2005 to include for the
first time a 'fixed-dose combination' (FDC) of three antiretroviral drugs marketed
under the name "lamivudine + nevirapine + zidovudine,,138. Antiretroviral (ARVs)
FDCs are a major breakthrough for HIV/AIDS treatment in developing and least-
136 INDUSTRY CANADA, lac. cit., note 122.
137 CANADIAN HIV/AlDS LEGAL NETWORK, lac. cit., note 43, p.20.
138 Order amending schedule 1 to the Patent Act, Canada Gazette Part 1,14 May 2005, p. 1152,
(Hereafter quoted as "Order on schedule 1").
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developed countries as they promote greater patient adherence and require less medical
supervision139, which are often crucial advantages especially in least-developed
countries. Hopefully the Canadian authorities will continue to expand the scope of
schedule 1 towards FDCs, an essential device in the fight against AIDS.
iii) Exclusion of non-WTO countries from bill C-9
Since the forum where the Doha negotiations were conducted was the WTO, one
would say that their legal consequences would only apply to WTO Members.
However, the right to health for all as included in the Covenant for Economic, Cultural
and Socioeconomic Rights and other legal documents has nothing to do with the WTO.
Considering the fundamental idea behind the Doha declaration, Members agreed that
its effects would apply to every country categorized as a 'Least Developed Country'
(LDC) based on UN criteria, countries that are all regrouped in schedule 2 of Bill C-9.
But among the rest of the developing countries, only the WTO Members could at first
benefit from Bill C-9, i.e. the countries mentioned in schedule 3. The developing
countries not part of the WTO were prevented from contracting with Canadian generic
drug manufacturers to obtain lower-cost medicines.
The first part of the issue at stake here is that among these developing countries, many
would not have been able to fight mV/AIDS effectively partly due to the costs of
reliable medicines, such as Viet Nam, East Timor, Lebanon, Uzbekistan and many
others140• Everyone should be entitled to the benefits of this important legislation, and
furthermore Canada should respect all its international obligations:
" ...Canada's human rights obligations are not limited to realizing the right to the highest
standard of health only in countries that join the WTO. An international decision has been
taken, by all WTO Members, to relax the restrictions in TRIPS on using compulsory licensing
to export lower cost generic pharmaceuticals. There is nothing in WTO that prevents Canada
from sharing the benefit of this development with non-WTO countries, and Canada's human
rights obligations do mandate such assistance '4 I".
139 Id.
140 CANADIAN HIV/AIDS LEGAL NETWORK, loc. cit., note 43, p.22.
141 Id., p.22.
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The second part of the issue is that political matters, such as choosing for a state
whether to belong or not to the WTO, should not prevent the fulfillment of the right to
health for the population of that state. Since the legal effects of Doha already did
apply to the LDCs not members of the WTO, the moral responsibility of Canada
towards developing countries outside the scope of Doha could become very large.
Accordingly, under the pressure of Canadian civil societies, a developing country non-
WTO Member, that is eligible for official development assistance according to a list
maintained by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
and which declares it is facing an emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency will be able to benefit from the regime of Bill C_9142. These requirements are
substantially the same as for those mid-income countries WTO Members that do not
qualify as a developing country but that could possibly lack manufacturing capacity to
face a grave health crisis. These countries are included in schedule 4 of Bill C-9.
iv) Restrictions in the acquisition of generic pharmaceuticals
Before the bill was amended, only national governments could enter a contract with a
Canadian generic manufacturer under the Bill C-9 regime. This was probably due to
concerns from the brand-name manufacturers and their governments over the effective
control on who will be able to acquire the generics, and in which market they will sell
these products. Most of the criticism over this comes from the fact that some
governments have never shown interest in effectively fighting mY/AIDS, nor have
they required the knowledge to do so. This leaves the entire responsibility to abate the
mY/AIDS pandemic to these same governments, which seems irresponsible and
negligent.
But most importantly, political interests or decisions do not bind NGOs. For example
Myanmar, which is a member of WTO and has been declared a LDC by the United
Nations, but is not mentioned in Schedule 2, and therefore is not eligible under the Bill
C-9 regime, because of a Canadian policy toward illegitimate military governmentsl43 .
Bill C-9 could provide an alternative way for the Canadian government to ensure the
142 Bill C-9, section 21.03(1 )d)ii).
143 CANADIAN HIV/AIDS LEGAL NETWORK, lac. cit., note 43, p.23.
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distribution of cheaper drugs in developing countries where political matters stand in
the way. This could also be seen as a breach of Canada's international obligations
arising from the right to health:
"To comply with their international obligations in relation to article 12, States parties have to
respect the enjoyment of the right to health in other countries, and to prevent third parties from
violating the right in other countries, if they are able to influence these third parties by way of
legal or political means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and applicable
international law. Depending on the availability of resources, States should facilitate access to
essential health facilities, goods and services in other countries, wherever possible and provide
the necessary when required,,144.
However, the Canadian government eventually accepted that NGGs could contract
directly with Canadian generic manufacturers, as long as they get the permission from
the government of the importing country. Unfortunately, this requirement
considerably weakens that amendment, as non-transparent bureaucracy, rampant
corruption and bad faith from the state authorities are often significant characteristics
of regimes under sanctions from the international community.
v) Concerns over the emergency and the safety criteria in Canada
The pharmaceuticals manufactured to be distributed or sold in Canada must comply
with strict safety requirements in order to avoid defective drugs entering the market145.
The products exported under Bill C-9's regime will also be subject to the same
requirements to ensure that these products are of good quality, safe, and effective for
the intended recipients.
However, the extent of the pandemic requires that the drugs manufactured under Bill
C-9 be distributed with no delay while ensuring similar safety standards as if they were
distributed in Canada. Therefore, NGGs and United Nations organs claim that
essential safety requirements should be applied to these drugs and that the Canadian
authorities should stay flexible in the implementation of further regulatory
144 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, op. cit., note 24, paragraph
39.
145 FDA, section 37.
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requirements. Following usual drug assessment trends prior to marketing, the
Canadian HIVIAIDS Legal Network is of the opinion that:
" ...every national drug regulatory authority must weigh, on the basis of the best available
evidence, the risks and benefits associated with the product, in light of its intended and
foreseeable use in that country's particular context. Thus, giving different contexts, the
national regulator in one country may make a different assessment than the regulator in another
country, where the context may be quite different,,146.
The main issue regarding drug safety is that generic medicines manufactured only for
use in poor settings, such as FDCs, are rarely marketed in developed countries such as
Canada147. As such, there is no single Canadian Reference Product against which this
particular FDC could be compared for the purposes of establishing bioequivalency, a
condition precedent to obtaining Health Canada approval of a generic drugl48.
However, Health Canada has explored the feasibility of a preliminary assessment of
the process for reviewing an FDC and is satisfied that an approval would be possible in
circumstances where sufficient clinical data respecting the composite ARV agents is
supplemented by bioequivalency comparisons between the products and the agents in
question, the latter having already been individually approved and marketed in
Canadal49. Finally, it seems that Health Canada is determined to go on with this
procedure, which would significantly reinforce Bill C-9's regime by improving the
number of medicines that would be allowed to be exported (schedule 1) and the quality
of these drugs, taking into account that these measures favor FDCs:
"It should be noted that while section 21.18 provides for the establishment of an expert
committee to advise the Ministers of Industry and of Health on their recommendations to the
Governor in Council respecting the amendment of schedule I, that committee is not yet in
place. The government has nonetheless elected to proceed with pre-publication of the proposed
amendment immediately on the understanding that discussions are already underway between
Health Canada and parties intent on securing approval to export the FDC in question.
Furthermore, the ARV agents which make up the FDC already appear individually on schedule
I and the Canadian manufacturers of those agents have been advised of the government's
146 CANADIAN HIV/AIDS LEGAL NETWORK, op cit., note 43, p.24.
147 Order on Schedule I, op. cit., note 138.
148 Id.
149 Id.
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proposed amendment and will have an opportunity to submit their views during the 3D-day
comment period"150.
4) A Memorandum ofUnderstanding between Canada and the United States
In addition to adopting Bill C-9 on May Ith, 2005, Canada entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the United States to regularize the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Doha in July 2004. This is required
since the article 1709(10)f) prevents a compulsory license granted in one jurisdiction to
be used to supply foreign markets. The parties, as provided in the Memorandum of
Understanding, agreed to suspend the section 1709(1O)f) of NAFTA as between
themselves, consistent with the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, with respect
with compulsory licenses issued in accordance with the terms of the WTO Decisionl51 .
Article 1709(10)h) of NAFTA states that adequate remuneration must be given to the
right holder considering the economic value of the authorization. This will be
interpreted as 'the economic value to the importing country of the use that has been
authorized in the exporting country' 152. Moreover, any cross-reference with article
1709(10) will be interpreted in light of this MoU.
The adoption of this MoU is important for the cohesion of international trade rules
between such close trade partners. If Canada has placed a milestone on universal
access to medicines and decent health care with Bill C-9, the United States has no easy
choices between respecting their international obligations arising from Doha, and
protecting as much as possible the interests of its national brand-name pharmaceutical
industry, by far the biggest around the world. The case of United States shows how
and where the patent debate can become highly political.
150 Id.
151 USTR, Memorandum ofUnderstanding on the access to medicines for poor countries, San Antonio,
Texas, July 16th, 2004, available at:
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Sectors/Intellectual Propertv/asset upload tile426 6319.pdf.
152 Id.
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Chapter b) United States
1) A different perspective on compulsory licensing ofpharmaceuticals in the United
States
The United States has quite a different tradition regarding the issuance of compulsory
licenses. Even if subject to the same international obligations as Canada by virtue of
being a member of the WTO and subject to the UN international instruments
mentioned in previous sections, the international behavior of USA on access to cheap
and essential drugs to poor countries remain contradictory. The U.S. legislation has
been included in this analysis not because it brings anything innovative in terms of
flexibility for intellectual property rights and public health considerations but because
of its dominant position on the pharmaceutical markets worldwide and the way it
favors some international obligations to the expense of others.
There is a very recent example showing the reserve of the American authorities when it
is time to grant compulsory licenses for national public health issues, even when the
potential health threats concern their own population: the Cipro-anthrax case.
After the September 11 th terrorist attacks and the threats of bio-terrorism with anthrax
that followed shortly afterwards, the American authorities were facing a potentially
very serious public health emergency on its own territory, as the national health experts
evaluated that medication for 10 million people were needed. For the 120 pill
recommended course of treatment for ciprofloxacin, this comes to 1.2 billion pillS153 .
The main problem with ciprofloxacin is that it was subject to patent protection until
December 2003, so the only authorized manufacturer was the German company Bayer,
which could only produce 2 million pills a day. At this rate, it would take about 600
days to produce and stockpile the 1.2 billion pills requirement established by the health
authorities. These facts raised a number of concerns among the American population
but especially among one part of the scientific community, as some of it evaluated the
need for generic ciprofloxacin based on three questions:
153 Ralph NADER and James LOVE, Letter from Ralph Nader and James Love to DHHS Secretary
Tommy Thompson, October 18th, 2001, available at: http://www.cptech.org/ip/health.
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• Can anthrax be delivered to a large number of people through a terrorist
attack?
• Are strains of anthrax resistant to other (cheaper and widely available)
antibiotics available to terrorist groups?
• Could such an attack take place before Bayer could deliver large quantities
of cipro?154
The Consumer Project on Technology further provided itself the answer that the risk
was existent even if the probabilities of its occurrence were not high:
"Based upon what we know, there is a non-zero chance that all of these things could happen. In
fact, no one knows what the probability is, but it is clearly not a trivial risk, given the
consequences"155.
But still, the government would not grant a compulsory licence even if generic firms
like Ranbaxy, Mylan, Geneva Pharmaceuticals and Novopharm have had received US
FDA clearance for the quality of their version of ciprofloxacin; and would not exercise
its power of government use of patented inventions, which if used would avoid the
need for the government to negotiate a license and allow any federal employee to use
or to authorize the use of a patentl56. Mr. Ralph Nader and Mr. James Love expressed
their concerns to the Secretary of the Direction ofHealth and Human Services, Tommy
G. Thompson, to deny the right to authorize generic production of ciprofloxacin arising
from this statute:
"We were shocked by your comments in the October 17,2001 Washington Post, indicating that
you do not have the legal authority to authorize generic production of ciprofloxacin ... This, of
course, is not true. As your own staff is well aware, you may use 28 USC 1498 to issue
compulsory licenses for patents, and you could immediately authorize the five companies who
have already satisfied US FDA requirements for the quality of their products to speed the
manufacturer of ciprofloxacin, and indeed this could and should be done for any other medicine
needed to confront the current crisis. By failing to act, you are putting Americans at risk. By
154 CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECHNOLOGY, Talking points on Cipro patent dispute, Health Care
and Intellectual Property Branch, Washington D.C. 24 October 2001, version 1.0, available at:
www.cptech.org/ip/health.
155Id.
156 See 28 USC 1498.
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acting to authorize generic competitors to manufacture ciprofloxacin, you would reduce public
anxiety over the supply of the drug, and take steps to introduce competition which would
ensure redundant capacity and a more favourable procurement environment,,157.
So the main question according to the Consumer Project on Technology is "why not let
the generic firms do it?" - especially when it is believed that the generic producing
ciprofloxacin along with Bayer, which is operating its factories at high capacity, are
only running theirs slowly waiting for Bayer's patent to expire158• Asking this question
brings the unavoidable comparison between the issues at stake in the Cipro case in
United States and those regarding the treatment of HIV/AIDS in Africa. Nancy
Bradish Myers, senior political analyst at Lehman Brothers, acknowledged the
common issues at stake in both situations:
"It's a very interesting parallel to the position taken by the U.S. in urging South Africa not to
override patents of U.S. drug companies and make generic versions of AIDS drugs available to
patients in that country,,159.
From there assumptions that the US government was acting as such to protect its
negotiating position in the upcoming WTO negotiations in Doha, from November 9th
to November 13th 2001 started to flow in. It was said that the US government was
cutting comers on public health of Americans to avoid being forced to make high
compromises with other nations in the Doha talks, where the issue of compulsory
licensing of drugs, and imports under a compulsory license where a country does not
have domestic capacity for production is a central issue, and where the US, Canada and
the EU were opposing the Africa group160.
In Canada, where the background regarding compulsory licensing is quite different as
analyzed in the previous section, the authorities were more inclined to consider
granting a compulsory license to stockpile a generic version of Cipro to treat the
population in case of a bio-terrorist attack with anthrax. Claiming 'extraordinary and
unusual times', Health Canada had first agreed to override Bayer's patent for Cipro,
157 R. NADER and 1. LOVE, op cit., note 153.
158 Matthew HARPER, "Should Bayer Cut Prices To Protect A Patent?", Forbes.com magazine, 24
October 2001.
159 Jill CARROLL and Ron WINSLOW, "Bayer to Slash by Nearly half Price U.S. Pays for Anthrax
Drug", Wall Street Journal, 25 October 2005.
160 R. NADER and 1. LOVE, op. cit., note 153.
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stating that it had to answer the population's demand that necessary steps be taken to
protect their health and safetyl61.
However, the Canadian government backed up under the pressure exercised by
displeased reactions of the US authorities and the head of the International Federation
of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, which said that the move was
unwarranted and threatened to undermine research on new drugs 162. Bayer further
stated that any Cipro units ordered before October 22nd, date the agreement was signed
between Bayer and the Canadian government, would become the property of Bayer;
although they did not state who would have to pay Apotex, the generic manufacturer of
these units.
In an attempt to avoid any further temptations for any national government to contract
with a generic manufacturer for the supplying of Cipro, Bayer accepted to cut its prices
in half, as it is often the case when a threat to contract with a generic manufacturer
occurs due to too high pricing of a drug.
This section on the Cipro and anthrax case was included in this paper to show the
different backgrounds in compulsory licensing between Canada and the United States,
to describe the interests which may be advantaged in slowing down as much as
possible the implementation of obligations arising from Doha, and also to disclose the
political side of this patent versus the access to medicines in situation of crisis debate.
The legal instruments within American legislation to avoid abusive pricing of drugs
will be analysed in next section.
161 Amy HAMON and Robert PEAR, "Canada overrides patent for Cipro to treat anthrax", New-York
Times, 19 October 2001.
162 CNN Money, "Canada makes Cipro deal: Government says Bayer to stay sole supplier of anti-
anthrax drug Cipro", available at: http://money.cnn.com/200l/10/23/companieslbayer/.
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2) Tools to avoid abusive pricing ofdrugs in the American legislation
i) Hatch-Waxman Act
1- Description of the Hatch-Waxman Act
The official name of the statute that is most commonly referred to as the 'Hatch-
Waxman Act' is the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of1984.
This statute was intended to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in order
to accelerate the applications for new drugs by allowing an abbreviated procedure for
generic manufacturers. Instead of requiring the generic manufacturer to provide
clinical data to get marketing approval of its product from the FDA, it will only have to
submit bioequivalence studies. This abbreviated application will need to include:
• Information to show that the conditions of use prescribed in the labelling
proposed for a new drug have been previously approved for a drug that
appears on a list prepared by the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(listed drug);
• A certification relating to patents covering such listed drugl63 .
The applicant will also need to certify in the application that a specified notice has
been sent to each owner of the patent or their representative, and also to the holder, or
his representative, of the approved application for the drug or drug use claimed by the
patent.
This statute also provides an extension of maximum 5 years of marketing exclusivity
additional to the 20-year period already given by the issuance of a patent to cope with
the time a patented drugs remains in the development pipeline. Moreover, the statute
grants a 30-month stay to brand name companies that file suit against a generic
manufacturer that challenges their patentsl64 . However this last provision became
controversial as brand-name companies made an abusive use of it keeping generics off
163 Bill Summary and Status for the 98'hCongress, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/.
164 CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECHNOLOGY, The Hatch-Waxman Act and the Legislation to Close
its Loopholes, available at: http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/generic/hw.html
51
the market by adding other patents of poor quality on their products. In this case it
does not matter if the lawsuit will be lost since brand name companies get extra
marketing exclusivity anyway.
2- Actions to close the loopholes of the Hatch-Waxman Act
To avoid the occurrence of abuses of the Hatch-Waxman Act by the brand-name
companies, George W. Bush, the President of the United States launched a new
initiative on October 21 st, 2002, to lower prescription drug costs by improving access
to generic drugs. It was intended to close the loopholes in the implementation of the
Hatch-Waxman Act. According to White House website, the new proposed FDA rule
on generic drugs will:
• "Allow one 30-month automatic stay at most in patent infringement litigation involving a
generic drug application: Drug manufacturers would be limited to only one 30-month stay per
generic application, to resolve allegations that a generic drug maker is infringing a drug patent.
According to the FTC, this is an appropriate time period for courts to resolve cases of patent
infringement. Multiple 30-month stays, which have led to delays in generic entry of an
additional 4 to 40 months, would not be permitted.
• Tighten requirements and increase disclosures for drug patent listings: Drug manufacturers
would no longer be allowed to list patents in the FDA Orange Book for drug packaging, drug
metabolites, and intermediate forms of a drug. Permitted listings include patents on active
ingredients, drug formulations, and uses of a drug. In addition, a more detailed signed
attestation accompanying a patent submission will be required, and false statements in the
attestation can lead to criminal charges. This will significantly reduce opportunities to list
inappropriate patents just to prevent fair competition from generic drugs.
• Provide billions of dollars in savings for public and private health insurance programs: The rule
will not only provide savings for patients by giving them more safe and effective, low-cost
prescription drug alternatives; it will reduce budgetary pressures on state Medicaid programs,
and reduce the cost burdens facing employer-provided coverage.
• Lower the cost of improving Medicare with prescription drug coverage: The rule provides
important relief for seniors, but it is only a first step. Seniors really need an improved and
strengthened Medicare program like the President has proposed, with better and more secure
coverage options. While the House of Representatives took an important first step this year by
passing legislation to provide drug coverage, the Senate failed to act. The President is calling
on the leadership of the Senate to put politics aside and pass a prescription drug benefit for
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Medicare. The proposed rule makes this job easier by reducing the cost of a Medicare
prescription drug benefit,,165.
To limit the brand name industry to only one 30-month automatic stay undoubtedly
would help generic copies of the 200 drugs that the patent expired, from 2002 to 2005,
to reach the market much faster. This is said to bring cost savings to employer health
plans, to state Medicaid programs and to seniors of more than $3 billion a year only in
the United States.
The announcement of the beginning of the implementation of this initiative was made
almost a year later, on June li\ 2003. It was described as mean to "streamline the
process of making safe, effective generic drugs", and "to help improve the speed and
reduce the cost of determining that a new generic drug is safe and effective" in
implementing changes in its review procedure166; thus, respecting the engagements he
made mentioned above.
However Sherrod Brown, the lead Democrat and the House companion to the
McCain/Schumer bill (similar to Gregg/Schumer proposal, which will be explained
below), stated these measures were insufficient to actually bring significant savings to
American consumers on prescription drugs, and that the grounds to take action were
more about politics than pricing167.
The Gregg/Schumer bill, even if similar to the President Bush and McCain/Schumer
initiatives, use a different approach to modify patent laws answering some criticism
made on previous initiatives. First, the 30-month stay remains but would run
concurrently to the FDA's consideration of the generic company's application. This
165 U.S. WHITE HOUSE, "President Takes Action to Lower Prescription Drug Prices By Improving
Access to Generic Drugs", available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releasesI2002/I0/2002I 021-
4.html.
166 US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, "HHS Revises Regulations And
Procedures To Speed Access To Generic Drugs: Changes To Save Consumers Billions Of Dollars Each
Year", News Release, 12 June 2003, available at:
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2003presI200306I2.html.
167 Sherrod BROWN, "White House Prescription Drug Proposal Is About Politics, Not Price", available
at: http://www.house.gov/sheITodbrown/oldsite/genericsI021.html.
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will not delay the introduction of a generic product on the market significantly since it
takes from 18 to 25 months to approve a generic drug l68 .
Secondly, to ensure that brand-name companies do not make frivolous uses of patents
to delay the introduction of generics on the market (such as patents on the colour of a
pill for example), the Gregg/Schumer initiative allows a generic company to initiate a
counter-claim against a brand-name company if the latter sues the generic for patent
infringement, claiming that the patent at stake should have been included in the Orange
Book in the first placel69 .
Thirdly, the initiative also prevents a generic company from making an abusive use of
the legislation. As it stood previously, a generic company has an incentive to be the
first one to be able to market a product because it obtains a ISO-day exclusivity. Under
the bill, a generic company is not entitled to this exclusivity if it was found to have
made an anti-competitive deal with a brand-name company, or if it fails to market the
product within the timeframe it said it would170.
And fourth, the bill clarifies that the FDA does have the required authority to establish
test of bioequivalence for drugs that are not absorbed in the bloodstream, if these tests
are based on solid scientific evidence.
This bill was enacted by the House of Representatives and the Senate under the title
"Greater Access to Pharmaceuticals Act" on 10 June 2003.
3- Relevance of the Hatch-Waxman Act to poor and developing nations
When compared to other IP regimes active around the world, the Hatch-Waxman Act
may not do much to facilitate the access of cheaper medicines for those in need within
the United States. Neither does it provide exceptions for the use of generics outside
the country for those who cannot afford to buy brand-name products. But preventing
brand-name companies from using the American patent legislation by extending the
168 Rep. SCHUMER, "Schumer Generic Drug Legislation passes Full Senate", 19 June 2003, available
at : http://schumer.senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/pressreleasesIPROI804.html.
169 Id.
170 Id.
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length of their patents by abusing the 30-month stay is at least a good start. Moreover,
"the Hatch-Waxman model has been used to develop regulatory systems in developing
and poor nations,,171, after the much admired Canadian compulsory license regime had
to be abandoned with the advent of NAFTA in 1993. It required the right holder to
license his invention for a fee in certain cases, bringing much lower prescription
medicine costs172. The Hatch-Waxman Act became an important model world-wide as
it allowed the entry of generic drugs on the "world's largest and most profitable
pharmaceutical market", as these products were "virtually excluded from the
marketplace" because of the extremely heavy regulatory burden that had to be
supported by the industry prior to the advent of the act173 . But more importantly, the
Hatch-Waxman Act acknowledges that a generic is interchangeable with a brand-name
product when it is properly tested, bringing an end to the argument that a brand-name
product is chemically superior to its generic version.
ii) The Bayh-Dole Act
The Bayh-Dole Act deals with the commercialization of products issued from R&D
financed by public funds. It will allow "the transfer of exclusive control over many
government funded inventions to universities and businesses operating with federal
contracts for the purpose of further development and commercialization"174. These
universities and businesses will then be allowed to exclusively license the invention to
other parties, while the Government will retain 'march-in' rights to allow the licensing
of the invention to third parties if it decides the invention is not being made available
to the publie on a reasonable basis175. In that case, the Government will not need the
agreement nor to preliminary negotiate with the patent holder or the original licensee
for the use of this provision176•
171 William HADDAD, "Generic Medicines: The Solution or the Problem?", 21 October 2004, p.8,
accessible at : http://www.cptech.orglip/health/generic/haddadl 0212004.doc.
172 Id., p.8.
173 Id., p.9.
174 CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECHNOLOGY, Bayh-Dole Act web page, available at :
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175 Id.
176 35 USC 203.
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The most recent famous case involving the use of the Bayh-Dole Act is the CellPro
case, where CellPro asked the Clinton administration for a compulsory license for 4
patents held by John Hopkins University. This was a very important dispute, which
concerned the use of patents based upon government-funded research. To determine if
'march in' rights shall be exercised, the National Institute ofHealth (NIH) needed to
examine whether:
• "Baxter has failed to take, or is not expected to take in a reasonable time,
effective steps to achieve practical application of the subject inventions;
• It exists a health or safety need which is not reasonably satisfied by Hopkins or
Baxter"l77.
The NIH has decided not to initiate proceedings to pursue 'march-in' rights on the
basis of the available information. It stated that Hopkins and Baxter have taken the
required steps to achieve practical application of the applicable patents, and that the
evidence did not show an unmet health need that is not reasonably satisfied by Hopkins
and Baxter. This case has come under important criticism at that time, some authors
affirming that this case 'exemplifies the problems arising from academic secrecy,
broadly defined patents, and the lack of government oversight of commercialization of
university discoveries made using federal funds,,178.
Moreover, Mr. Ralph Nader, Mr. James Love and Mr. Robert Weissman have tried to
use the Bayh-Dole Act to enter into an agreement that would enable the World Health
Organization as well as other public health organizations to use US government rights
in patents on medicines and other health care inventions. In fact, under the Bayh-Dole
Act and its regulations179, 'the government can enter into an agreement with the World
Health Organization or other international public health and development groups, such
as UNICEF or UNAIDS, giving the organizations the right to use foreign rights in
177 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, Determination in the case ofPetition ofeel/Pro, Office of
the Director, August 1997.
178 Avital BAR-SHALOM and Robert COOK-DEGAN, "Patents and Innovation in Cancer Therapies:
Lessons from CeIlPro", Milbank Quarterly, December 2002.
179 18 USC 200 and seq.
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patents that benefited from federal funding,,180. The same request was made under the
Clinton's administration with no results. The absence of will to act from the last two
American administrations has left a lot of bitterness:
"The fact that this has not happened [the use of the Bayh-Dole to enter licensing agreements
with public health organizations regarding government-funded patents1, after years of requests,
shows a disregard for public health in poor countries. It is also shortsighted, because with
increasing globalization, diseases in other countries intensify dangers for our citizens. This is
not a proud chapter in our government's history, and we ask that the Bush Administration
correct this longstanding failure, and do what is best for the public health"181.
iii) 28 USC 1498
Section 28 USC 1498 renders it possible for the government of the United States to use
a patented invention or a copyright without being obliged to seek a license and
negotiate this use with the right holder. Through this section any government
employee may authorize or use a patented invention while it is impossible for the right
holder to prevent this use, although he is entitled to compensation. This immunity of
the government of the United States extends to any contractor, sub-contractor, firm or
corporation exercising activities on the behalfof the government.
This provision was referred to in this chapter where the Cipro/Anthrax case was
studied. The NIH also recommended that the researchers of publicly funded R&D
projects use section 28 USC 1498 to accelerate the negotiations over the use of
patented research tools, such as cell lines and human genes, as a result of growing
difficulties and longer delays in negotiating a license for the use of such inventions in
biomedical research182. So far this provision is what comes the closest, considering
liberal standards, in the US federal jurisdiction, to a compulsory license regime that we
find in many legislations of western countries. However, it is doubtful that this
provision can be used, at least under its current form, to allow a generic manufacturer
to enter into an agreement with a developing country for the provision of essential
180 Ralph NADER and aI., Letter from Ralph Nader, James Love, and Robert Weissman to US Secretary
ofHealth and Human Services Tommy Thompson, 28 March 2001, available at:
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health.
181 Id.
182 WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS, Report ofthe National Institute ofHealth, June 4th,
1998.
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medicines. Section 28 USC 1498(c) prevents the use of this provision for a claim
arising in a foreign country. Moreover, the work of the generic manufacturer in
question would need to qualify as 'under a government project' according to the
United States case law183 .
iv) Prescription Drug Compulsory Manufacture License Act of2005 (Washington D.C.
Compulsory Licensing Bill)
Since the last two federal governments have shown no interest in anything but
strengthening rather than lessening patent enforcement, state administrations, which
must bear the resulting sharp increase of the costs of Medicaid programs, are exploring
new avenues to force some kind of control over drug pricing into their jurisdiction.
One recent initiative that may lead to further actions by other states comes from
Washington D.C. On 1 February 2005, Councilman David Catania introduced a bill I 84
that would allow the D.C. government to issue compulsory licenses to FDA-approved
finns for the production of certain pharmaceuticals at rates far below those currently
offered. The bill would authorize Washington, D.C.'s mayor to declare a health
emergency and, under 'eminent domain' authority, issue a compulsory license to a
generic finn to produce selected patent drugs. The authority that leads to such action
takes its roots in a 1999 U.S. Supreme Court decision granting states immunity from
patent infringement in cases of legitimate public need [527 U.S. 627 (1999)]185. The
'eminent domain' authority is the one used by governments to:
"...appropriate private property for its own use without the owner's consent. Governments
must commonly use the power of eminent domain when the acquisition of real property is
necessary for the completion of a public project such as a road, and the owner of the required
property is unwilling to negotiate a price for its sale"186.
183Crater Corporation V. Lucent Technologies. Docket No. 00-1125.
184 B16-0114: Prescription Drug Compulsory Manufacture License Act of2005.
185 COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, "Catania Continues Crusade to Expand
Prescription Drug Access", 1 February 2005, accessible at:
http://www.dccouncil.us/CATANIAInews/20050201drugaccess.asp.
186 Wikipedia Encyclopedia, Definition of 'Eminent domain', available at:
http://en.wikipedia.orglwiki/Eminent domain.
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The 'eminent domain' authority remains untested regarding the appropriation of a
patent, i.e. it has never been used to appropriate intellectual (and immaterial) property
rights.
This initiative follows another measure from Mr. Catania last year which led to a
Access Rx bill, which requires in part that the District negotiate with drug companies
for discounted prices187.
However, this initiative did not receive a warm welcome among Washington D.C.'s
newspapers, nor from the brand-name manufacturers. In a Washington Post editorial
on 17 March 2005, the proposed Prescription Drug Compulsory Manufacture License
Act was stated as being 'an act of criminal socialism' 188. The act of using the eminent
domain authority to give the right compensation to patent owners for public use is
qualified as no less than 'stealing' in that same article. Another editorial from the
same newspaper warns that if a government in the United States seizes control of drug
patents resulting from high prices of medicines, it might also nationalize energy
companies, seize control of the private housing market, and also own supermarkets189.
The brand-name manufacturers also wanted to warn lawmakers that such legislation
would 'kill companies' financial incentives to research and develop new drugs',
through their patent law expert David Remes, representing the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America19o.
In fact, in addition to the allegations mentioned in the previous paragraph, the
Prescription Drug Compulsory License Act faces serious challenges before becoming
law. First, courts will have to determine whether the Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board V. College Service BanJ(91 is applicable to Washington
D.C., which is not a state but a federal territory. Secondly, the eminent domain
authority has never been used for the appropriation of intellectual property contrary to
land or real property. This would also have to be determined by the courts. Thirdly,
this bill may be unconstitutional as Congress alone has the power to regulate patents
187 Susan LEVINE, "Eminent Domain Urged as Tool to Cut Drug Costs", Washington Post, 17 March
2005.
188 ''No Rxfor Rising D.C. Costs ", Washington Times, 17 march 2005.
189 Doug BANDOW, "D.C.'s Drug Problem", Washington Times, 23 March 2005.
190 Id.
191 527 U.S. 627 (I 999).
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and licenses192• This is the bottom line argument against its validity. Even if the bill
succeeds through these three previous tests, it is far from sure that this bill will bring
any savings at all to the D.C. administration. In fact, under the eminent domain
authority, the D.C administration would have to compensate the right holder for the
loss of purchases at the rate this right holder would have sold his medicines in first
place. And moreover, there is still the 4% royalty of the generic price to be paid to the
right holder under the compulsory license regime. Perhaps a more profitable state
approach for public health authorities would be issuing the license as a remedy to
anticompetitive practices, under a state anti-trust regime, where the license is not just a
simple taking, but a remedy193.
Even considering all this uncertainty around the validity of the bill, Mr. Catania's
initiative is certainly a fresh approach that might put more attention on the patent
debate and the unwillingness to act from the President and the Congress. As eminent
domain requires just compensation for the patent, this may lead to a long, drawn-out
due process review and hearings to determine just compensation194. Increased
transparency in drug pricing may not be vcry profitable to brand-name manufacturers.
The bill may also serve as a model for other states that would be interested in this kind
of action.
3) Free-Trade Agreements with other countries
i) A new trend in adopting numerous Free-Trade Agreements
Over the last few years, the trends underlying world trade liberalization have reached
an interesting and somehow controversial juncture. While being in an ambitious round
of multilateral trade negotiations, the world, but especially the United States, have
increased their will and efforts to also conclude bilateral or regional trade agreements,
commonly referred to as Free Trade Agreements or FTAs.
"Recent FTAs negotiated by the US include US-Chile (2003), US-Jordan (2000), US-Morocco
(2004), US-Singapore (2003), and the US-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA
192 Constitution ofthe United States ofAmerica, Article I, section 8, clause 8.
193 Information gathered from a partially open forum on intellectual property, hosted by the Consumer
Project on Technology, section on health and intellectual property, archives, I3 February 2005,
accessible at: http://lists.essential.org/pipermaii/ip-health/2005-February/007469.html.
194 Barbara T. DREYFUSS, "Patents Pending", The American Prospect, 23 February 2005.
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2004) that includes the Dominican Republic. The US is also negotiating numerous new FTAs
with other developing countries including the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA
deadline 2005), Andean Countries, Thailand, Panama, Bahrain, and Southern African countries,
with others under consideration" 19S.
Since the momentum in forging bilateral or regional trade agreements is so well
advanced, there is very little debate as to whether the policy itself should be
pursued l96 ; the United States may, except for specific sectors, support this policy so as
to increase its geopolitical influence and facilitate the fight against terrorism rather
than increasing the trade in goods per se. As a shown by an International Monetary
Fund Study:
" ...apart from NAFTA members, US export of goods to other potential partners are not
significant as a share of total exports -less than 3% for Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Egypt, Israel,
Jordan, Morocco, Singapore, SACU and CAFTA individually. On the other hand, the partners
rely much more on their trading relationship with the United States and their shares of exports
to the US market have generally increased over time ... ,,197
Much of the economic incentive for the U.S. to pursue their policy toward increasing
the number of FTAs with diverse partners lies outside of merchandise trade. FTAs not
only regulate merchandise trade but also the trade in services, where the U.S. have a
very strong interest in opening the market as the world's principal exporter of services:
"Rules on liberalizing services as well as on such matters as intellectual property rights, the
environment, labor standards and provisions for uninhibited capital transfers are now standards
components of the new genre ofFTAs,,\98.
The increased attention on bilateralism or regionalism will likely have consequences
for other countries that are not party to the agreement. As concentration on building
bilateral and regional trade alliances increases, there is momentum towards multilateral
trade liberalization, where a larger scope of issues is covered and where developing
countries have more bargaining power and visibility as they often can team up together
under the same interests. As the number of FTAs increases, confusion may arise from
19S OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, Undermining Access to Medicines: Comparison offive US FTAs, June
2004, p.l.
196 Alvin HILAIRE and Yongzhen YANG, The United States and the New Regionalism/Bilateralism,
IMF Working Paper, WP 031206, October 2003, p.3.
197 Id., p.5.
198 Id., p.5.
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sometimes overlapping trade agreements and the increased administrative burden of
managing numerous trade agreements.
Developing countries may also become more vulnerable in the exercise of their
national sovereignty once an agreement is concluded, since trade preferences may be
modified or withdrawn, for political or other reasons l99.
ii) Entering FTAs to extend pharmaceutical patent protection at the expense of poor
populations
One of the sectors where merchandise trade is rather important for the United States is
the pharmaceutical manufacturing industry. According to Oxfam International:
"The U.S. is using bilateral and regional free-trade agreements to impose unnecessarily
stringent intellectual property standards on developing countries that go beyond even the
damaging requirements of the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. These new higher
standards favor the short term commercial interests of U.S. pharmaceutical companies, at the
expense of public health in developing countries,,20o.
Such agreements including more restrictions on trade than required by TRIPS to
protect patents are called TRIPS-plus agreements. TRIPS-plus agreements, while not
contravening the TRIPS agreement itself, are often entering in conflict with human
rights obligations such as the right to health and more particularly the access to
essential medicines. The provisions of five TRIPS-plus agreements, gathered by an
Oxfam studyOl, will be analyzed below.
The power to negotiate bilateral or regional FTAs is currently delegated to the
President of the United States by the Congress through the Trade Promotion Authority
Act of 2002202• When the Trade Act came to the floor of the Senate, the Senators
Feinstein and Kennedy brought an amendment to the section on the negotiating
o!Jjectives of the United States in trade negotiations203 that required the respect of the
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health adopted by the WTO in Doha
199 Id., p.8.
200 OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, op. cit., note 195, p.l.
201Id.
202 Public Law 107-210, loth Congress, August 6,2002.
203 Trade Promotion Authority Act of2002, section 2102b)(4)(c).
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on 14 November 2001. Even if it is stated in this declaration that the TRIPS
Agreement does not and should not prevent any member from taking measures to
protect public health, thus confirming the primacy of public health over patents in
international law, the U.S. administration has clearly ignored its international
obligations arising not only from the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health and the WTO Decision of August 2003 on parallel imports, but also from its
own legislation204 . In his speech of February 16th, 2005, the Senator Kennedy
regretted that instead of using the American legislation to allow urgently needed access
to medicines, the administration has used trade agreements to promote the interests of
the pharmaceutical industry at the expense of the access to drugs in developing
nations205 .
The report of Oxfam Internationafo6 has compared five FTAs with the TRIPS
Agreement and the Doha Declaration to examine if these FTAs comply with the
obligations the United States contracted in Marrakech and Doha; and this in different
fields related to patents and access to healthcare: patent term and regulatory approval,
compulsory licensing and data exclusivity, parallel importations, and the inclusion of a
bolar provision. The five agreements that will be examined are the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), US-Chile, US-Singapore, the Central America Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA), and the Free Trade Area ofthe Americas (FTAA).
1- Patent term and regulatory approval
The period of monopoly granted for a patent is intended as a reward for investing in
R&D that will improve the life of others and as a means to recover the related costs
and make profits to make investment in R&D appealing.
"The harmonization of the patent term among WTO members under TRIPS at 20 years
reflected a significant extension of the patent term in intemationallaw. This period was agreed
by WTO members as adequate for recuperation of the inventor's R&D and other investment
costs. TRIPS does not require extension of the patent term beyond 20 years for any reason,,207.
204 Id.
205 Senate Records, 15 February 2005, p. SI498-99.
206 OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, 00. cit., note 195, pA.
207 Id., p.6.
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However, all of the five FTAs open the door for a patent extension beyond 20 years as
a compensation for delays in issuing the patent or for delays in granting regulatory
approvat2°8.
2- Compulsory licensing and data exclusivity
Compulsory licensing, as mentioned previously in this report, serves as a means to
override patents, while providing compensation to the patent owner, for public health
purposes. The provisions on compulsory licensing included in TRIPS and Doha
Declaration are the best examples of the consensus of WTO members on the fact that
public healt~ interests should be given priority over patent rights in cases of national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency. The Doha Declaration
affirmed the right of WTO members to use compulsory licensing, and to determine for
themselves the grounds for its use.
However, all of the five FTAs provide language restricting grounds on which
compulsory licensing can be used. Four out of five agreements provide a data
protection period (NAFTA, US-Chile, US-Singapore, CAFTA) that would prevent
generic manufacturers from using clinical data gathered by the brand-name company.
Usually generic companies may use this data and need only to demonstrate
bioequivalence between the products. This period corresponds to the whole patent
protection period for US-Chile, US-Singapore and CAFTA; while for five years in
NAFTA.
Moreover, in the US-Singapore and FTAA agreements, compulsory licensing may
only be used in certain circumstances, when TRIPS and the Doha Declaration leave it
to WTO members to determine when its use is appropriate or necessary:
• For anti-competitive behavior;
• For public non-commercial use;
208 See NAFTA, Section 1709, article 12 - US-Chile, section 17.9(6), 17.10(2) and 17.9(5) - US-
Singapore, article 16.7(7), 16.8(4a) and 16.7(8) - CAFTA, article 15.9(6), 15.10(2) and 15.9(8)-
FTAA, section B.2.e, article 9 and section B.2.j, article 1.
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• For national emergencies.
When it comes to compensation for the right holder from the generic manufacturer
benefiting from the compulsory license, the US-Singapore agreement also brings a
higher standard of evaluation by using 'reasonable and entire' instead of 'adequate'
compensation209 .
3- Parallel importation
According to TRIPS and the Doha Declaration, each member of WTO can determine
their own rules on parallel importations21O • The term 'parallel importation' refers to
the importation of a patented product that has been commercialized both abroad and
domestically but sold for a cheaper price abroad.
There is no mention of 'parallel importation' in NAFTA, US-Chile or CAFTA, which
implies that the standards laid down in TRIPS should prevail. However, US-Singapore
and FTAA may be considered as 'TRIPS-plus' agreements. Article 16.7(2) of US-
Singapore limits parallel importation by requiring that the US and Singapore provide
patent holders with the means to block the importation of patented drugs into the US or
Singapore when same is done in violation of a distribution agreement anywhere in the
world. In FTAA, each country is allowed to determine its own rules regarding parallel
importation and exhaustion of right matters, as expressed in TRIPS. However, the
agreement becomes TRIPS-plus when the article 4 of section B.2.e obliges the parties
to review their exhaustion rules, at least at the regional level, within five years from the
entry into force of the agreement. This leaves the door open for the application of
political pressure from the U.S. to adopt national exhaustion rules according to Oxfam
Intemational211 .
209 For relevant provisions on compulsory licensing, see: NAFTA, section 1709, article 10- US-Chile,
article 17.9(4) and 17.10 - US-Singapore, article 16.7(6) - CAFTA, article 15.10(3) and 15.10(1)-
FTAA, section B.2.e, article 6.
210 See TRIPS, op. cit., note 8, article 6, and the Doha Declaration, op. cit., note 45, paragraphs 4 and 5c.
211 OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, op. cit., note 195, p.12.
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4- Bolar provision
A 'bolar provision' is an exception to patent rights that allows generic manufacturers
to produce a patented product in order to get marketing approval, so as to enter the
market upon patent expiry. Without such a provision, the patent term would be
substantially extended and generic firms would not be able to enter the market soon
after a patent expires. TRIPS provides flexibility for governments to set up bolar
provisions or other limited exceptions to patent rights2l2 .
All of the five agreements reflect TRIPS language on bolar provisions213 . However,
the FTAA agreement is more restrictive than TRIPS on two points. The article 5 of
section B.2.e requires an extension of the patent where granting of the patent is made
prior to marketing approval. Moreover, governments would have to notify the patent
owners who is seeking marketing approval and who would rely on originator test data
during the patent term. According to Oxfam International, "this type of provision has
been abused in the U.S. context by pharmaceutical companies and is under.
investigation,,214.
Chapter c) European Union
1) Position of the European Union in increasing the access to essential medicines for
developing countries
The European Union (EU) is one of the most important entities in the international
community, which confers it a predominant role in the formulation of human right
treaties, WTO obligations or other bilateral or regional trade agreements. This is
because the European Union has a common foreign policy, where the European
Commission negotiates on behalf of the Union's 25 Member States. As such, the EU
is one of the driving forces in the new round of multilateral trade negotiations in the
212 See TRIPS, article 30.
m NAFTA, section 1790, article 6 - US-Chile, section 17.9(3), section 17.9(4) - US-Singapore, section
16.7(3) and section 16.7(5) - CAFTA, section 15.9(3) and section 15.10(5) - FTAA, section B.2.e,
article 5.
214 OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, op. cit., note 195, p.19.
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WTO, the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), among other things. The EU trade
policy is based on article 133 of the European Community Treaty. Under this article
133, a special committee shall be formed with one representative from each of the 25
Member States and the European Commission. This special committee has the power
to determine future policies of the EU regarding trade and trade-related aspects.
The Trade Commissioner of the EU has ambitious objectives when it comes to
international trade in relation to developing countries:
"The main objective of the new round is to put development at the heart of the world trade
system in a way that will help them combat poverty,,215.
However, it has not always been this way. When South Africa adopted a legislative
framework to increase the availability of affordable medicines for HIV/AIDS by way
of generic substitution216, the European Commission joined the U.S. in pressuring the
South African authorities to repeal the legislation2l7 . Since the European Union
adopted a Program for Action to Accelerate Actions on HIV/AIDS in February 2001,
malaria and tuberculosis, it recognized the need to rebalance its priorities, reflecting a
shift in support of a pro-public health approach to TRIPS:
"DG Trade dropped its objections to the use of compulsory licensing to overcome patent
barriers to medicine access and became an advocate for a global tiered pricing system for
pharmaceuticals. These policy changes are in stark contrast to previous European Commission
policies, which closely track the pharmaceutical industry's agenda,,218.
As a major innovative force in the pharmaceutical sector the EU recognized that
intellectual property rights are an essential stimulus for creativity. It believes that
adequate protection should be enacted through WTO in order to encourage investment
in research and development of new medicines, and particularly those targeted at the
215 Eur~pean Union's website accessible at:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/newroundlindexen.htm.
216 Infra, Part V, chapter c).
217 E. HOEN, loco cit., note 69, p.206.
218 Id., p.21!.
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major communicable diseases219. However, the EU also recognizes that essential
medicines should not be diverted away from the patients who need them the most. It
took an important step towards this recognition on 26 May 2003 when it adopted a
regulation allowing exporters of life saving pharmaceuticals to deliver their products at
a sharply reduced price to developing nations. This new regulation220 was brought to
the discussion agenda at the Evian G8 Summit on 3 June 2003 (a noticeable effort to
press other G8 Members to address this issue) while the focus of the debates of the
other G8 Members was mainly on international terrorism and the ailing international
economy. In a joint answer to written questions on Doha trade talks and anti-retroviral
drugs, the Trade Commissioner Mr. Pascal Lamy reiterated on behalf of the
Commission its will to integrate public health concerns in intellectual property
policies:
" ... the Commission is fully committed to incorporating the Doha Declaration on Public Health
and TRIPS into its trade policies, and with particular regard to trade assistance for the
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. It is the view of the Commission that proper
implementation will improve access to medicines including antiretroviral (ARVs) to treat
HIV/AIDS,,221.
In fact, the European Community describes itself, within its Program of Action to
Fight mY/AIDS and other grave diseases, as being "at the forefront of international
efforts to establish a global tiered pricing system for key pharmaceuticals for the
poorest developing countries"m. It further states in that program of action that:
"[The European Community] remains convinced that a firm, long-term commitment from
manufacturers to supply these products at the lowest possible prices would be a major
contribution to the problem of access to affordable medicines. Further discussions will
therefore be pursued with the pharmaceutical industry, and with the public authorities in the
poorest developing countries, with a view to setting up such a system at the earliest
219 EUROPEAN UNION, TRIPS: Council Discussion on Access to Medicines, paper submitted by the
EU to the TRIPS Council, for the special discussion on intellectual property and access to medicines,
IP/C/W280, 12 June 2001, (01-2903).
220 Council Regulation (EC) No 953/2003 of26 May 2003 to avoid trade diversion into the European
Union ofcertain key medicines, Official Journal L 135, 03/06/2003, p. 0005-0011.
221 Written question E-1779/03 by Claude Moraes (PSE) to the Commission, Doha trade talks and
antiretroviral drugs, Official Journal 011E, 15101/2004, p.0225-0226.
222 Programme for action: Accelerated action on HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis in the context of
poverty reduction, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament,
COM(2001) 96 final, p.lO.
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opportunity. In the future, tiered pricing for the poorest developing countries should no longer
be the exception, but the rule,,223.
The European Community, through the Program of Action and the regulation cited
above, has placed much emphasis on preventing product diversion, i.e. the
reintroduction of the 'tiered priced' products in exporting markets, as it would both
harm the interests of the brand-name manufacturers and the much-needed medicines
would still be diverted from the population who needs them the most.
Following this, since the WTO General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 on the
implementation ofParagraph 6 ofthe Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health was finally adopted, the European Parliament and the Council formulated a
proposal for a regulation allowing compulsory licensing of patents for developing
countries with public health problems224 . The European Union, while it held the Joint
Parliamentary Assembly of the Partnership Agreement between the members of the
African, Caribbean and Pacific Group ofStates and the European Community and its
Member States, also adopted the Resolution on the importation and local production of
generic drug?25, which will be described below.
2) European Union legal documents supporting an increased access to essential
medicines for developing countries
i) Resolution on the importation and local production of generic drugs
From 19 to 22 March 2001, in Libreville, Gabon, members of the African, Caribbean
and Pacific Group of States and the European Community and its member states met to
discuss and negotiate initiatives for the importation and the local production of generic
drugs in developing countries. At that time, the efforts by South Africa to import and
locally produce affordable generic drugs were being hampered by a court action
brought by multinational pharmaceutical companies against their 1997 Act concerning
223 Id., p.1 O.
224 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Proposalfor a Regulation ofthe European
Parliament and ofthe Council on compulsory licensing ofpatents relating to the manufacture of
pharmaceutical products for export to countries with public health problems, Brussels, November 2004,
accessible at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal market/en/indprop/patent/draft medicines en.pdt:
225 Official Journal (European Union) 265,20/09/2001, p. 0024-0025.
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the control of medicines and related substances. In the meantime, the prices of
essential medicines were decreasing very slowly if decreasing at all, even though the
WHO was supporting South Africa in its efforts to obtain cheaper medicines by
importing and producing locally generic drugs for HIV/AIDS.
Thus, the developed and developing countries present in Libreville adopted this
Resolution probably to increase political pressure on the pharmaceutical manufacturers
and the governments involved to withdraw the court action with South Africa.
Specifically, the Resolution calls for:
• The multinational pharmaceutical companies to reduce the costs of patented
HIV/AIDS drugs to honor the commitments made in Seattle (paragraphs 1 and
2);
• The TRIPS Agreement to be revised in order to render developing countries
able to adopt legislation favoring fair access to cheapest medicines as possible
for the population and obtain partial or full waivers on patents in favor of
public health interests (paragraphs 3 and 4);
• The pharmaceutical industry to make available affordable HIV/AIDS
medicines to developing countries, to withdraw the court action against South
Africa, and to participate to the establishment of a global funding mechanism
to promote development of vaccines as well as the purchase, in large quantities
and for distribution amongst the poor, of a full range of drugs to combat
HIV/AIDS and other diseases (paragraphs 5, 7 and 8);
• The development of safeguards within the WTO, including compulsory
licensing, and the commitment by the Commission to launch a debate in the
WTO on reconciling the TRIPS Agreement with the objectives of health
protection in developing countries (paragraph 6/26 •
226Id.
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ii) Council Regulation (EC) No 953/2003 of 26 May 2003 to avoid trade diversion into
the European Union of certain key medicines227
This EU Council Regulation on trade diversion is formulated to encourage
pharmaceutical companies to reduce the price of certain medicines in a number of poor
countries by preventing their re-importation in the markets of rich countries, as this
measure facilitates the policing of existing laws regarding the illegal import of patented
products. This regulation will apply to all products that are offered at tiered prices,
whether patented or generic, since the article 1(2)(a) defines 'tiered priced product' as
"any pharmaceutical product used in the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of a
disease referred to in Annex IV which is priced in accordance with one of the optional
price calculations set out in article 3, verified by the Commission or an independent
auditor as provided for in article 4 and entered in the list of tiered priced products set
out in Annex 1,,228. The diseases targeted by the Council's regulation, as set out in
Annex IV, are HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and related opportunistic diseases.
Territorially, the scope of the regulation is relatively broad, although some countries
where the damage caused by HIV/AIDS are significant were omitted in Annex II. For
example, for no apparent reason, Papua New Guinea, with a gross national income of
per capita of only $700US, cannot benefit from this important and symbolic European
development initiative229 . This Annex still provides a list of the 72 countries where the
exportation of 'tiered priced' pharmaceuticals is allowed.
The core mechanism of this regulation is included in article 2:
Article 2
1. It shall be prohibited to import into the Community tiered priced products for the purposes of
release for free circulation, re-export, placing under suspensive procedures or placing in a free
zone or free warehouse.
227 Official Journal L 135,03/06/2003, p. 0005-0011.
228 Id., article 2 (a).
229 OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, "Oxfam response to ED trade diversion regulation", accessible at :
http://lists.essential.orglpipermail/ip-health/2002-December/003 898.htm I.
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2. The following shall be exempted from the prohibition regarding tiered priced products as set
out in paragraph I:
(a) re-export to countries of destination;
(b) placing under a transit or customs warehouse procedure or in a free zone or free warehouse
for the purposes of re-export to a country of destination.
Although the NGO Oxfam 'welcomes the Commission's efforts to boost access to
medicines for developing countries and believes that the Commission has a critical role
to play in the immediate development of an international system to promote offers of
cheaper prices in developing countries,230, it still states that this regulation on trade
diversion is insufficient to significantly reduce the pricing of essential medicines in the
developing world. It further states that:
" ...comprehensive reductions in the cost of medicines will only be achieved through reform of
the TRIPS Agreement to allow flexible patenting, combined with improved drug procurement
measures,,231 .
These views were expressed prior to the adoption of the Decision ofthe WTO General
Council on the Implementation of the paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration232 , which
gives more flexibility on patenting rules and allows parallel imports in developing
countries under specific conditions as we have seen previously in this analysis. In fact,
the adoption of this new device in international law was essential to give full effects to
this regulation, allowing a government of a developing country where a drug is
patented to import the 'tiered priced' drug, therefore not limiting the effects of the
European regulation only to developing countries where such drug would not be
patented.
Moreover, Oxfam suggests three other amendments to this regulation that would make
it more adequate to efficiently combat poverty and recurring diseases in the developing
world:
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Doha Declaration, op. cit., note 18.
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• The disease scope of this regulation should be broadened beyond HIV/AIDS,
malaria and tuberculosis. Diabetes and asthma are also problems in developing
countries;
• The country scope of the regulation should be extended, as currently it does not
protect pharmaceutical manufacturers offering 'tiered priced' medicines in
other poor countries. This appears to be an arbitrary cut-off point, all
developing countries should benefit from a system that reduces the price of
vital, lifesaving medicines;
• As products exported under this regime will be deemed to be 'fairly priced',
incentives for maximum discounts should be given. As set out in article 3, 20%
of the average OECD price will not provide sufficient incentive for companies
to offer maximum discounts, i.e. as close as possible to the costs of
d . 233pro uctlOn .
iii) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
compulsory licensing of patents relating to the manufacture of pharmaceutical products
for export to countries with public health problems
The European Commission issued this proposal for a regulation on 29 October 2004 to
implement at Community level the WTO General Council Decision of August 3(jh,
2003 on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health234 • The main goal of this proposed regulation is to allow
generic manufacturers to produce patented medicines that will be exported to
developing countries with insufficient or no capacity in the pharmaceutical sector.
This would be done by way of compulsory licenses, as provided in the General
Council's Decision. Under the current system in force in the European Community,
the national governments can only grant compulsory licenses for use within their own
jurisdiction and cannot export compulsory licensed products to the majority of
countries that have no domestic pharmaceutical industry for essential medicines.
233 OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, loco cit., note 229.
234 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 00. cit., note 224, preamble.
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There are no limitations on the scope of medicines or diseases that are targeted by the
proposed regulation. In fact, the definition of 'pharmaceutical product' in article 2
refers to 'any product of the pharmaceutical sector, including medicinal products as
defined in article 1(2) of Directive 200l/83/EC of the European Parliament and the
Council'235. However, only WTO Members will be able to seek cheap medicines
manufactured under a compulsory license under this regulation236 . According to the
article 4 of the proposed regulation, the WTO members that do not qualify as a 'least
developed country' will need to notify the World Trade Organization 'of its intention
to use the system as an importer, including whether it will use the system in whole or
in a limited way'. Restricting the potential benefits to the populations of the members
of the WTO seems to be in total contradiction with the right to health. We think that
all least-developed countries and developing countries should be entitled to contract
with European generic manufacturers, whether they belong to the WTO or not.
Moreover, the WTO members that declared previously to the WTO that they will not
use the system as an importing member are not eligible for the current regime237 .
Similarly to what we have in the Council Regulation (EC) No 953/2003 of 26 May
2003 to avoid trade diversion into the European Union of certain key medicinei38,
some emphasis has been put on preventing the re-importation in the European
Community of the products exported under a compulsory license, except if those
products are re-imported to be further exported to the same WTO member cited in the
application and identified in the packaging and documentation associated with those
products239. In that case, the right holder over a patented product will be entitled to use
existing national laws to enforce its rights if the product is smuggled back in240 .
Additional restrictions regarding who can contract with European generic
manufacturers are also included in the proposed regulation. According to article
5(3)g), the generic producer applying for a compulsory license has to submit evidence
of a specific request for the pharmaceutical product in question 'from authorized
representatives' of the importing country, 'indicating quantity of product required'.
235 Official Journal, L 311, 28/1112001, p.67.
236 EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, op. cit., note 224, section 4.
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238 Id., section 10.
239 Id., section II.
240 Id., article 12.
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According to the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, "this likely means that only
governments of importing developing countries can purchase products from generic
manufacturers,,241. Since NGOs are already purchasing medicines from brand name
and generic manufacturers for use in their programs, it is quite unfortunate to cut off
this avenue to obtaining cheaper medicines for their patients. Moreover, to efficiently
carry out their task in some cases, NGOs need to be independent from the local
government. The way article 5(3)g) of the proposed regulation is currently drafted,
NGOs would need to become the agents of a government to have access to these
cheaper drugs.
As required by the TRIPS Agreemenr42, article 7 of the proposed regulation states that:
"The applicant shall provide evidence to satisfy the competent authority that he has made
efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and
conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time.
The determination of a reasonable period of time shall take into account whether the importing
WTO member has declared a situation of national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency".
Medecins Sans Frontieres declared on 29 October 2004 that they regret that the
proposal requires prior negotiations with the patent holder, which will inevitably delay
the swift use of the mechanism243 . The Canadian HIVIAIDS Legal Network, added
that:
"...the ED [proposed] regulation is dangerously vague on these points. It does not provide any
guidance as to what is a 'reasonable term and condition' of a license, nor as to what constitutes
a 'reasonable period of time' for trying to negotiate a voluntary license before the way is clear
to apply for a compulsory license. It simply repeats the undefined terms from the original
WTO agreement,,244.
241 Richard ELIOTT, "Doha para 6 implementation: ED proposal vs. Canadian legislation" opinion
given on the Consumer Project for Technnology Forum, available at:
http://lists.essentiaI.org/pipermaiI/ip-health/2004-November/007091.htmI.
242 TRIPS, section 31 (b).
243 MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES, MSF Statement on EC proposalfor export ofgenerics to
developing countries, accessible at : www.accessmed-msf.org/prod/publications.
244 Richard ELIOTT, loc. cit., note 241.
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Oxfam also expressed their concerns about costly delays in ordering generic essential
pharmaceutical products:
" ... in the event of a public health emergency in a developing country, European governments
should not require potentially time-consuming negotiations with the patent holder before
issuing a compulsory license for export,,245.
Even if developing countries manage to negotiate reasonable terms with European
generic manufacturers, the legal mechanism agreed within the WTO is complex, their
markets may not be large enough to allow generic companies to offer cheaper prices.
The European governments will need to monitor how this new legal framework will
work in practice, in order to reach the point where generic production is no longer the
exception but the norm in developing countries246 .
There is an interesting provision in the proposed regulation that we think should be
underlined concerning the regulatory approval for the safety of a particular drug.
According to the article 16 of the proposed regulation, a generic manufacturer may
avail itself of the scientific opinion procedure provided in the Directive 2001/83/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of6 November 2001 on the Community
code relating to medicinal products for human use247 but it is in no way mandatory.
As a result, some requirements regarding the length of the marketing authorization and
the communication of pharmacovigilance information to the general public are not
applicable to the regime provided in the proposed regulation248 . This exception to the
usual regulatory review of generic products only applies to the products that will be
exported under the regime of the proposed regulation. Generic producers selling
versions of existing products that have already been approved for sale in the European
Community usually need only to go through an abbreviated review process
demonstrating the bioequivalence of both products. Bioequivalence will still be the
requirement regarding drug safety for exported generic drugs, since an exception has
been included in the proposed regulation if there is no 'reference product' approved in
245 OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, EC gives positive signal on access to cheap medicines, Oxfam press
release, available at: http://lists.essentiai.orgipipermaiI/ip-health/2004-November/007090.html.
246Id.
247 Official Journal L 311, 28/1112001, p.0067-0128.
248 See sections 24(4) and (5) and 14(4) and (5) of Regulation (EC) No. 726/2004 of the European
Parliament and the Council and section 6 of Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Commission.
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the European Community. In that case, if it was not under the exception, a generic
product for export would need to comply with the full regulatory process that brand
name drugs usually need to go through, which is time-consuming and very costly249.
This would be the case, for example, with numerous 'fixed dose combinations' of anti.,
retroviral drugs that combine several drugs in only one pill, described as a 'first-line
therapy by the WH0250. Very few 'fixed dose combinations' have been approved for
sale in western jurisdictions since they combine drugs which are patented by different
competitor brand-name companies. The study for the safety of a generic drug could be
based on data information that may be obtained from other jurisdictions, or from
scientific studies carried out in universities or by NGOs for, and not necessarily from
the formal regulatory review body of the European Community.
After reviewing laws and policies from developed countries mentioned above
regarding an increased access to essential medicines for developing countries, we will
now turn to the analysis of public health safeguards in intellectual property legislation
at the national level favouring an increased access to essential medicines in developing
countries.
PART V - MEASURES TAKEN IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW BY
BRAZIL, INDIA, AND SOUTH AFRICA IN ORDER TO INCREASE ACCESS
TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES FOR THEIR POPULATIONS
Chapter a) Brazil
1) Us. vs. Brazil: The Brazilian AIDS Program
From the mid-1990's, the Brazilian government has implemented a state program on
AIDS care, through which universal access to ARV treatment was promoted. The
capacity to control the mY/AIDS epidemic in Brazil and the number of sick people
under ARV treatment makes the Brazilian state program one of the best example to
follow for other states to fight HIV/AIDS. That program also proved to have positive
effects on public spending as a consequence of significant cuts in hospital costs at the
249 Richard ELIOTT, loco cit., note 241.
250 rd.
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charge of the state. In fact, Brazil achieved very sound results through its health policy
based on universal access to ARVs:
"An estimated 536,000 people are infected with HIV in Brazil, with 203,353 cases of AIDS
reported to the Ministry of Health from 1980 through December 2000. In 2001, 105,000
people with HIV/AIDS received ARV treatment. The Brazilian AIDS program has reduced
AIDS-related mortality by more than 50 percent between 1996 and 1999. In two years, Brazil
saved $472 million in hospital costs and treatment costs for AIDS-related infections,,251.
Brazil could afford to take the means to achieve universal access to ARVs as a result of
its ability to produce medicines locally. In Brazil, the price of AIDS drugs fell by 82
percent over five years because of generic competition. In the meantime, the price of
the drugs that had no generic competitors within this market only fell 9 percent over
the same period252•
In fact, the implementation of the Brazilian program shows the benefits that increased
competition may bring to pricing of essential drugs. When Brazil began to purchase
antiretroviral drugs in large quantities in 1996, it purchased the active ingredients for
two of these products from Asian generic suppliers for prices in excess of US $20,000
per kilo253 • By 1999, the prices for these two ingredients have fallen respectively to
US $8,000 and US $5,000. Since the Brazilian purchases constituted a significant
market for generic products, the prices for these products have recently fallen to
approximately US $500 per kilo254 •
However, although the Brazilian program constituted one of the best examples to
follow for high-income developing countries regarding the achievement of significant
progress through universal access to ARVs for its population, the United States and the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PhRMA) have done everything to
discredit that program, claiming that it was not meeting the international standards on
patent protection.
251 Ellen 't HOEN, loco cit., note 69, p.206-207.
252 Id., p.207.
253 Affidavit ofJames Love, South Africa - Competition Commission Complaint Against
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The conflict between the U.S. and Brazil can be traced back to June 11 th, 1987, when
the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association filed a petition to USTR complaining of
Brazil's lack of process and patent protection for pharmaceutical products as an
unreasonable practice that burdens or restricts US commerce255 • Accordingly, on July
23 rd, 1987; the USTR initiated an investigation and requested consultation with Brazil,
which were held on February 29, 1988, but did not lead to any results. On July 21 st,
1988, the President of the U.S. determined that the Brazilian policies regarding patent
protection were unreasonable regarding U.S commerce, and this lead to public
hearings that were held on September 8th and 9th. This eventually lead to tariff
increases of 100% ad valorem on certain Brazilian products, such as some paper
products, non-benzenoid drugs, and consumer electronics items, which were
proclaimed on October 20 t\ 1988, and became effective on October 30t\ 1988256 .
As a result of these trade sanctions, the Government of Brazil announced on June 26t\
1990, that it would follow-up with the presentation of a bill ensuring the provision of
patent protection for pharmaceutical products and the process of their production.
Therefore, the USTR announced on June 2i\ 1990, that it was in the interest of the
United States to terminate trade sanctions against Brazil since it was determined that
'Brazil has taken satisfactory measures to eliminate the practices that were determined
by the President to be unreasonable and a burden or restriction to U.S. commerce257.
Since patent rules would now find a stricter application in Brazil, the authorities
formulated provisions and mechanisms that would allow the local industry to survive,
and the interests of the population in general to be respected, such as public health. An
example of these provisions that brought much controversy is the article 68 of the 1996
industrial property law (Law no. 9.279/96):
"Under that provision, Brazil requires holders of Brazilian patents to manufacture the product
in question within Brazil - a so-called 'local working' requirement. If the company does not
fulfill this requirement, the patent shall be subject to compulsory licensing after three years,
unless the patent holder can show that it is not economically feasible to produce in Brazil or
255 PhRMA, PhRMA 's 1987petition to USTR, from which passages are available at:
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/braziI/.
256 rd.
257 rd.
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can otherwise show that the requirement to produce locally is not reasonable. If the company is
allowed to work its patent by importation instead of manufacturing in Brazil, parallel import by
others will be permitted,,258.
In February 2001, the U.S. took action against Brazil through the WTO procedure over
this article 68 of the Brazilian patent law. The U.S. argued that the Brazilian law was
discriminating U.S. patent holders registered in Brazil and that their rights were
curtailed by this provision259 • Moreover, the U.S. stated that the article 68 of the
Brazilian patent law was violating article 27 (1) and article 28 (1) of TRlPS60, which
lay down the basic rights and obligations conferred by patents at the international level.
Brazil answered by stating that article 68 was in line with the spirit of TRIPS,
including article 5 (4) of the Paris Convention, which allows compulsory licensing if
there is a failure to work a patenf61 • Brazil also issued a counter-complaint, which
focused on articles 204 and 205 of Title 35 of the US patent code, stating that it was
discriminating against foreign producers262• The outcome of this action would have
been rather interesting for Canada since it had a 'local working' requirement until it
became a member of NAFTA in the early nineties, when this provision needed to be
repealed to comply with new international obligations263 • Section 68 of the Brazilian
patent law translated in English may be read as follows:
"Section 68: A patentee will be subject to having its patent compulsorily licensed if he
exercises rights resulting therefore in an abusive manner or by means of abuse of economic
power proven under the terms of the law by an administrative or court decision.
§1 The following may also result in a compulsory license:
- Non-exploitation of the subject matter or the patent in the territory of Brazil, by lack of
manufacture or incomplete manufacture of the product or, furthermore, by lack of complete use
of a patented process, except in the case of non-exploitation due to economic unfeasibility,
when importation will be permitted; or
- Commercialization that does not meet the market needs.
258 Ellen 't HOEN, loc. cit., note 69, p.207.
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§5 A compulsory license, to which §I refers, may only be requested after 3 (three) years form
grant date,,264.
While this was a trade dispute, Brazil was also active on the human rights scene to
condemn U.S. behavior regarding the application of patent law. On April 23, 2001, the
UN Commission on Human Rights passed a resolution promoting access to
pharmaceuticals proposed by Brazil and titled Access to Medication in the Context of
Pandemics Such As HIVIAIDS. The resolution was adopted 52 votes against none with
only the U.S. abstaining. Among other things, the resolution calls for:
"- The availability in sufficient quantities of pharmaceuticals and medical technologies used to
treat pandemics such as HIV/AIDS or the most common opportunistic infections that
accompany them;
- The accessibility to all without discrimination, including the most vulnerable sectors of the
population, of such pharmaceuticals or medical technologies and their affordability for all,
including socially disadvantaged groups;
- The accessibility to all without discrimination, including the most vulnerable sectors of the
population, of such pharmaceuticals or medical technologies and their affordability for all,
including socially disadvantaged groups.
About two months later, the U.S Trade Representative announced on June 25th, 2001,
that the United States and Brazil 'have agreed to transfer their disagreement over a
provision of Brazil's patent law from formal WTO litigation to a newly created
bilateral consultative mechanism ,265.
"The Bush administration wants to resolve trade disputes by seeking constructive solutions to
problems that arise. I stand four-square behind strong enforcement of the WTO rules on
intellectual property. However, litigating this dispute before a WTO panel has not been the
264 Law 9279/86 on Intellectual Property Law, effective as of May 15th, 1997.
265 USTR, United States and Brazil agree to use newly created Consultative Mechanism to promote
cooperation on HIV/AIDS and address WTO patent dispute, The Office of the United States Trade
Representative, June 25 th, 2001, accessible at:
http://www.ustr.gov/document library/press releasesl200l/June/United States Brazil.
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most constructive way to address our differences, especially since Brazil has never actually
used the provision at issue,,266.
Still, the U.S. continues to view local manufacturing requirements as being contrary
and inconsistent to various WTO rules and general principles. As a counterpart, Brazil
has agreed to provide advance notice to the U.S. if it plans to use article 68 of its
intellectual property la~67. The Government of Brazil issued a press communique on
June 25 th, 2001, to announce the withdrawal of the case, stating that it was still holding
its grounds regarding the litigation:
"The Government of Brazil receives with great satisfaction the decision by Government of the
United States to withdraw the panel against Brazil at the WTO concerning the compatibility of
article 68 of the Brazilian Industrial Property Law (Law 9279/96) with the TRIPS Agreement.
In the event it deems necessary to apply article 68 to grant compulsory licenses on patents held
by U.S. companies, the Brazilian Government agrees to hold prior talks with U.S Government.
These talks would be held within the scope of the U.S.-Brazil Consultative Mechanism, in a
special session scheduled to discuss the subject.
Brazil maintains its conviction that Article 68 is fully consistent with the TRIPS Agreement
and an important instrument available to the Government, in particular in its efforts to increase
access of the population to medicines and to combat diseases such as AIDS,,268.
In fact, it was widely viewed that the request seeking an appointment with a WTO
panel was dropped by the U.S. as a result of fierce criticisms from NGOs and the
general public269, as they feared that it would have a detrimental effect on the Brazil's
successful AIDS program270.
On August 22, 2001, Brazil threatened to issue a compulsory license for the production
of the antiretroviral drug nelfinavir as a result of unsuccessful negotiations between the
Brazilian Government and Roche. On August 31St, the parties reached an agreement
266 Id..
267 Id.
268 Government of BRAZIL, Press Communique by the Government o/Brazil, June 25 th , 2001,
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through which Roche will continue· to sell nelfinavir in Brazil at an additional 40
percent discount while Brazil will not issue the compulsory license27 \ •
Although Brazil has certainly benefited from the withdrawal of the U.S. complaint to .
the WTO, giving away a 'right of supervision' on day-to-day administration of patent
law to another nation, especially one as powerful as the U.S. should be the object of
cautious reflections. Even if the objection of the U.S. aimed solely at the 'local
working' requirement, the joint U.S.-Brazil statement seems to cover the entire article
when it states that:
"The Brazilian Government wiII agree, in the event it deems necessary to apply Article 68 to
grant compulsory license on patents held by U.S. companies, to hold prior talks on the matter
with the U.S.. These talks would be held within the scope of the U.S-Brazil Consultative
Mechanism, in a special session scheduled to discuss the subject." 272
2) Compulsory licensing used as a threat in order to get price reductions
So far, Brazil never needed to make use of its compulsory license regime to produce
cheap drugs. In fact, after long negotiations with the Swiss drug giant Roche, the
Brazilian Government came to an agreement to cut the price of the AIDS drug
Viracept by a further 40 percent, which ended the threats by the government to break
the patent and produce the drug 10cally273. After that discount, the price for Viracept in
Brazil will amount to about 30 percent of its price in the United States; it was about 50
percent of that price prior to the negotiations. It was reported that no country has ever
issued a compulsory license as a result of high prices on essential drugs and health
crisis, and it was widely viewed that if Brazil would have gone ahead with the idea,
other developing countries with high numbers of people suffering from AIDS might
have followed274 • This agreement happened, as it must be underscored, a few weeks
prior to the WTO negotiations held in Doha on patents and access to health care.
271 See the Consumer Project on Technology web page on Brazil at:
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Similarly, the same story repeated itself in 2003 when Brazil announced on November
18th that it had reached an agreement with Merck for the provision of Efavirenz at 25
percent off, and with Bristol-Myers Squibb for Atazanavir at a 76 percent reduction
one week before that275 • Again, Brazil has put pressure on pharmaceutical companies
to reduce their drug prices by threatening to make generic copies locally if they did not
oblige. Moreover, the Brazilian Health Ministry said it was continuing talks with two
other drug companies in an effort to negotiate further price reductions, namely Roche,
which produces Nelfinavir, and Abbott, which manufactures Lopinavir276.
These two deals occurred about two months after the Decision ofthe WTO Council on
the implementation ofparagraph 6 ofthe Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and public health, allowing the issuance of a compulsory license for the provision of
pharmaceuticals for foreign markets lacking the manufacturing capacity to produce
essential drugs and the subsequent announcement made by Brazil that it intended to
import generic medications from China and India277 .
On June 24th, 2005, since the negotiations with Abbott did not come to a conclusion,
Brazil announced that a compulsory license would be issued in 10 days for lopinavir +
ritonavir (kaletra). The Ministry of Health of Brazil has declared the antiretroviral
drug kaletra of public interest, which enables the Brazilian Government to adopt a
compulsory license regarding this medication in case the manufacturer does not
provide guarantees for the sustainability of the national AIDS Program278 • This time,
the authorities decided not to use the 'local working' requirement at article 68 but the
article 71 of the Brazilian patent law on national emergencies and public interest:
"Article 71: In cases of national emergency or public interest, declared in an act of the Federal
Executive Authorities, insofar as the patentee or his licensee does not meet such demand, a
275 BBC News, New anti-HIV drug deal for Brazil, November 18, 2003, available at:
http://news. bbc.co.uklgo/pr/ti'/-/I/hilworld/americas/328 I683.stm.
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public interest and will produce it in Brazil", June 24th, 2005, available at:
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temporary ex-officio non-exclusive compulsory license for the exploitation of the patent may be
granted, without prejudice to the rights of the respective patentee,,279.
The notice to the manufacturer was intended as an ultimatum; the laboratory had ten
days from receipt of the notice to inform the Brazilian Ministry of Health that it was
prepared to reduce the sales price of Kaletra to national production levels280• In case
Abbott would not agree to reduce its sales price, the Ministry of Health would go
ahead in issuing the compulsory license to a national laboratory. There are 16 types of
antiretroviral drugs that are distributed free of charge through the national program in
Brazil. Kaletra is from a new generation of antiretroviral drugs and is administered to
those that have already developed resistance to other medication281 • But the share of
expense for the newest generation of ARVs in the total budget devoted to the
acquisition of drugs in the Brazilian program is enormous:
"Today close to 80 percent of the budget of the AIDS National Program for ARVs is spent on
imported patented drugs. 70 percent is spent on the purchase of four patented drugs,
LopinavirlRitonavir, Tenofovir, Efavirenz and Nelfinavir. Brazilian public and private
companies are only producing 7 out of 16 drugs that are used in the tri-therapy while there is
capacity to produce all of the needed medicines,,282.
The arinouncement of the ultimatum provoked significant reactions from different
stakeholders. Obviously, civil society organizations were very enthusiastic regarding
the procedure that the Brazilian Government had taken, and some asked for a wider
non-application in developing countries affected by HIV/AIDS. That was the case for
Health GAP (Global Access Project), which issued this statement when the decree
authorizing a compulsory license was proclaimed:
"The medicines are critical for HIV treatment when initial combinations of medicines have
failed. The high cost of second generation patented HIV/AIDS drugs threatens the
sustainability of treatment program not only in Brazil, but troughout the developing world ...
Now other countries, particularly countries with the capacity to produce and export medicines
279 Law 9279/86, note 264.
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to other countries must follow suit and break the patent monopolies of overpriced AIDS drugs
in order to ensure access to affordable life-long treatment,,283.
Even within the United States, the announcement of the possibility of the issuance of a
compulsory license in Brazil raised positive reactions among U.S. Congressmen. U.S.
Representative Tom Allen expressed publicly his agreement with the measure taken by
the Brazilian Government:
"Brazil's issuance ofa compulsory license for HlV/AIDS drugs is an appropriate and legal tool
to use when the high prices charged by brand-name manufacturer limit the number of
HIV/AIDS patients that can be treated,,284.
He further reaffirms that the use of a compulsory license in the public interest is
unconditionally legal under the light of the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha
Declaration on Public Health, and made direct reference to the latter, its paragraph 4
stating that 'each WTO Member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted'.
Moreover, U.S. Representative Henry A. Waxman, the father of the so-called Hatch-
Waxman Act that has been discussed previously85, has also showed support for the
Brazilian initiative.
"Some who oppose Brazil's action have claimed that it violates trade rules. In fact, the World
Trade Organization's 1994 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
specifically permits compulsory licensing,,286.
But PhRMA and many pro-industry groups also expressed hostile reactions towards
the Brazilian action. PhRMA expressed its polite disagreement in a press statement on
July 1st, 2005, stating that the solution for mY/AIDS does not lie in breaking patents,
283 HEALTH GAP (Global Access Project), Brazil Breaks Patent on Monopoly on Costly HIV Medicine
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since the members of PhRMA are 'devoted to inventing medicines that allow patients
to live longer, healthier, and more productive lives,287. Therefore, PhRMA is of the
opinion that:
"As a matter of policy, the solution to helping Brazilian HIV/AIDS patients lies in furthering
the constructive relationships between our companies and the government of Brazil - not
breaking patents,,288.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce warned 'all investors around the world' about the
dangerous precedent the Brazilian initiative sets for the treatment of intellectual
property289. Abbott, the patent holder of Kaletra, affirms that Brazil, as the world's 9th
largest economy, should not benefit from the same relief as developing countries and
that this would be contrary to the spirit of the TRIPS Agreemenf90.
"Compulsory licensing would have significant negative consequences for the global discovery
and development of future treatments for all disease areas, not just HIV/AIDS. In the end,
without innovation and new therapies, it is the people fighting HIV/AIDS and many other
devastating diseases who will lose,,29\.
Opposite to some reports, other countries have previously used a compulsory license to
attempt to slow down the spread of mY/AIDS within their borders: Mozambique,
Malaysia, Indonesia, and South Africa292. But most certainly, perhaps along with
South Africa, but probably for different reasons that will be discussed in next section,
this was the most meditated case of this sort.
As brand-name manufacturers did previously when their interests were threatened by
the issuance of a compulsory license, Abbott announced that a deal has been reached
with Brazil on July 8th, 2005. Abbott was pleased to affirm that 'the agreement
accomplished Abbott's objectives of helping Brazil to expand patients access to
287 PhRMA, PhRMA Statement on Protecting Patent Rights in Brazil, July I't, 2005,_ available at:
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Kaletra while preserving the company's intellectual property rights, which Abbott was
not willing to negotiate,293. It further underscores that strong intellectual property is
the reason why many HIV treatments are available today, and will make it possible to
find new cures in the future as the HIV virus continues to evolve. Abbott reiterates its
"commitment to the protection of intellectual property in order that innovation keep on
flourishing for the benefit of the patients all over the world294".
However, this agreement with Abbott frustrated many Brazilians. The terms of the
agreement were said to be ambiguous and impossible to evaluate because of the lack of
transparency of the information given by the govemmenf95. In fact, 'Abbott presented
a gradual price reduction proposal up to 2010, foreseeing an increase on the number of
patients from around 23 to 60 thousand in this period. Additionally, the company
would offer technology transfer from 2009 onwards, only 6 years before the patent
expires in Brazil,296. The Associa9ao Brasileira Interdisciplinar de AIDS has
identified three serious flaws into the agreement:
• Pricing will only drop from 2006 at a very gradual pace, and in order to
reach the lowest price provided by the agreement by 2010, it would be
necessary to prescribe Kaletra to patients that do not need it. Such an
increase of users of Kaletra is not expected, and this requirement is not
necessary.
• The fact that Brazil, the largest market amongst the middle-income
countries, will not have a dramatic cut in price before 4 or 5 years, will
dramatically restrict the room of maneuver of other developing countries in
the price reduction negotiations.
293 ABBOTT, Abbott Statement on Agreement with Brazilian Government/or Kaletra ®
(Lopinavir/Ritonavir), Canada Newswire, July 9th , 2005, available at:
http://press.arrivenet.com/bus/article.php/665926.html.
294 Id.
295 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WORKING GROUP ofRede Brasileira pela Integrat;ao dos Povos,
"Agreement of the Brazilian Government with Abbott frustrates Brazilians", July 14th, 2005, available
at:
http://www.rebrip.org.br/publique/cgi/public/cgilua.exe/web/templates/htm/templateOl/frameset.htm?u
ser=reader.
296 ASSOCIA<;AO BRASILEIRA INTERDISCIPLINAR DE AIDS, Overview o/the Compulsory
Licensing Process in Brazil, July 2005, English version available at:
http://www.cptech.org/ip/healthic/brazil/abia07152005.html.
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• The technology transfer will start too late, only 6 years before patent
expiration, even if a Brazilian laboratory has the means to start production
as early as 2006297 .
For these reasons, the Associa9ao Brasileira Interdisciplinar de AIDS believes that
compulsory licensing is the only valid alternative to secure short and long term cuts in
pricing and to provide alternatives for developing countries to ensure newest line
treatment for patients in need. Surprisingly, 6 days after the agreement was announced
and through a new Minister of Health, reports that an agreement was reached with a
U.S. drug manufacturer were denied despite earlier statements that such a deal was
finalized298 . To this day, no confirmation has been given whether a compulsory
license will be issued or not. More developments are expected regarding these
negotiations.
3) Exemption ofpatentability for pharmaceutical products
On June 1St, 2005, the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies approved Bill No. 22/03, which
would amend the Law No. 9.279 of May 14th, 1994, which lists exemptions to
patentability, thus making HIV/AIDS drugs unpatentable in Brazil. The new article 18
goes as follow:
"Article 18: The following shall not be patentable:
IV - the medication, together with its respective procurement procedure, specifically for the
prevention and treatment of the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome SIDA/AIDS.
Mr. Roberto Gouveia justified this amendment by maintaining that patent protection in
Brazil "is so broad that in many cases this results in economic or commercial abuse
under the aegis of the law (9.279/96) itself', and by the powerful influence of the
pharmaceutical lobby very present in Legislative and Executive circles, delaying as
297 Id.
298 ASSOCIATED PRESS, "Brazil Minister Says no AIDS Drug Deal", July 14th, 2005, available at:
http://www.forbes.com/business/feeds/ap/2005/07/14/ap2139640.html.
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much as possible the application of Law No. 9787/99 on generics, among others299.
This is an interesting initiative, as it may comply with Brazil's international obligations
concerning patents, since article 27(2) of TRIPS provides that:
"Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of
the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including
to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment,
provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their
law".
It remains to be seen if this Bill was part of the negotiation strategy of the Brazilian
Government to get price cuts on HIV/AIDS drugs from foreign brand-name
pharmaceutical firms. To come into force, the Bill still needs to get the approval of the
Federal Senate and the President's sanction30o • Unfortunately, most likely because of
the political crisis affecting the current government in Brazil, there have not been any
developments concerning Bill No. 22/03 since June 1st, 2005.
Chapter b) India
1) Trends in Indian patent law regarding the patentability ofmedicines
What distinguishes India from other developing countries wishing to produce generic
drugs is that it had already a strong generic industry prior to the implementation of
WTO and TRIPS within its jurisdiction. In fact, this section devoted to India is a good
opportunity to have a closer look at the interests at stake when the TRIPS Agreement
was negotiated as a component of the WTO Uruguay Round of negotiations in the
early nineties. Because of the difference of their interests at stake, TRIPS gave rise to
extensive debates between developed and developing countries. On one side, strong
business interests in the developed world claimed that illegitimate use of their
innovation was being made in the developing world, and that this was leading not only
to important financial losses for the industry in the developed countries, but also a
299Mr. Roberto GOUVEIA, "Justification and the original text of Bill Number 22/03 -
PARLIAMENTARY BILL", available at:
http://www.cptech.orglip/health/clbrazil/gouveia06082005.html.
300 INTERFARMA, "Brazilian Research-Based Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association - on Bill
22/03", available at: http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/brazil/interfarma06022005.html.
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disincentive for foreign investment, technology transfer and greater domestic research
and developmeneo1• On the other side, developing countries governments were
strongly opposed to this view, and were worried that the higher prices brought by a
stronger and compulsory IP international regime would prevent the blossoming of a
new high-tech industry in their jurisdiction.
India was considered as one of the most vehement opponents of TRIPS, and no part of
TRIPS was, and continues to be, more sensitive than the proposal to require product
patents on pharmaceutical innovations302. This is indeed a strong national sentiment,
as well expressed in a statement by Indira Gandhi at the World Health Assembly in
1982:
"The idea of a better-ordered world is one in which medical discoveries will be free of patents
and there will be no profiteering from life and death,,303.
According to Mr. Philippe Cullet, India is particularly noteworthy in respect of taking
into consideration the price of medicines and the access to drugs in the development of
their legal and policy framework in the health sector304. In 1970, India adopted patent
legislation that prohibited product patents for medicines, restricting the scope of
patentability of medicines only for the production processes and not for the end
product itself. This constituted a major incentive for the development of a relatively
strong pharmaceutical industry305.
"5. Inventions where only methods or processes of manufacture patentable.
In the case of inventions-
(a) claiming substances intended for use, or capable foe being used as food or as medicine or
drug, or
(b) relating to substances prepared or produced by chemical processes (including alloys, optical
glass, semi-conductors or inter-metallic compounds),
301 J.O. LANJOUW. "The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patents in India: Heartless
Exploitation of the Poor and Suffering", WP 07/99, OIPRC Electronic Journal oflntellectual Property
Rights, available at: http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP0799.html.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 P. CULLET, loco cit., note 63, p.182.
305 Id., p.182.
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no patent shall be granted in respect of claims for the substances themselves, but claims for the
methods or processes of manufacture shall be patentable,,306.
One of the most important impacts of the Indian Patents Act under its 1970 version and
the development of a strong generic industry is the advent of significantly lower prices
for drugs compared to other countries307. Moreover, because India did not have to
comply fully with WTO standards until 2005, it became the home of a number of
independent drug manufacturers that make generic copies of drugs that were originally
developed and patented in the wesf08. Through these trends, India became one of the
main suppliers of cheap drugs to developing countries. Among others, Indian drug
manufacturers have contracted with Cameroon309, Nigeria and South Africa310 for the
provisioning of cheap generic AIDS drugs. Thus, India clearly became one of the most
important actors in the provisioning of essential drugs to poor populations. Medecins
Sans Frontieres even assessed that as much as 50 percent of the 700,000 people
estimated to be on ARV treatment in developing countries rely on Indian generic
d . 311pro uctIon .
Moreover, the general provisions for compulsory licensing will become much more
relevant since TRIPS has started to be implemented in India from March 2005,
therefore modifying significantly India's patent legislation. Section 83 of the Patent
Act no. 39 of 1970 first provides general principles about the working of a patent in
India. It states that without prejudice to other provisions of that Act, "that patents are
granted to encourage inventions and to secure that the inventions are worked in India
on a commercial scale and to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable without
undue delay"; and "that they are not granted merely to enable patentees to enjoy a
monopoly for the importation of the patented article". Section 84 allows the issuance
of a compulsory license if an invention is not made available to the public in India at a
reasonable price after three years since the invention has started to be commercialized.
306 The Patent Act - Act no. 39 of1970, article 5.
307 P. CULLET,loc. cit., note 63, p.183.
308 A.M. CURTI, loc cit., note 12, p.478.
309 INDIA PRESS, "Cipla to provide AIDS drugs to Cameroon", Dow Jones Asian Equities Report, July
27th , 2001.
310 AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, "Nigeria Buying Generic drugs for an AIDS Treatment Trial", New
York Times, November 30th , 2001.
311 MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES, "MSF statement about new Indian Patent Bill", March 23 rd,
2005, available at: http://www.accessmed-
msforg/prod/publications.asp?scntid=243200594 12 I8&contenttype=PARA&.
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2) Amendments to Indian Patent Law as a result ofthe implementation ofWTO in 2005
As stated earlier, the main vehicle for the introduction of medical patents in developing
countries is the TRIPS Agreement. All WTO member states have to comply with the
minimum IP standards included in TRIPS, which are equivalent to a consensus
position among developed countries, through their national legislation3l2 . Even though
TRIPS was never considered as a good bargain by developing countries, they
nonetheless agreed to be part of it since it was itself part of the broader package deal of
the GATT agreements of Marrakech in 1994 and because it includes broad safeguards
provisions for public interests. Moreover, to facilitate the implementation of these new
rules in countries lacking the required technical and financial resources, many
developing countries had delays to comply with WTO rules. India had until 2005 to
fully comply with WTO standards, although it had interim obligations to meet during
its transitional period, which were in fact a matter of dispute in itself as the United
States brought an action against India before a WTO panel. The U.S. claimed that
India was not meeting its transitional obligations according to article 70(8) and 70(9)
of TRIPS3I3 . Furthermore, the new amendments to the Indian Patents Act that were
adopted in March 2005 led to much debate recently since their effect goes well beyond
the fields of trade and intellectual property, and the standards of protection of patents
went way beyond what is required by TRIPS.
i) New use of known medicines
Initially it was proposed to provide a patent for new uses and dosages of known
medicines, which would considerably extend the traditional scope of patentability,
opposed to patents given only to new chemical entities, which require a much higher
degree of inventive step and novelty from the manufacturer314. The mere discovery of
a new use for a known chemical entity did not qualify under the threshold of inventive
312 P. CULLET, lac. cit., note 63, p.l83.
313 A.M. CURTI, lac. cit., note 12, p,478.
314 AFFORDABLE MEDICINES AND TREATMENT CAMPAIGN, "Alert: Send protests to the PM of
India on Patent Amendment", a statement by Affordable Medicines and Treatment Campaign (AMTC),
available at: http://Iists.essentiaI.orgipipermaiIlip-health/2004-0ctober/007057.htmi.
93
step in the former Indian Patents Act, as in most other countries315 . This proposition
would also involve a lax interpretation of the novelty standard of patentability, thus
extending the scope of patentability of the Indian Patents Act beyond the requirements
of TRIPS Agreemenel6 .
Moreover, such broad standards of patentability may delay significantly the
introduction of generic medicines in the Indian market by allowing frivolous patent
applications on the colour/shape of a pill, its composites or its dosage, as seen in the
V.S3I7 . Effective provisions defining 'product', 'novelty' and 'inventive step' should
be provided in the legislation, in order to avoid patent grants for insignificant
innovation or improvement, thus unjustifiably prolonging the life of a patent at the cost
of access to drugs for poor populations.
Not surprisingly, after considerable pressure from civil society associations, the final
version of the Indian Patents Act provided some safeguards regarding the
'evergreening' of patents. The amendments to the Ordinance tabled by the
government have now restricted the scope for the granting of patents on frivolous
claims3l8 . They clarify the definition of' inventive step' as an invention that:
" .. .involves technical advances as compared to the existing knowledge or having economic
significance or both.,,319
Furthermore, the Bill clarifies the concept of 'new invention' in Indian law, which is:
" ...any invention or technology which has not been anticipated by publication in any document
or used in the country or elsewhere in the world before the date of filling of patent application
315 N.V. ZAVERI, "Some critique on patent amendment bill (India)", a statement by Affordable
Medicines and Treatment Campaign (AMTC), available at: http://Iists.essential.orgipipermail/ip-
health/2004-0ctober/007039.html.
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Delhi, India, March 22nd, 2005, available at:
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with complete specification, Le. the subject matter has not fallen in public domain or that it
does not form part ofthe state of art.,,320
The amendments also bring a definition for 'pharmaceutical substance'. In order to get
a patent on such a subject matter, the compound will need to be:
" ... a new entity involving one or more inventive step.,,321
This will clarify the above-mentioned ambiguities regarding the scope of patentability
of pharmaceuticals under the new Patents Law in India and will bring it back to usual
international standards predominant in most countries around the world, such as those
studied in this document. Patent claims evaluation should be restricted to the
significance of the improvement of a drug opposed to the expectation of profits of its
new use. Extending the scope of patentability of pharmaceuticals, especially in a
country like India with a strong tradition of providing developing countries with very
low cost pharmaceuticals, and with such a large and increasing population infected
with HIV/AIDS, would have been a very strong blow and a dangerous precedent
against human rights law and especially the right to access to health care for all
populations.
ii) Incorporation of August 30th Decision of the TRIPS General Council in the Indian
legislation
As seen in previous chapters, the August 3dh Decision of the TRIPS General Council
exceptionally authorizes the grant of a compulsory license for export purposes, to
countries with no or insufficient manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector.
Initially, the draft bill for the amendment of the Patents Act did not fully comply with
this decision. The Bill was proposing to allow compulsory licensing to a country with
no or insufficient manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector if there was a
corresponding patent in the importing country322. This is clearly more restrictive than
what has been laid out in the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health, and the August 3dh Decision of the TRIPS General Council, since no
320 rd.
321 rd.
322 AMTC, loc. cit., note 314.
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such requirement as the issuance of a compulsory license in the importing country is
included in these legal agreements. Moreover, this provision completely ignored the
transition period granted to least developed countries by the WTO to comply with the
TRIPS requirements, which will be over only in 2016323 . Because of this transition
period, many LDCs have not yet implemented IPR schemes in their jurisdiction. In
that case, Indian drug manufacturers could not export cheap medicines to LDCs, which
would be totally against the spirit of TRIPS, the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health, and the August 3(/h Decision o/the TRIPS General Council.
Other critiques reported that the new Indian compulsory licensing scheme was not
respectful of the spirit of the Doha Declaration since it was burdened with conditions
and time-consuming requirements, allowing anyone to oppose the grant of a
compulsory Iicense324• The Doha Declaration does not contemplate any right to
oppose or hold elaborate inquiries for the grant of compulsory licenses325 . Such a
mechanism is pretty much an open invitation for brand-name pharmaceutical
manufacturers having a valid patent in India to initiate costly and endless court
proceedings to protect these patents. In the meantime, very serious illness may
continue to spread as a result of the lack of affordable medicines in India and in many
other developing countries. Although the scope of the opposition proceedings was
later restricted, the grant of a compulsory license remains burdensome compared to the
. I d' P A 326prevIOUS n Ian atents ct :
"A key safeguard to assure availability of affordable medicines is the procedure of compulsory
licenses - government grants patents but allows generic companies to make their versions of the
patented medicines against a payment of a royalty to the patent holder. However, in the Bill
that passed the Lower House (Lok Sabha) today procedures are still extremely complex and
there is no control on levels of royalties to be paid, which will lead to endless litigation and
delays" 327.
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In short, whether or not the new compulsory licensing scheme will be efficiently used
to promote public health in India and other developing countries will depend on the
strength of the will of the health authorities, which at this point remains uncertain since
India has never used a compulsory licensing scheme, at least since 1970:
"India previously has not used compulsory licensing to produce drugs because it has not
provided patent protections under TRIPS. Compulsory licenses allow the production of
patented material without authorization from the patent holder, but TRIPS places certain
conditions on the use of compulsory licensing."328
What remains certain for Indians though is the fact that most of them will have to wait
at least three years until they will be able financially to afford the last generation of
HIV/AIDS medicines, since this is the delay a generic company will have to wait
before it is entitled to issue an application to produce the drug329 . The government of
India may avoid this delay by declaring a health emergency as provided by the TRIPS
Agreement, the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, and the August 3dh
Decision of the TRIPS General Council, which will put again under the spotlight the
will of the Indian health authorities to efficiently use their compulsory licensing
scheme to protect public health.
Another important late addition to the compulsory licensing scheme is the provision of
a time-line that will give better indications on what constitutes 'a reasonable period of
time' to carry out the negotiations between the right holder and the generic company
regarding the terms of the compulsory license330 • This period shall not exceed six
months, which however seems disproportionately long compared to the 30-day period
provided by the Canadian legislation in similar situations33 !.
iii) Pre-grant opposition procedure
The pre-grant opposition procedure constitutes 'an important mechanism for civil
society to oppose frivolous patents,' by allowing public scrutiny over patent
328 Id.
329 Id.
330 Amit Sen GUPTA, loco cit., note 3 I8.
331 Supra, Part IV, chapter a)2) and 3).
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applications pending in the 'mailbox' of the Indian Patent Office332 • Pre-grant
opposition may be particularly important to redress a lax application of patentability
requirements on new uses of already known molecules333 . It is also said to be more
effective, faster and less expensive than claims in post grant reexamination procedures
or legal proceedings after grant of the patent.334 However, it seems that the intention
expressed in the Bill was to abandon the pre-grant opposition procedure, to the great
discontent of the Indian civil society.335 It was claimed that if the pre-grant opposition
procedure would have been abandoned, 6000 patent applications might have been
granted with no delay. This is about 12 times the number of patent application that
received marketing approval from 1995 to 2004.336
More precisely, the number of grounds under which the grant of a patent could be
opposed was reduced from 9 to 2, and the clause that provided for the hearing of a
person to the person making the opposition was deleted.337 However, under pressure
again from the civil society organizations, the Ordinance from which these changes
arose was repealed:
"The new amendments have now restored all the original grounds in the previous Act for
opposing grant of a Patent and has also provided that: "the Controller shall if requested by such
person for being heard, hear him ..." The time for filing such opposition has also been
extended from 3 months to 6 months.,,338
iv) Availability of generics marketed prior to the grant of a patent in India after that
patent has been granted
This issue was said to be one of the biggest concerns expressed by many about the new
patent Bill339 . Without a clear exception, drugs that were being produced by Indian
companies and for which patent applications are pending in the mailbox, would go off
332 AMTC, lac. cit., note 314.
333 Supra, Part V, chapter b)2)i).
334 N.V. ZAVERI, lac. cit., note 315.
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336 AMTC, lac. cit., note 314.
337 Amir Sen GUPTA, lac. cit., note 318.
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the market once the patents are granted340. This of course would have probably
involved a sharp raise in the pricing of these drugs since free competition would have
been replaced by a monopoly. In a similar case, an anti-cancer drug named Glivec was
granted an Exclusive Marketing Right (EMR) by the NDA Government in 2003 to
Novartis. This led to a tenfold hike in prices and misery to ten of thousands of
patients.341
Fortunately, the new amendments to patent law provide patent protections
prospectively, which means pharmaceutical patent applications registered under a so-
called mailbox arrangement allowed under WTO rules will not get the protections
promised to them under the TRIPS Agreement. Under the new amendments, the local
manufacturers that were already producing these drugs will be able to continue to
produce them after payment of a royalty even if the drug is placed under a patenf42.
The right holder will be entitled to receive 'a reasonable royalty from such enterprises
which have made significant investment and were producing and marketing the
concerned product prior to the first day of January, 2005 and which continue to
manufacture the product covered by the patent on the date of grant of a patent and no
infringement proceedings shall be instituted against such enterprises,343. No time-line
has been provided in the law to circumvent what constitutes 'a reasonable royalty'.
Around 9000 patent applications have been registered in the mailbox since it was set
up in 1995344.
The mailbox is a device provided by the WTO that developing countries had to set up
in case they chose not to implement the patent protections under TRIPS. In the
meantime, companies could register patent applications for their drugs in that mailbox
and eventually get patent protection after January 1st, 2005345. However, India's new
law might be in clear violation of articles 70(8) and 70(9) of TRIPS since a five-year
exclusivity for patent applications registered in the mailbox is not provided. No
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recourses are provided for right holders to seek the removal from the market of
products that violate their patenf46 .
3) The Indian pharmaceutical industry and the recognition of the safety of generic
medicines
i) A few words about the WHO pre-qualification project
The pre-qualification project, a service provided by the WHO, was set up in 2001 in
order to unify the standards of quality, safety and efficacy of drugs, thus facilitating
access to HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis drugs. It was first intended for UN
procurement agencies, but with time it became a useful tool used by anyone wishing to
bulk purchase medicines, including countries and NGOs347. This list of drugs is little
known outside the world of essential drugs but is also a vital part of drug delivery in
the developing world348 .
To see their products included on the pre-qualified products list, manufacturers need to
provide extensive information in order to carry out a proper examination of the
products submitted to be on the list, and open their manufacturing sites for stringent
inspections by the WHO or another reliable regulatory body349. Principles and
practices of the world's leading regulatory agencies, such as the European Agency for
the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA) and the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), forged the standards of assessment of the pre-qualification
project, through which:
• "The manufacturer provides a comprehensive set of data about the quality, safety and
efficacy of its product, including details about the purity of all ingredients used in
manufacture, data about finished products, such as information about stability, and the
results of in vivo bioequivalence tests (clinical trials conducted in healthy volunteers);
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• The team of assessors evaluates all the data presented and if satisfied with the evidence
sends the product to professional control testing laboratories contracted by WHO in
France, South Africa or Switzerland for analytical verification of quality;
• If the product is found to meet the specified requirements, and the manufacturing site
complies with GMP, both the product linked to this manufacturing site and company are
added to a list hosted by WHO on a public web site"J50.
The evaluation process takes a minimum of three months if the product satisfies to all
required standards. Moreover, all medicines need to be re-qualified after three years or
earlier. So far, 42 brand names and 61 generic medicines have been registered on the
list, including pills with more than one active ingredient or fixed-dose combinations
(FDCs):
"In soliciting applications from companies, WHO does not question whether the products
presented are patented or generic, since patent laws vary according to different national legal
systems. It suffices that a company is duly authorized for pharmaceutical manufacture in its
own country and that the final product meets stringent standards of quality, efficacy and
safety,,3 51 .
ii) Concerns over the safety of generic drugs
Some concerns have been raised in at least three articles in three different newspapers
in the U.S., about the safety and the efficacy of generic drugs, as well as the
development of a resistant strain of mY/AIDS because of the use of these drugs in
developing countries352 • These concerns were expressed after a series of withdrawal of
generic drugs from the WHO list of pre-approved essential drugs. On November 9th,
2004, after having found discrepancies in the documentation relating to the
bioequivalence study of the generic drugs with originator medicines, the company
Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited India informed the WHO that it would withdraw
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voluntarily all its antiretrovirals temporarily from WHO pre-qualification353 . At that
time, Ranbaxy provided the WHO with a plan indicating proposed dates for the
submission of new study reports for these products354.
And then, ten days later, another Indian generic manufacturer withdrew six
antiretroviral medicines from the WHO pre-qualification list in order to further review
data on their bioequivalence. The company recognized that the centers it had used to
carry out the bioequivalence studies were not compatible with the current standards
used by the WH0355. Again, Hetero Drugs Ltd. has committed to submit new test
results for the bioequivalence of the six medicines as soon as possible, after it would
contract with different contract research organizations (CROs).
These two withdrawals have joined another one made by an Indian generic
manufacturer, Cipla, in May 2004 due to non-compliance with international standards
at the CRO hired by Cipla to conduct bioequivalence tests on the products356.
The withdrawals brought a lot of bad press for generic pharmaceutical, the WHO and
the pre-qualification project, which was anything but justified. An author from San
Francisco Chronicle accused the United Nations of carrying out inefficient tests, or
even not carrying out tests at all, on drugs that were intended for poor populations in
Africa, which will lead to the development of strains of HIVIAIDS resistant to drugs:
"The hasty approval of cheap, untested AIDS drugs by one of its agencies has likely caused
new strains of HIV to emerge in the developing world, according to the American Foundation
for AIDS Research. American taxpayers give nearly $1 billion per year to the United Nations
and its agencies, comprising roughly 25 percent of its budget. Congress is now sure to take a
hard look at how tax dollars have been mismanaged in the U.N. fight against AIDS,,357.
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Another author from the Seattle Times, stated that Africans should not be given
untested and inferior drugs, and that they deserve better than being 'caught in a
Western spitball contest over drugs, pricing and intellectual property rights':
"A principle no one would question for Western citizens - that no group of people should
systematically be given an inferior and untested class of drugs simply because they are unable
to pay - has become a source of fury against the United States' contributions to the global
AIDS crisis"m.
These statements have been judged 'deliberately misleading,359, being 'irresponsible
and inaccurate claims about generic AIDS medicines,36o by two Medecins Sans
Frontieres heads of missions in Malawi and South Africa. In the cases of withdrawal
that the above-mentioned citations refer to, the generic products were withdraw from
the WHO list of medicines not because they potentially involved deadly side effects,
but 'to resolve important questions about the paperwork demonstrating the drugs
bioequivalence,361. In fact, Cipla's products that were withdrawn from the WHO list
were reinstated after the bioequivalence study was repeated, and data clarifications sent
to the WHO. Ranbaxy, after submitting filing data for its range of ARVs with the U.S.
FDA in January 2005, under its expedited review process for the U.S. President
Emergency Program For AIDS Relief, has also made three fresh filings for its ARV
agents to the WHO for its approvals362. The recent saga about Vioxx, an original anti-
inflammatory commercialised by Merck, shows that drug safety should never been
taken lightly, whether the drug is original or generic.
However, in a statement issued on January 7th, 2005, MSF expressed its concerns
about the lack of support from the World Health Organization leadership for the WHO
358 Collin LEVEY, "Cheap Drugs Help No One if They are not Effective", Seattle Times, editorial
column, November It\ 2004.
359 Eric GOAMERE, "Doctors Without Regrets", Seattle Times, The Reader's View, November 20th,
2004.
360 Roger TECK, "Generic AIDS Drugs Work", San Francisco Chronicle, letter to the editor, December
4th , 2004.
361 Rowan GILLIES and Bernard HIRSCHEL, "In War on AIDS, Generics give Poor a Fighting
Chance", statements by Dr. Rowan Gillies, President of Medecins Sans Frontieres International
Council, and by Bernard Hirschel, Head ofHIVIAIDS division, Geneva University Hospital, available at:
http://lists.essential.orgipipermaillip-health/2004-DecemberI007257.html.
362 RANBAXY, "Ranbaxy Makes Three Fresh Filings ofAntiretrovirals to WHO", Ranbaxy press
release, January 24th, 2005, available at:
http://www.ranbaxy.com/newsroom/pressrelease det.asp?sno=197.
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pre-qualification projece63 . The WHO pre-qualification project is a key instrument in
improving the access to quality and affordable medicines, through ensuring that
generic and originator products are of quality364.
"Before the pre-qualification project, information on the quality of generic drugs used in
developing countries was limited. Regulatory agencies in developing countries often lack the
capacity to conduct quality assessments. In the case of HIV/AIDS, for instance, many
countries would have chosen to use medicines of unknown quality or more expensive
originator drugs due to this lack of information on quality of generics. Considering the
difference on prices between originator and generic products, there was and continues to be a
real need to make quality assessments of generics available,,365.
MSF further states that the several products that have been delisted from the pre-
qualification list show the rigour of the assessment process.
"The delisted products are subject to reassessment. Some products have been put back on the
list again after new data was submitted. WHO needs to take a proactive approach with
companies to ensure that drugs are rapidly reassessed,,366.
With new TRIPS/Doha flexibilities, an efficient pre-qualification process becomes
even more important in order to dispatch safe, efficient and affordable medicines
worldwide. Unfortunately, the program has not received the required resources and
internal support it should have had in order to carry out its important task.
"The project remains severely understaffed and under funded and therefore risks not being able
to face the growing challenges ofAIDS, TB and malaria,,367.
363 MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES, "MSF briefing note regarding WHO pre-qualification for the
I15th Session of the WHO Executive Board", Campaign/or access to essential medicines, available at:
http://www.cptech.org/ip/healthlwho/index.html#pre.
364 Id.
365 Id.
366 Id.
367 Id.
104
Chapter c) South Africa
J) Human rights and the spread ofHIVIAIDS in South Africa
Considering the particular history of South Africa, one would not be surprised at the
tendency of the constitution of the newborn country to defend a global approach for the
respect of human rights. But that's not the only positive feature in the new South
African Constitution regarding the definition of the right to health.
"Even more significantly, it has conspicuously recognized socioeconomic rights closely
modeled on those found in the ICESCR as justiciable rights in its Constitution,,368.
The right to health is found in numerous provisions of South African legislation, but is
more clearly expressed in Section 27 of the Constitution:
27. (1) Everyone has the right to have access to:
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care;
(b) sufficient food and water; and
(c) social security, including if they are unable to support themselves and their
dependents, appropriate social assistance.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realization of each of these rights.
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatmene69 •
i} The scope ofthe right to health in South Africa
Mr. Charles Ngwena, LLB, LLM, an associate professor in the Faculty of Law at Vista
University (South Africa) and a senior research associate of the Centre for Health
Systems Research and Development at the University of Orange Free State (South
368 Charles NGWENA, "The Recognition of Access to Health Care as a Human Right in South Africa:
Is It Enough?", (2000) 5 Health and Human Rights, No.1, p.27.
369 Constitution ofthe Republic ofSouth Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996.
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Africa), has attempted to delineate the scope of the right to health as laid down in the
South African legislation370 • He states that the South African right to health
'is enforceable against the state as well as individuals, [but] its importance lies in the former,
not the least because the state had historically played a dominant role in maintaining an
inequitable and iniquitous health care system,371.
As we will see further in this section, human rights clearly playa very important role
in renewing the South African legislation after such a long and painful denial. But not
without regards to the best possible motivations and intentions, practical results of
implementation policies will be the gage of success for policy and lawmakers, not the
maximum extent of what the population potentially deserves according to the law. Is
Section 27 robust enough to impose tangible obligations against the state? Professor
Ngwena has a mitigated answer to that question. On the one hand, Section 27 may be
accused of being another vague and imprecise provision that characterizes so well the
field of international law, especially socioeconomic rights:
"Its language is that of compromise and flexibility. It does not define the quantity or quality of
health care services to be accessed. Though, like the [International Covenant of Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights] ICESCR, it imposes a mandatory injunction, it adopts a gradualist
or incremental approach by requiring only progressive rather than immediate realization. It can
even be argued that Section 27 is weaker than the ICESCR in that it requires recourse only to
"available" rather than "the maximum of its available" resources, and thus insufficiently
impresses upon the state the importance of deploying optimally all feasible resources, including
international assistance,,372.
On the other hand, it logically cannot be said that Section 27 has unrealistic objectives
affecting its credibility. Health care is a concept that is hardly quantifiable in terms of
resources that a state would be obliged to provide for everyone of its citizens. The
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has stated, when
elaborating about the obligations arising from the International Covenant ofEconomic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) that the principles for an efficient and fair
370 Charles Ngwena, loc. cit., note 368, p.3!.
371 Id., p.30.
372 Id., pp. 30-31.
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application of a national constitution should be left to courts373 , and it is widely
accepted that provisions of the South African Bill of Rights must be interpreted
generously374. Professor Ngwena suggests that the obligations under Section 27 "are
neither open-ended nor without time constraints,,375. He adds that "the state should, at
the very least, begin by meeting minimal or basic needs as proclaimed, for example, in
the Alma-Alta Declaration"376. Essential health services then, should be provided at
international standards of diligence within a scheduled period of time.
Provided that the obligation arising from Section 27 has a progressive time-line to be
implemented, this is good news for those who need the support of the state to enjoy
minimal health services. The use of the terms "progressive realization of each of these
rights" and "within its available resources" at Section 27 (2), was a clear indication
that the limited resources of South Africa shall be taken into account by courts when
determining where the state obligation regarding the provision of health care shall end.
In a recent and famous case in South Africa, Soobramoney v. Minister ofHealth377, the
Constitutional Court had to interpret whether the appellant was entitled to be treated or
not under Section 27(3) on the obligation to provide emergency care and the right to
life included Section 11 of the South African Constitution. The appellant, who was in
the final stages of chronic renal failure, had been receiving renal dialysis through the
private health care system, but exhausted his funds. He was refused public assistance
even considering that if no further dialysis was given to him he would not survive.
Renal dialysis was heavily rationed through public health care, since only 30 percent of
the demand for dialysis could be met.
The Constitutional Court stated that Section 27(3) was intended for sudden illness or
unexpected trauma, not a chronic condition that has existed for years and would last
until the end of the appellant's life. There was also the fact that South African
resources were scarce, which rendered rationing as what was done in the case of the
appellant, both inevitable and reasonable378 .
373 UNCESCR, General Comment No.3 ojthe United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Fifth Session, 1990, U.N. Doc. ElI 991/23.
374 S v. Mhlungu 1995 (3) SA867 (CC), 1995 (7) BCLR 793 (CC).
375 Charles NGWENA, loc. cit., note 368, p.3 I.
376 Id., p.3 I.
377 (Kwa-Zulu Natal) 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC).
378 Charles NGWENA, loc. cit., note 368, p.33.
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The Soobramoney case shows that when the enforcement of a socioeconomic right is
claimed against the state, the availability of resources is a crucial consideration that
ought to be considered by national courts. However, Professor Ngwena criticized the
grounds on which this decision was taken, although he acknowledged that the grounds
he favors would probably have given the same decision if the judges would have had
applied them in Soobramoney:
"[The Court] should not have shied away from its implicit constitutional obligation to inquire
sufficiently into budgetary appropriations when dealing with enforcement of socioeconomic
rights. In this regard, the Court failed to inquire whether priorities within the provincial and
national governments' health care budgets were in consonance with its constitutional
obligations"379.
But the progressive nature of the realization of the government's obligations arising
from the right to health has its limits. One of the most controversial actions of the
South African government was that it restricted the use of Nevirapine to prevent the
transmission of HIV from mothers to infants. The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)
brought a lawsuit against the government because it restricted the availability of
Nevirapine in the public sector only to two pilot studies carried out in two hospitals for
the whole country, and that was a violation of the right to health of the HIV-positive
pregnant women and their unborn child380 . The court agreed with the TAC, stating that
" ... the policy of restricting the availability of Nevirapine is unreasonable and a violation of the
government's obligation to take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realization of the right to access to health care services,
including reproductive health care,,381.
2) Significance ofSection 27 ofthe Constitution in South Africa
Although the obligation to provide health care may be limited by the availability of
resources in South Africa, the way Section 27 has been drafted shows a strong will for
379 Id., p.34.
380 George J. ANNAS, "The Right to Health and the Nevirapine Case in South Africa", in Sofia
GRUSHIN, Michael A. GRODIN, Georges J. ANNAS, and Stephen P. MARKS, Perspectives on
Health and Human Rights, Taylor and Francis Group, New York, 2005, p.498.
381 Id., p.502.
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significant improvement in the respect of human rights for all segments of the
population. Section 27 is an affirmation of the confluence between civil/political
rights and socioeconomic rights and, thus, challenges the classical liberal assumption
that the latter are too polycentric and too politically charged to be amenable to
adversarial adjudication382 . Section 27 also seeks to redress the past by making a
fundamental break with a health care system that had historically been saturated with
unfathomable disparities383 . Section 27 seeks to bring equality in the provision of
health care, including the elimination of extraneous factors such as race, gender or HIV
status case, but also the amelioration of other social disadvantages such as income and
geographical location.
But indeed, South Africa has more people living with HIV/AIDS than any other
country - an estimated 5.3 million, equal to 13 percent of the world's infected384 •
Since the government has done much regarding law and policy, these may no longer be
the main impediments to universal access to health care. "Rather, South Africa's high
burden of disease and trauma, extreme disparities in income, and general poverty are
now the main constraints,,385. Although the country has put in place a bold program
for reforming the economy and the health care system, it is hostage in the short term to
the constraining factors of historical neglect, extreme income differentials, and general
poverty386.
However, South Africa, perhaps because of its particular history, is one of the few
countries to demonstrate an understanding of the holistic nature of human rights, and to
underscore this understanding in its Bill of Rights387. The courts will now need to
develop their own criteria based on the legal/policy framework formulated by the
legislative authorities for a better enforcement of these rights. After having seen the
extent of the right to health in the Constitution of South Africa, we will turn to two
382 Charles NGWENA, loc. cit., note 368, p.28.
383 Id., p.28.
384 REUTEURS AND BLOOMBERG, "Glaxo, Boehringer, cut a deal on AIDS drugs", Business
Report, December 11 lb, 2003, available at:
http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=563&fArticleId=3060 11.
385 Charles NGWENA, loc. cit., note 368, p.36.
386 AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, "A National Health Plan for South Africa", Johannesburg,
1994.
387 Charles NGWENA, loc. cit., note 368, p.38.
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cases more specific to the access to essential drugs and which were largely publicized
at the international level a few years ago.
3) Two Cases Brought in Front of South African Courts Regarding the Access to
Essential Medicines
i) Pharmaceutical company lawsuit against the Government of South Africa about the
compliance of the Medicines and Related Substances Act with the TRIPS Agreement
on February 18th, 1998
South Africa has been involved in trade disputes with the U.S. and several European
countries over its efforts to make medicines more affordable among its population, in
attempting to respect its obligations at the international and national levels regarding
the right to health. The most important and mediated dispute involved a new
amendment of current patent law included in the Medicines and Related Substances
Act No. 90 of1997, especially at Section 15 c), which would provide the authority to
issue compulsory licenses in a more efficient and timely manner and authorize parallel
imports of medicines.
Measures to ensure supply of more affordable medicines
15C. The Minister may prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable medicines in
certain circumstances so as to protect the health of the public, and in particular may-
(a) notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Patents Act, 1978 (No. 57 of
(978), determine that the rights with regard to any medicine under a patent granted in
the Republic shall extend to acts in respect of such medicine which has been put onto
the market by the owner of the medicine, or with his or her consent;
(b) prescribe the conditions on which any medicine which is identical in composition,
meets the same quality standards and is intended to have the same proprietary name as
that of another medicine already registered in the Republic, but which is imported by a
person other than the person who is holder of the registration certificate of the
medicine already registered and which originates from any site of manufacture of the
original manufacturer as approved by the council in the prescribed manner, may be
imported;
(c) prescribe the registration procedure for, as well as the use of, the medicine referred to
in paragraph (b).
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The adoption of this legal provision led to the court case involving PhRMA and 39
pharmaceutical firms against the Government of South Africa388 . PhRMA and its
members claimed that Section 15C contravened to sections 27 and 28 of TRIPS
regarding non-discrimination and the respect of patent rights, as well as section 6 and
31 of TRIPS on parallel imports389• The Government of South Africa, for its part,
alleged that Section 15C complied with the exigencies arising from TRIPS. Since
Section 27(2) of TRIPS provides that in order to protect human health, member states
may exclude inventions from patentability as long as the exclusion is not made merely
because their law prohibits the exploitation of those inventions, this is likely to have
been the case. The fact is that at that time, the Doha Convention on TRIPS and Public
Health390 and the WTO General Council Decision ofAugust 3(jh, 2003391 , have not yet
been formulated. This litigation seemed to have been the first test run for the TRIPS
health safeguards and both parties and those who shared the same interests would take
that opportunity to speak out and lobby about their interests.
The United States Government, in order to defend its strong national pharmaceutical
industry, exercised a lot of pressure on the Government of South Africa in order to
convince him to repeal Section 15C. On April 30th, 1999, the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) put South Africa on the "Special 301" watch list that purports
to "detail the adequacy and effectiveness of intellectual property protection" in
countries throughout the world392 . This report is only one of various documents
formulated to monitor important foreign trade barriers to US exports. According to the
Consumer Technology Project:
"Being on the list itself is considered a trade sanction, because the U.S Government is
advertising the country as an investment risk. But in my opinion, the lists are more significant
as a source of information for U.S. Government policy. That is, being on the list is much less
important that the bilateral pressures the U.S. Government applies to countries on the topics
mentioned on the list,,393.
388 See Notice ofMotion in the High Court ofSouth Africa, case number 4183/98, Tranvaal Provincial
Division, available at: http://www.cptech.orgiip/health/sa/pharmasuit.html.
389 Id.
390 Doha Declaration, op. cit., note 45.
391 August 30th Decision, op. cit., note 18.
392 James LOVE, "Notes on the USTR Watch Lists and Reports" July 15th, 1999, available at:
http://www.cptech.orgiip/health/whatrlists.html.
393 Id.
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Moreover, on October 21 st, 1998, Rep. Rodney Frelinghuysen from New Jersey
introduced an omnibus appropriations law, H.R.4328 that became P.L. 105-277. This
text intended to cut off aid to the Government of South Africa, "pending a Department
of State report outlining its efforts to negotiate the repeal, suspension, or termination of
Section 15C ... ,,394. PhRMA also participated in the lobbying, issuing frequent press
releases and statements such as:
"From the recent remarks and actions, the apparent intent of the Government of South Africa is
to not only defend its diminishment of the effectiveness of patent protection in South Africa,
but to urge other countries to similarly weaken patent protection for pharmaceutical products.
Such a posture is plainly antagonistic to the concept of effective patent protection for
pharmaceuticals, and is likely to give rise to a substantial diminishment of the effectiveness in
protection not only in South Africa but elsewhere,,395.
However, a lot of pressure was also exercised by civil society on the U.S Government,
PhRMA, and its members to drop the case against the South African Government. On
February 23rd, 1999, Rep. Jesse Jackson Jr. introduces H.R. 772, the HOPE for Africa
Bill, which among other things include Section 601 aiming to cut off funding to any
department or agency that sought "through negotiation or otherwise, the revocation or
revision of any Sub-Saharan African intellectual property or competition law or policy
that is designed to promote access to pharmaceuticals or other medical technologies, as
long as they comply with TRlPS,,396. Major newspaper stories about the dispute also
start to be published in mass media397 •
Thus, on December 1St, 1999, after considerable pressure from the public opinion, the
USTR removed South Africa from its "Special 301" Watch List. Former President
Clinton declared that from now on, the U.S would seek flexibility in the enforcement
of drug patent laws when countries face a public health crisis398 . This shift in
American policy occurred after Vice-President Gore was "badgered at campaign stops
by protesters who accused him of placing drug company interests ahead of the needs of
394 Id.
395 Id.
396 Id.
397 See Merrill GOOZNER "Third World Battles for AIDS Drugs", Chicago Tribune, April 28th , 1999.
398 Sabin RUSSELL, "Poor Nations Given Hope on AIDS Drugs New Policy Would Lower Prices",
San Francisco Chronicle, December 3'd, 1999.
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AIDS patients in Africa, where two-thirds of the 33.6 million people infected with the
AIDS virus reside,,399. As a counterpart, South Africa reaffirmed that it would abide
by the WTO's TRIPS Agreement regarding access to essential drugs policies40o .
However, the lawsuit from the 39 pharmaceutical firms against the Government of
South Africa went on for another two years before it was dropped. One of the decisive
turns in the trial was when the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) was granted the
status of amicus curiae, or friend of the court, which authorizes the third party that has
received this status to submit evidence or argument before the court40I . This new
status allowed the TAC, on April lOt\ 1999, to submit a replying affidavit to PhRMA
intended to establish evidence and provide information to the court that:
• There is no impermeable barrier between the private and public health care
system in South Africa. The health system must be viewed as an integrated,
interdependent, and complex whole;
• The alleged violations of intellectual property can in no way be said to threaten
the viability or profitability of the research based pharmaceutical industry;
• There are examples of other developed and developing countries of legal
measures promulgated to ensure the affordability, as well as safety and
efficacy of medicines;
• An analysis of the factors behind recent drug company willingness to provide
the South African Government with essential medicines at substantial
discounts402 .
This was in response to PhRMA allegations that the Medicines and Related Substances
Control Act no.90 of1997 :
399 Id.
400 James LOVE, "Five Common Mistakes by Reporters Covering US/South Africa Disputes Over
Compulsory Licensing and Parallel Imports", September 23, 1999, available at:
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/mistakes.html. -
401 Theodora STEELE, Replying Affidavit, Treatment Action Campaign, High Court of South Africa,
Case No. 4183/98, available at: http://www.tac.org.za/Documents/MedicineActCourtCase/affi041 O.doc.
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• "will not result in cheaper medicines for a significant number of people
because they mainly target the private sector, and because the offers of price
reductions have already met the need for lower priced medicines and can
protect the rights of the amicus' members to dignity, equality and access to
health care services;
• violate intellectual property and trade mark rights that belong to the applicant
and thereby threaten to jeopardize the international system of research,
development, and marketing of medicines;
• are a violation of the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects on
Intellectual Property (TRIPS), and are not practiced in any country other than
South Africa,,403.
Whether PhRMA trusted its argumentation or not, it decided, along with the 39
pharmaceutical firms, to drop the case under an extremely high amount of international
pressure. Since TRIPS, even before the advent of the Doha flexibilities that came to
clarify the issues at stake in this lawsuit, allowed compulsory licensing and parallel
imports in order to cope with human health crisis, we doubt, strictly on legal terms,
that PhRMA would have won this case and that the Medicines Act would have been
declared illegal in regard to the TRIPS Agreement. Since there was no adversary
adjudication from the High Court of South Africa, what mostly is significant about this
case is the fierce and almost desperate contestation and denial from PhRMA members
and the u.S. Government of public health safeguards included in the TRIPS
Agreement, as well as basic and fundamental human rights that the South African
population was entitled to.
ii) Complaint at South African Competition Commission against GSK and BI for
excessive pricing of their ARVs medicines
In a much less mediated case but as significant as the victory over the 39
pharmaceutical firms, the AIDS Law Project, TAC and other civil society
organizations had yet another opportunity to be delighted on how a South African legal
body ruled over another issue of access to essential drugs. On September 19th, 2002,
403 Id.
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the AIDS Law Project issued a complaint with the Competition Commission against
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Boehringer Ingelheim (BI) on the behalf of four people
living with AIDS, four health care workers, TAC, COSATV and its affiliate
CEPPWAWU, alleging that that the two multinational pharmaceutical firms were
unlawfully setting excessive prices for some of their ARVs, thus involving grave
consequences for consumers. Two parties joined the complaint in February 2003, one
police officer infected with AIDS who eventually died on June 16th, 2003, and an
AIDS consortium representing more than a thousand individual and organizational
members404 .
"The excessive pricing of ARVs is directly responsible for premature, predictable and
avoidable deaths of people living with HIV/AIDS, including both children and adults,,405.
There are four ARVs targeted by this complaint, namely AZT (branded as Retrovir),
Lamivudine (branded as 3TC), AZT/Lamivudine (branded as Combivir), and
Nevirapine (branded as Viramunet06 .
The complainants base their allegations on three provisions of the Competition Act No.
89 of1998:
"8. Abuse of dominance prohibited
It is prohibited for a dominant finn to -
(a) charge an excessive price to the detriment of consumers;
(b) refuse to give a competitor access to an essential facility when it is economically feasible
to do so;
(c) engage in an exclusionary act, other than an act listed in paragraph (d), if the anti-
competitive effect of that act outweigh its technological, efficiency or other pro-
competitive, gain; or,
(d) engage in any of the exclusionary acts, unless the firm concerned can show technological,
efficiency or other pro-competitive gains which outweigh the anti-competitive effect of its
act:
404 TREATMENT ACTION CAMPAIGN, "Competition Settlement Agreements Secure Access to
Affordable Life-Saving Antiretroviral Medicines", TAC Newsletter, December 10th, 2003, available at:
http://www.tac.org.za/newsletter/2003/nsl0122003.htm#TAC.
405 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, "Statement of Complaint in tenns of
Section 49 B(2)b) of the Competition Act of 1998", paragraph 17, available at:
http://www.tac.org.za/Documents/DrugCompaniesCC/HazeITauAndOthersVGlaxoSmithKlineAndOthe
rsStatementOfComplaint.doc.
406 Id., paragraph 17.1 to 17.4.
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a. requiring or inducing a supplier or producer not to deal with a competitor;
b. refusing to supply scarce goods to a competitor when supplying those goods is
economically feasible;
c. selling goods or services on condition that the buyer purchases separate goods or
services unrelated to the object of a contract;
d. selling goods or services below their marginal or average variable cost;
e. buying up a scarce supply of intermediate goods or resources required by a
competitor.
7. Dominant Firms
A firm is dominant in a market if-
(a) it has at least 45% of that market;
(b) it has at least 35%, but less than 45%, of that market, unless it can show that it does not
have market power; or,
(c) it has less than 35% of that market, but has market power.
6. Restricted Application of Part B (abuse of a dominant position)
(I) Minister, in consultation with the Competition Commission, must determine--
(a) a threshold of annual turnover, or assets, in the Republic, either in general or in relation to
specific industries, below which this Part does not apply to a firm; and
(b) a method for the calculation of annual turnover or assets to be applied in relation to that
threshold.
(2) The Minister may make a new determination in terms of subsection (I) in consultation with
the Competition Commission.
(3) Before making a determination contemplated in this section, the Minister, in consultation
with the Competition Commission, must publish in the Gazette a notice-
(a) setting out the proposed threshold and method of calculation for purposes of this section;
and,
(b) inviting written submissions on that proposal.
(4) Within six months after publishing a notice in terms of subsection (3), the Minister, in
consultation with the Competition Commission, must publish in the Gazette a notice-'
(a) setting out the threshold and method of calculation for purposes of this section; and
(b) the effective date of that threshold407".
The complainants argued that GSK and BI "engaged in excessive pricing of ARVs, to
the detriment of consumers,,408, as prohibited by section 8(a) of the Competition Act.
Moreover, it argued that GSK and BI both qualified as a "dominant finn" in regards of
408 Id., paragraph 17.
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section 7 of the Act, thus engaging the mechanism laid down in section 8. Finally, the
complainants also argued that GSK and BI have exceeded the threshold referred to in
section 6 of the Act and provided in the Government Notice 562 in Government
Gazette 22128 dated March 9th, 2001409.
Whether by coincidence or feeling that it should act promptly since the decision of the
Competition Commission would be soon, GSK issued a press release on October 16th,
2003, announcing that the originator company would go on with further price cuts on
its ARVS410 . Since the multinational firm held its commitments regarding cost savings
in the manufacture of ARVs, the firm has reduced again its third world prices for
ARVs destined for qualifying countries and organizations from US$ 0.90 to US$ 0.65
per day. Moreover, GSK has agreed to extend the voluntary license it has granted to
Aspen Pharmacare in South Africa and Zimbabwe for the manufacture and sale of 3
ARVs, Combivir, Retrovir and Epivir. Until October 16th, 2003, the license could be
used only by the public sector of these two countries. From now on, the voluntary
license would apply to both private and public health care systems (although the price
for the private health care system would remain much higher) and all countries in the
Sub-Saharan area411 • On the very same day, the Competition Commission issued its
ruling in what was called a "stunning victory for access to cheaper drugs,,412.
"The commission's decision goes far beyond the complaint laid by the TAC and 11 other
complainants in September 2002, which argued that the two companies were charging too
much,,413.
Mr. Brook K. Baker, a Health Gap member and a law professor at Northwestern
University, affirmed that:
409 Id., paragraph 19.
410 GLAXOSMITHKLINE, "GlaxoSmithKline takes further action to help the world's poorest fight
mV/AIDS", London, October 16th, 2003, available at:
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"After this historic decision, drug companies will no longer have carte blanche to set monopoly
prices. Big pharma's so-called 'discount prices' are a public relations sham,,414.
He further goes on by describing the legal significance of this precedent setting
decision, since it represents the first good faith application of the Doha Declaration on
TRIPS and Public Health prioritizing public health over absolute patent protection:
"First, the decision validates three important theories. It clarifies: (a) that drug companies
monopoly prices, even when partially discounted, can unnecessarily impede access to
medicines; (b) that the refusal of drug companies to issue voluntary licenses to generic
competitors can abusively impede competition; and (c) that the refusal to grant licenses can
prevent manufacture of fixed-dose combination medicines, thereby complicating patient
adherence to multi-pill treatment regimes.
Second, the decision sets the stage not only for administrative penalties, it also permits the
grant of a compulsory license that would permit the production of ARVs both for the internal
South African market and for export to other developing countries. . .. Because the South
African license would remedy anti-competitive practices, it would not be subject to the WTO
domestic-use rule nor would it be subject to the red tape procedural loopholes of August 30th
Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health.
Finally, the decision indicates that South Africa is no longer going to suffer the fraudulent price
reduction offers from big pharma, especially to the private sector... The difference [between
public and private sector] is such that four people could be treated generically for each patient
d h · . ,,415treate at t e prIvate sector prIce .
In fact, the Competition Commission found that the firms contravened the law by
refusing to grant voluntary licenses under reasonable conditions, thus abusing their
dominant position. Specifically, the firms were found to be involved in three
forbidden practices according to the law (1) denial to a competitor of an access to an
essential facility; (2) excessive pricing; and (3) engagement in an exclusionary act416 .
This ruling from the Competition Commission implied a request to the tribunal to
414 AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, loco cit., note 386.
415 Id.
416 CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECHNOLOGY, "Competition Commission finds pharmaceutical
firms in contravention of the Competition Act", file compiled by the Consumer Project on Technology,
16 October 2003, available at: http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/cclOI62003.html, and Competition
Act No. 89 of1998, Section 8 (a), (b), and (c).
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make "an order authorizing any person to exploit the patents to market generic
versions of the respondents patented medicines or fixed dose combinations that
requires these patents, in return for the payment of a reasonable royalty,,417. But
moreover on top of this, the Competition Commission recommended to the tribunal
that 10 percent of the annual turnover of GSK's and BI's ARVs be paid as a penalty
for each year they did not comply with the Competition Act. This ruling from the
Commission, although not definitive since the tribunal was free to reverse these
findings in its final ruling, would prove to be of strong influence if GSK and BI were
ready to negotiate a settlement agreement with the complainants.
Of course, GSK and BI strongly rejected the Commission's findings that they charge
excessive prices on ARVs. Mrs. Vicky Erich, the GSK spokesperson, claimed that
their sale prices of ARVs in South Africa are among the lowest in the world418. She
also defended GSK's position by affirming that GSK has issued a local license to
Aspen Pharmacare to manufacture generics for the public and private sector, and that it
lowered the price of ARVs more than once. BI also denied having abused its dominant
position, and argued that the Commission's position was not consequent with another
decision on a similar issue against the company a year before:
"We shall avail ourselves of the opportunity, given by the commission, to discuss the matter
further. This will be done as a matter of great urgency. We shall attempt to clarify what is
behind this significant change in the interpretation of the act,,419.
BI further argues that Aspen Pharmacare was given rights to manufacture BI's product
for the state sector, which requires a significant support from patent holders to provide
health care relief to those who need it the most.
"It is in this state sector of the market that the major need for anti-retrovirals exists, and it is for
this reason that we have agreed to provide Aspen Pharmacare with a voluntary license to
service this sector,,420.
417 CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECHNOLOGY, "Competition Commission finds pharmaceutical
firms in contravention of the Competition Act", file compiled by the Consumer Project on Technology,
16 October 2003, available at: http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/ccl 01 62003.html.
418 GLAXOSMITHKLINE, "GlaxoSmithKIine Rejects Commission Findings", SABC News, October
1t h, 2003, available at: http://www.sabcnews.com/economy/business/0.2172.67538.00.html.
419 "Drug firm denies abusing position", South Africa Mail and Guardian, 17 October 2003, available at:
http://lists. essential.org/pipermaiIlip-health/2003-0ctober/005451.html.
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However, what GSK and BI omitted to mention is that the rate under which they
licensed their products to Aspen Pharmacare was respectively 30% and 15% of the net
sales of ARVs42 \ when the standard rate for voluntary/compulsory licenses may be
around 4% or 5%422. On December 11 th, 2003, GSK and BI announced that they had
agreed to allow the manufacture of cheap generic versions of their patented medicines
to treat AIDS in South Africa. On that day, it was announced that the Competition
Commission concluded a settlement agreement with GSK while it was getting closer to
an agreement with BI. Essentially, GSK agreed to what it had already agreed in its
first proposition to the Commission on October 16th, 2003, namely (1) to expand the
voluntary license to Aspen Pharmacare in October 2001 in respect of the public sector
to include private sector; and (2) to allow the licensees to export the ARVs to other
Sub-Saharan countries423 •
More significantly, the agreement includes further concessions made by GSK that may
substantially facilitate the access to essential drugs in South Africa, namely to (1) grant
up to three more voluntary licenses on terms no less favourable than those granted to
Aspen Pharmacare, based on reasonable criteria which include registration with the
Medicines Control Council and the meeting of safety and efficacy obligations; (2)
where the licensee has not have manufacturing capability in South Africa, GSK will
allow the importation of the drugs for distribution in South Africa; (3) allow licensees
to combine the relevant ARV with other antiretroviral medicines; and (4) charge
royalties of no more than 5% of the net sales of the relevant ARVs424. To date, GSK
has granted licenses for the manufacture and/or importation of its products to Aspen
Pharmacare, Thembalami Pharmaceuticals, Feza Pharmaceuticals, Biotech
Laboratories and Cipla-Medpro. However, among these companies, only Aspen and
Cipla were being able to supply these medicines in December 2004425. According to
42° Id.
421 TREATMENT ACTION CAMPAIGN, loc. cit., note 404.
422 Supra, Part IV, chapter a) I).
423 CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECHNOLOGY, "Competition Commission concludes an agreement
with pharmaceutical firms", file compiled by the Consumer Project on Technology, December 10t\
2003, available at: http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/ccI2102003.html.
424 Id.
425 TREATMENT ACTION CAMPAIGN, "GlaxoSmithKline grants license to Cipla in accordance with
Competition Commission settlement", TAC electronic newsletter, December 14th , 2004, available at:
http://www.tac.org.za/newsletter/2004/nsI4122004.htm#grant.
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Mr. Nathan Geffen, national director of the Treatment Action Campaign, supporters of
human rights should be jubilant with the announcement of this agreement:
"Today, December 10th , is International Human Rights Day. It is also TAC's fifth birthday.
With the announcement of the South African government treatment plan a few weeks ago and
this agreement today, there is real hope for people with HIV/AIDS, their friends and family in
the months ahead that they can get life saving medicines. Five years of struggle are resulting in
the rights of people with HIV/AIDS being realized,,426
4) 2005 amendments to South African Patent Law
Last but not least concerning South Africa, a few amendments to its patent legislation
were proposed in 2005. These amendments mainly concern the procedure to patent
biological material and traditional knowledge in South Africa427. As stated in the
Memorandum on the objects of the Patent Amendment Bill, 2005, this patent bill will
seek to fix two loopholes in the patent legislation, namely the fact that the Patents Act
of 1978 "does not empower the registrar of patents to refuse, invalidate or revoke an
application for a patent which does not disclose or wrongfully discloses the origin of
the biological material upon which the invention is based,,428. Moreover, it will also
seek to facilitate the sanctioning of "non-disclosure or wrongful disclosure of
biological material results in the registration of patents which do not meet the criteria
for patenting,,429.
More particularly, the proposed amendments may affect directly the access to essential
drugs in South Africa considering the fact that given the absence of detailed patent
examinations, the AIDS Law Project and the TAC have proposed that "a system of pre-
grant opposition, similar to that found in the Indian Patents Act, 1970 (as amended), be
incorporated in through the amendment of section 34 of the act'.430. If the proposed
426 Philippe RIVIERE, "At last, generic anti-AIDS medicine for Sub-Saharan Africa", Le Monde
Diplomatique, December 2003, available at: http://mondediplo.com/2003/12/19aids.
427 Patents Amendment Bill no. [17-2005}, Republic of South Africa, pA.
428 Id., p.4.
429 Id., pA.
430 AIDS LAW PROJECT and the TREATMENT ACTION CAMPAIGN, Joint Submission: Patents
Amendment Bill [B 17-2005], 25 July 2005, availale at http://www.tac.org.za.
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amendments by the AIDS Law Project and TAC are adopted, section 34 would read as
follows (amendments underlined):
"The registrar shall examine in the prescribed manner every application for a patent and every
complete specification accompanying such application or lodged at the patent office in
pursuance of such application and if it complies with the requirements of this Act, he or she
shall accept it if the following steps have been completed:
(1) He or she has caused notice of the application for the patent to be published in the
Government Gazette not less than six months prior to the date upon which the application
is accepted;
(2) All interested parties, including those acting solely in the public interest, have been
provided the opportunity to make written submissions setting out the manner in which the
patent application does not comply with any provision of this Act; and
(3) He or she has provided written reasons justifying the acceptance of the patent application,
notwithstanding the submissions advanced in terms of subsection (2),',431
The AIDS Law Project and the TAC are also seeking to expand the grounds for patent
revocation in the law, They point out that there should be a procedure to revoke
patents granted on the grounds of unlawfully obtained bioprospecting results, Thus,
they proposed to add a new paragraph to section 61(1):
CD That at the time of the lodging of the statement in terms of section 300M, the applicant for
the patent did not have title or authority to make use of the indigenous biological resource or
genetic resource or of the traditional knowledge or traditional use, and the relevant invention
was directly derived from an indigenous biological resource or a genetic resource, and/or that
the invention was based on or derived from traditional knowledge or traditional use,,432.
Furthermore, the AIDS Law Project (ALP) and the TAC proposed that South Africa
undertake "a comprehensive review of its patent legislation to enable the development
of an appropriate patent regime within the bounds of both what is permitted in terms of
international trade law and what is required by international human rights law and the
Constitution"m. ALP and TAC further claim that considering the level of
development, the burden of disease and the industrial strategy regarding generics,
patentees are still overprotected in South Africa. This situation could be corrected by
431 rd, pp. 5-6.
432 rd., p.6.
433 rd., p.6.
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the integration of health safeguards provided by TRIPS, the Doha Declaration on
TRIPS and Public Health, and the WTO General Council Decision of August 30'h,
2003. In order to do so, ALP and TAC proposed further amendments to the South
African patent legislation:
• Expand the category of state officials who may use an invention for public
purposes, and provide a default procedure for compulsory licensing in this case
if the patentee and the state official fail to come to an agreement in this regard
(section 4);
• Ensure the possibility to issue a compulsory license to deal with a health
emergency, whether by the Minister of Health, the Minister of Industry, or the
executive council responsible for health in a province (new section 4A);
• Limit the granting of patents in respect of new uses and new forms of known
substances (section 25);
• Abolish 'TRIPS-plus' patent protections included in section 56 by allowing a
private person, including companies, to apply for a compulsory license;
• Ensure the exportation of generic pharmaceutical products to markets with no
or insufficient manufacturing capacity (new section 56B);
• Ensure the revocation of a patent when the grant of a voluntary/compulsory
license has not allowed to prevent abuses resulting from the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent, provided that at least two years have expired since the
grant of such license (section 61); and
• New definitions should be included in the patent act to clarify the amendments
proposed above434 .
434 Id., p.7.
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VI- ANALYSIS OF THE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE AND TENDANCIES
REGARDING THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
So far, among the countries studied, only Canada, India, and the European Union have
taken action to modify their legislative framework in order to comply with the TRIPS
Council Decision ofAugust 3(/h, 2003435. South Africa has been pressured by civil
society to undertake a legal reform concerning the export of generic drugs436, but it
must deal with the provision of ARVs to its own population first before thinking of
providing other developing countries with insufficient manufacturing capacity. So far,
the U.S. and Brazil have not demonstrated an intention to modify their compulsory
licensing regime to allow the export of generic drugs to developing countries. Canada,
India and the European Union have adopted similar regimes for the export of generic
drugs although they also include important differences.
The U.S., although it does not seem to intend to establish the suggested mechanisms in
the Doha negotiations, put forward a IS-billion initiative over S years, the Presidents
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief -(PREPFAR), in May 2003. However, the initiative
is significantly limited by not allowing generic drugs to be purchased under that
initiative, therefore strongly affecting its purchase power. PREPFAR remains rather
controversial since it limits safety approval standards· to those used by the FDA or
other stringent regulatory authorities, and it is also limited to a list of fifteen countries,
"which upsets anyone associated with a country not on the list',437. Moreover, the
adoption of a special regime for exports of generic essential drugs to countries affected
by HIV/AIDS, as provided by the Doha documents, seems to be a more appropriate
and efficient long-term approach to countering the spread of the pandemic.
The developing countries studied in part V of this analysis have all adopted health
safeguards in their intellectual property law in order to favour universal access to
essential medicines within their jurisdiction, as found in chapter b) of Part VI of this
analysis.
435 August 30th Decision, op. cit., note 18.
436 AIDS LAW PROJECT and the TREATMENT ACTION CAMPAIGN, lac. cit., note 430.
437 WIKIPEDIA, "Definition of'PREPFAR"', from Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopaedia, available at:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President%27s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief.
124
Moreover, radically opposed to the spirit of the Doha negotiations, there are attempts
to further strengthen the minimum standards of intellectual property protection
provided by TRIPS438• These attempts, if successful, would diminish the capacity of
the countries adopting such policies in favour of increased access to essential
medicines. These attempts are summarized in chapters c) and d) of this part of the
analysis.
Part VI will identify four key legal elements that need to be adapted to right to health
requirements in order to carry out a successful and fair distribution of essential drugs
worldwide. The first is compliance with the August 30th Decision of the TRIPS
Council, which is becoming crucial for the next generation of medicines, since TRIPS
is now applied in most countries with the infrastructures required to manufacture
essential drugs beginning in the year 2005. The second key element is the adoption of
laws by developing countries that favour universal access to essential drugs. No matter
how many legal measures developed countries might adopt to help poorer countries
distribute essential medicines, they will not produce any positive benefit if developing
countries themselves do not adopt corresponding measures. The third and fourth key
elements are measures that need to be closely monitored since they seek to increase
patent protection, the use of FTAs and the loosening of patentability criteria. These
elements negatively affect universal access to essential medicines, and decrease the
scope of the latest developments brought to TRIPS and the WTO concerning public
health.
Chapter a) Compliance with the August 3(jh Decision ofthe TRIPS Council
1) Countries covered by the compulsory licensing regime
The Canadian and Indian compulsory licensing regimes for the export of generic drugs
cover all states with insufficient manufacturing capacities, whether they belong to the
WTO or not. However, the developing countries not part of the WTO that do not
qualify as a least developed country (LDC) according to UN standards will be
disadvantaged compared to countries with the same income level that are part of the
438 TRIPS, OR. cit., note 8.
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WTO. The former will be treated as mid-income countries such as Czech Republic,
meaning generic manufacturers wishing to contract with such countries will need to go
through supplementary bureaucratic measures before they obtain their compulsory
license. However, the Canadian law entitles NOOs to contract with Canadian generic
manufacturers with the permission of the government of the importing country, while
only governments will be entitled to contract with generic manufacturers under the
Indian law.
Unfortunately, under European Union policies, only governments of WTO member-
states (and not NOOs) will be entitled to contract with European Union generic drug
manufacturers. This is unacceptable from a human rights perspective, since the
international obligations regarding universal human rights arising from the Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as the Alma-Alta Declaration, still
stand whether the population of a particular country belongs to the WTO or not. This
means that any generic manufacturer from a European Union member country will be
unable to sell generic drugs to a non-WTO country.
2) Limit oftime for negotiations with the brand-name manufacturer
Countries require the generic manufacturer to negotiate a voluntary license with the
brand-name manufacturer before the competent national authority may issue a
compulsory license. If after "a reasonable period of time", no agreement has been
reached between both manufacturers, then a compulsory license will be issued by the
appropriate national authorities.
In Canada, the meaning of a "reasonable period of time" will be no longer than 30
days. This contrasts starkly with the six-month period in India. There is no time-line
provided in the European Union policies, leaving a lot of uncertainty about when one
will have the right to claim a compulsory license. The Indian law's designation of six
months as "a reasonable period of time" appears far too long a period to conclude
negotiations, especially for the provision of essential drugs to poor populations in
urgent need. This will allow an unjustified extension of the monopoly of the patent
holder into countries with insufficient manufacturing capacities for pharmaceuticals,
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since this compulsory period of negotiations will likely be used to delay the
introduction of generic drugs in the relevant markets.
3) Scope ofmedicines and diseases covered by the compulsory licensing regime
Both India and the European Union provide an unlimited scope regarding the patented
medicines that may be exported under their compulsory licensing regime. Canada
however, limits the scope of Bill C-9 to 46 products based on the WHO list of essential
medicines for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. This is much too narrow, there are
many other diseases affecting poor countries for which cures are unaffordable. Canada
is certainly not in the right position to decide which medicines are most needed in the
developing world.
. 4) Safety requirements for exported drugs when there is no reference product sold in
the market ofthe exporting country
Canada and the European Union demonstrate flexibility when there is no reference
product sold in their national market. When sufficient clinical data is provided
individually on ARV agents constituting a FDC (sometimes three or four different
agents are in one FDC), the threshold for safety approval will be reached in Canada. In
the European Union, information from other jurisdictions, university studies or
international programs on drug safety may be sufficient for approval of generic drugs
for exports with no reference product sold within the European Union jurisdiction.
Since India has a large poor population, most of the generic products exported are also
used within their own borders. Therefore, there is often a reference product to conduct
bioequivalence studies. Moreover, as seen in the previous chapter, Indian
pharmaceutical manufacturers make extensive use of the WHO pre-qualification
program for drug safety requirements.
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5) Confusion ofcompulsory licensing for exports to developing countries and former
compulsory licensing regimes in force prior to the advent ofTRIPS and regional trade
agreements such as NAFTA
Until the early nineties, some countries such as Canada extensively used compulsory
licenses for pharmaceuticals. Fifteen years later, Canada can again claim the merit of
being one of the first developed countries to modify its national legislation. Bill C-9,
in force since 2005, complied with the Decision ofthe General Council ofAugust 30th,
2003 on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health. Although the main mechanism of Bill C-9 is
compulsory licensing, this new regime should not, however, be confused with the
former compulsory licensing regime providing a "local working" requirement for
pharmaceuticals. This approach was repealed under U.S. pressure to comply with
NAFTA and TRIPS in the early nineties. This is crucial since the brand-name
pharmaceutical industry sees Canada's compulsory licensing system in an extremely
negative light, and has convinced both levels of government that broad compulsory
licensing provisions would significantly hurt Canada's international reputation439.
Whether this fear is justified or not, the debate should not harm the new compulsory
licensing regime for exports to developing countries provided in Bill C-9, especially
considering the urgency of the situation. Moreover, if Canada's reputation should be
affected at the international level, it would be by not implementing the TRIPS General
Council Decision ofAugust 3dh, 2003, and not by complying with its responsibilities
towards developing nations regarding the right to health.
Chapter h) Health safeguards in intellectualproperty legislation at the national level
favouring the access to essential medicines in developing countries
In intellectual property law, health safeguards are crucial in developing countries. Yet,
due to the high number of poor people even in the populations of developed countries,
such safeguards are necessary to ensure adequate access to essential medicines for all.
The countries we studied in part V all have such safeguards to different extents.
439 Gold, E. Richard and al. Gene Patents: Past-Time for Reform, McGill University, (submitted).
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In Brazil, if the Federal authorities declare in an act of law that if there is a case of
national emergency or public interest, and that the patentee or his/her licensee does not
meet the demand from the public, "a temporary ex-officio non-exclusive compulsory
license for the exploitation of a patent may be granted,,440. This provision was used in
the latest attempt by the Brazilian government to grant a compulsory license and seems
to have appropriate grounds to do so, since the "local working" requirement441 likely
contravenes article 27(1) of TRIPS, which forbids discrimination in the enjoyment of
patent rights whether the products are imported or locally produced. However, that
picture may be significantly changed if the Bill No. 22/03 exempting pharmaceutical
products for the prevention and treatment of AIDS from patentability ever enters into
force.
In India, for drugs marketed prior to March 2005, there was much less need to use
health safeguards since only methods or processes of manufacture were patentable, as
opposed to the product itself. However, concerning drugs for which patents will be
registered after March 2005, health safeguards are essential to ensure access to
medicines since patents on products are granted after that date. Section 84 of the
Patent Act No. 39 of 1970 allows the Controller of Patents to grant a compulsory
license on a drug to any person who requests it if it has not been made available to the
public at a reasonable price, at least three years after the patented drug has been put on
the market. In this case, the standard on which to decide whether a compulsory license
may be granted or not is pricing. "Reasonable pricing" will undoubtedly be linked to
the capacity of the population to pay, thereby ensuring that essential drugs will not be
available only to rich segments of the society.
South Africa is the only country studied that has included the right to access to health
care in its constitution. It requires actions from the government to ensure the highest
attainable standard of health for all. Although this obligation is clearly limited by the
available resources of the state, it goes as far as examining budgetary appropriations
when dealing with enforcement of socioeconomic rights, a practical implementation of
right to health obligations in national law which is unseen in any other national
jurisdiction under study. In line with the South Africa Constitution, the government
440 Law 9279/86, op. cit., note 264, article 71.
441 Id., article 68.
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may "prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable medicines in certain
circumstances so as to protect the health of the pubIic,,442, including compulsory
licensing and parallel imports of patented medicines.
Public health safeguards in the application of intellectual property law in countries
such as Canada and the United States (although they are not as crucial as in Brazil,
India and South Africa for the survival of their nationals due to lower poverty among
their populations, broader public health insurance programmes, or private insurance)
should nonetheless be used as "watchdogs" to maintain fair access to medicines. In
Canada, the Patent Act offers three ways to limit patent rights considering public
policy concerns, i.e. in cases where the patentee abuses his/her exclusive rights under
his/her patent, through the government use of ~ patented invention against an adequate
consideration, and through the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board, if patented
medicines are sold at a price that, in the board's opinion, is excessive. In that last case,
the board may order the patentee to pay a fine or reduce the price of the medicine to an
extent that will offset the amount of the excessive revenue received443 .
The United States, however, is reluctant to adopt measures preventing abusive pricing
of pharmaceuticals within their jurisdiction. For the federal government, there are only
two mechanisms to derogate from the patent rules: 1) through government "march-in
rights" for publicly-funded inventions, if an invention is not being made reasonably
accessible to the public; and 2) through a broad government use provision, where the
federal government can use any patent or copyright, but where the right holder is
entitled to compensation. The other legal tool encouraging a form of price control over
pharmaceuticals is via the Hatch-Waxman Act. It supports the entry on the market of
generic products by allowing bioequivalence studies to be used for safety approval
requirements. But still, this Act allows a patent extension of five years to cope with
the time a drug remains in the development pipeline, and of two and a half years if a
generic manufacturer challenges the patent. And although these national public health
safeguards are not as permissive as those in the other countries studied, the U.S.
government seems to lack the will to use them when the opportunity arises. This was
442 Medicines and Related Substances Act No. 90 of1997, section ISC.
443 Robert G. HOWELL and aI, Intellectual Property Law: Cases and Materials, Edmond Montgomery
Publications Limited, Toronto, 1999, p.1 0 14.
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demonstrated in the Cipro case and through the request made under the Bayh-Dole Act
to the Clinton and Bush administrations to contract with the WHO for the provisions of
essential medicines to developing countries. At the state level, although the use of the
eminent domain for patents as a health safeguard may provoke some debate on the
access to affordable medicines issue in general, it seems to lack credibility.
Many of these public health safeguards are defendable under the TRIPS Agreement. In
fact, while TRIPS created many obligations in developing countries, some of which
were also new in developed countries, this treaty also allows WTO Member countries
to legitimately adopt regulations that ensure a balance between the minimum standards
of patent protection and the public good.
"... they can adopt measures which are conducive to social and economic welfare (article 7 of
the TRIPs Agreement), such as those necessary to protect public health, nutrition and the public
interest in sectors of vital importance for their socio-economic and technological development.
Countries can also adopt measures to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights (Article
8.1 and 8.2 of the TRIPs Agreement)444".
Professor Jerome Reichman also explained that:
"[C]ountries could also attempt to trigger the safeguards implicit in Articles 7 and 8 in one of
two ways. The least destructive approach would be to convince the Council for TRIPS itself to
recommend narrowly described waivers to meet specified circumstances for a limited period of
time. This approach would strengthen the mediatory powers of the Council for TRIPS and help
offset the problems arising from the inability of that body to quash or stay request for
consultations and dispute-settlement panels launched by trigger-happy governments.
Alternatively, developing country defendants responding to complaints of nullification and
impairment under Article 64 might invoke the application of Articles 7 and 8(1) to meet
unforeseen conditions of hardship. This defense, if properly grounded and supported by factual
evidence, could persuade the Appellate Body either to admit the existence of a tacit doctrine of
frustration recognized in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Either way, overly
aggressive complainants could wind up with what amount to ajudicially imposed waiver445".
444 Carlos M. CORREA, loc. cit., note 15, p.3-4.
445 Peter K. YU, "TRIPS and Its Discontents", (2005) Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research
Paper No. 03-03, Michigan State University College of Law, p.14.
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Section 27(2) of TRIPS also provides patentability exceptions under motives related to
ordre public. Although ordre public may be a broad notion, section 27(2) reveals that
it is not limited to security reasons; it also relates to the protection of human, animal, or
plant life or health and may be applied to inventions that may lead to serious prejudice
to the environment446 . However, this exception does not appear to be sufficient,
according to Professor Carlos M. Correa, to justify such an exclusion from
patentability, except in limited circumstances447 .
Moreover, we would like to underscore that competition law may also be used in most
jurisdictions to counter the use of a patent that unduly prevents access to the patented
invention to the detriment of the consumers. Through competition law remedies,
,courts may dispose of a relatively large range of measures that would cope with an
"abuse of dominant position" from a patent holder, such as financial penalties,
compulsory licenses under the conditions they deem appropriate, or simply revoking
the patent. South Africa has successfully used competition law to promote access to
essential drugs as analysed in part V, chapter c).
Chapter c) The Use ofFree Trade Agreements to Extend Patent Protection
Obviously, developing countries have been much concerned about the increased
protection required by TRIPS and its harmful impact not only in the area of health, but
also concerning agriculture, environment, education and culture. To make matters
worse, developing countries discontent did not end up with the TRIPS Agreement:
"Today, many developed countries have sought to ratchet up their protection by negotiating
around the TRIPS Agreement, seeking what commentators have called "TRIPS-plus"
protection,,448.
The Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 requires the U.S. Government to respect
the Doha Declaration on Public Health during the negotiations of free-trade
agreements (FTAs). Nonetheless, the most recent FTAs show that the U.S.
Government has chosen not only to maintain its hard line on protection of patent
446 Carlos M. CORREA, loc. cit., note 15, p.I2.
447 Id.
448 Peter K. YU, loc. cit., note 445, p.lO.
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rights, but also to increase patent protection and expand patent terms above what is
required by TRIPS, through the patenting of new uses of known molecules, among
other things. In fact, apart from intellectual property treaties to which the parties to a
free-trade agreement with the U.S. are subjected, and which are always duly reported
in the first provisions of such an agreement, little consideration has been given to other
treaties that may be affected by that FTA, especially regarding access to medicines and
the right to health. Among the states that are party to a FTA with the U.S., only
Bahrain, Morocco and CAFTA required the express recognition of a party's right to
benefit from the so-called Doha solution, while the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health is recognized in the preamble of the U.S.-Chile FTA.
This is not surprising, since the latest trend ofFTAs concluded by the U.S. government
constitute a clear attempt to prevent the other state party to use Doha mechanisms in
order to react to public health crises. For example, the U.S.- Australia FTA allows the
export of generic drugs to a third party only for marketing approval purposes if a
patent is still valid in the jurisdiction of that party449, clearly contravening the spirit of
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health and the Decision of
the TRIPS Council on the Implementation ofParagraph 6 ofthe Doha Declaration on
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health ofAugust 3dh, 2003. Other measures included in
most FTAs involving the U.S. affect the implementation of access to essential drugs
policies. These measures include preventing marketing approval of a product when the
patent of the reference product is still valid; limited grounds for patent revocation;
abolishment of pre-grant opposition procedure; patent term extension if a marketing
approval takes more than a defined time-line; and, protection of clinical data for the
term of the whole patent plus a five year period after patent exhaustion.
What is also disturbing to developing countries that reluctantly joined the TRIPS
Agreement to avoid unilateral trade sanctions is that they find themselves in no better
position, as far as unilateral sanctions are concerned, than they were had they not
signed the TRIPS Agreement:
449 Us. _Australia Free- Trade Agreement, section 17.9.6, signed on May 18th, 2004.
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"Because most of the items negotiated under the bilateral and plurilateral agreements were
considered outside the scope of the TRIPS Agreement, the Agreement would not shield less
developed countries from trade sanctions,,450.
But even more problematically, the recent trend of FTAs came at a time when the
intellectual property system was closely watched by the civil society in the developed
world. Until recently, intellectual property was not of popular interest. Considering
this new perspective and the concerns over expanding intellectual property rights in
developed countries, it is very difficult to find it
" ... timely to harmonize and elevate international standards of patent protection - even if that
were demonstrably beneficial - when there is so little agreement in the U.S. itself on how to
rectify a dysfunctional apparatus that often seems out of control,,451.
Nevertheless, the Doha mechanisms are voluntary. Such measures do not constitute a
breach of international trade obligations with sanctions under the WTO. There are no
mechanisms in the international trade framework that aim to re-equilibrate a bilateral
agreement where one party would have misled the other through its dominant position
during the negotiations. However, such provisions clearly constitute a breach of
international obligations regarding the right to health, including the responsibility that
rich states have towards developing states regarding the access to essential medicines.
That is why developing countries need to be sensitised, informed and supported during
the negotiations for a free-trade agreement in order not to give away their entitlements
under international law. The U.S. is currently negotiating a FTA with the South
African Customs Union (SACU), a regional trade union regrouping South Africa,
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, a region widely affected by HIV/AIDS,
malaria, tuberculosis and many other diseases. On July 2nd, 2003, eight NGOs
highlighted in a letter to U.S. President George W. Bush, the necessity to exclude
intellectual property from the negotiations over a U.S - SACU Free Trade Agreement,
because it will likely limit the ability of these countries to adopt appropriate measures
to fight HIV/AIDS and other serious health problems452 • The negotiations on this very
450 Peter K. YD, loc. cit., note 445, polO.
451 Id., p.ll.
452 "Letter from Eight NGOs to President Bush Asking for the Exclusion ofIntellectual Property from
the South African Customs Union FTA", accessible at:
http://www.cptech.org/ip/healthitrade/sacuingos07022003ohtml0
134
important FTA, at least regarding access to essential drugs, are not completed yet.
Hopefully, provisions generating human rights violations will be dropped from that
agreement, despite the recent trend in the conclusion ofFTAs.
Chapter d) The loosening ofpatentability criteria in order to expand the length of
patent monopoly on pharmaceutical products
Pressure to expand patentability criteria has occurred not only through FTAs that
include "TRIPS-plus" requirements, but also through the industry lobbying
governments to reform their intellectual property law, such as in India453 . India
considered allowing the patenting of new uses or dosages of an already known
molecule, thus significantly increasing the possibility of extending the length of a
patent over 20 years. Another form of expression is the frivolous patent claims that
have occurred in the U.S. because of a lax application of patentability criteria454.
In India, in order to avoid the "evergreening" of patents, the authorities have decided to
prevent the patentability of new uses of already known molecules by clarifying the
definitions of "inventive step", "new invention", and "pharmaceutical substance,,455.
In the U.S., although they are now preventing patent listing for drug packaging, drug
metabolites and intermediate forms of a drug, they are still allowing patents on new
uses of a drug456.
Canada also allows the patentability of new uses of known molecules. Since this issue
is not specifically covered by the law, such as in India, it is up to the patent authorities
and the courts to rule on the matter, through the interpretation of the patentability
criteria of "novelty" and "inventive step". In a case that now constitutes precedent, the
Supreme Court of Canada had to rule on whether a new use of a known product for
which the patent was already exhausted should be granted another patent, according to
the definition of "invention" in section 2 of the Patent Acl57 in Shell Oil Co. v.
453 Supra, Part V, chapter b)2).
454 Supra, Part IV, chapter b)2)i).
455 Patents Amendment Act No. 15 of2005, section 2 f), g), and h).
456 Supra, Part IV, chapter b)2)i).
457 Patent Act, 00. cit., note 97.
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Canada (Commissioner of Patents/58• That decision ruled that the "invention" at
stake in the claims was the newly discovered properties of that product, and not the
composition of that product itself. Therefore, it was not necessary for the Court that
the composition of the known product be new, as long as the new properties of that
product demonstrate novelty and inventive step459.
No matter what road patent authorities or national courts may take to justify or prevent
the patentability of the new use of a known product to extend patent term, it remains a
political choice dictated by a wide spectrum of interests. However, we think such a
decision as whether or not to grant a patent on new uses of known molecules is a
choice that needs to be addressed independently by every national government, with no
pressure exercised by any other trade partner in taking that decision. Moreover,
specifically regarding essential medicines, patent claims evaluation should be more
focused on the significance of the improvement of a molecule instead of the
expectation of profits arising from its new use. Regarding TRJPs'60 and the associated
Doha documents461 , a state-member is entirely justified to prevent the patenting of new
uses on known products. Accordingly, countries entering FTA negotiations and
considering implementing patents on new uses of known products should carefully
examine how patent term extension might affect their national industry and the well
being of their population.
"The TRIPS Agreement does not define what an "invention" is; it only specifies the
requirements that an invention should meet in order to be patentable. This leaves Member
countries considerable freedom to determine what should be deemed an invention, and to
exclude from patentability any substance which exists in nature462".
Thus, TRIPS may allow enough "policy space" for developing countries to be able to
push for an interpretation of the substance of the agreement that will meet their needs
"while preserving the national autonomy appropriately reserved to them during the
458 [1982] R.C.S. 536.
459 Id., paragraph 31.
460 TRIPS, op. cit., note 8.
461 August 30th Decision, op. cit., note 18, Doha Ministerial Declaration, op. cit., note 44, and Doha
Declaration, op. cit., note 45.
462 Carlos M.CORREA, loco cit., note 15, p.19.
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negotiation process,,463. The ambiguities included into TRIPS may be used by
developing countries to counter the continuous expansion of intellectual property
rights, and may even allow them to get back what has been lost in the recent battles
regarding uniform intellectual property protection.
"In sum, the TRIPS Agreement has provided many reasons why less developed countries are
dissatisfied with the current international intellectual property system. However, the
Agreement alone does not result in the current state of dissatisfaction. New developments,
such as the increasing use of TRIPS-plus free trade agreements as well as the growing use of
technological protection measures, have made the system even more unbearable464".
PART VII - CONCLUSION
It was demonstrated in this analysis that measures consequent with the right to health
and universal access to essential medicines were adopted successfully at the national
level in most of the countries studied, due to the room for interpretation given by the
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration. We say successfully
since those measures often had to be strongly supported by civil society organizations,
or government officials, against the intense lobbying of the brand-name
pharmaceutical industry and some developed countries. It may lead as far as litigation
in front of WTO panel or a national court, as it was the case for Brazil and South
Africa. Even if the WTO DSU had been used primarily by developed countries, as the
Agreement matures, less developed countries have begun to use the process more
frequently. As Professor William Davey pointed out:
"In the first five years of the system's existence, developing countries initiated by themselves
roughly one-quarter of the consultation requests. In the four and one-half years from 2000 to
June 2004, developing countries initiated 62% of the consultation requests - more than
doubling their relative share of initiations. ... Thus, in the last few years developing countries
have become more frequent users of WTO dispute settlement, both in absolute and relative
terms. Interestingly, the majority of those cases have involved developing country respondents.
That is to say, developing countries seem to have found the WTO dispute settlement system to
463 Peter K. YD, loco cit., note 445, p.I2.
464 Id., p. I I.
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be a useful mechanism to deal with a wide range of trade disputes - using it not only against
developing countries, but also in their trading relations with other developing countries465".
In light of what we discovered through our research, we suggest that the right to health
is reconcilable with intellectual property protection as long as the previous has
precedence over the former. It seems that this assumption is also shared by an
increasing number of stakeholders. However, this does not include the U.S., more
inclined to defend the interests of their powerful pharmaceutical industry, which
explains their recent propensity to prevent states from adopting measures commanded
by the right to health and the access to essential medicines through the conclusion of
FTAs.
An efficient enforcement of intellectual property rights might need to be paired with
considerations from other fields, such as human rights. As long as strict enforcement
of patents on essential medicines will not be balanced by human rights interests and
will let millions of people affected by diseases suffer and die without treatment, there
will be no legitimacy to the manner which patents on medicines are enforced for most
of the world's population. As stated by an author from the Center for Study of
Responsive Law:
"Of all the grotesque inequities that prevail in the world, that of health is arguably the most
offensive,,466.
At the moment, poorest countries' populations are denied treatment through unfair
international intellectual property agreements pushed by the greed of western
businesses and governments. There are no valid reasons why this issue should not be
addressed. The arguments for the limitation of access to treatment in poor countries
seem dubious at best. Supporters of strong intellectual property protection claim that if
patented drugs are produced by generic companies to supply poor countries, incentives
for pharmaceutical firms to market new medicines, which benefit not only the poor but
the whole population, will be significantly endangered. In reality, because of their lack
465 Peter K. YU, loco cit., note 445, p. 16.
466 Amir ATTARAN, "Human Rights and Biomedical Research Funding for the Developing World:
Discovering State Obligations under the Right to Health", (1999) 4 Health and Human Rights, no. I,
p.27.
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of resources, poor countries should represent a minimal share of brand-name
pharmaceutical manufacturers' market. They simply cannot buy patented essential
drugs. If brand-name manufacturers do not significantly supply poor markets anyway,
why would they be opposed to the generic industry manufacturing those medicines and
get from 1% to 5% of the net sales of the copycat product?
"Two important questions, in this context, are (a) the extent to which the income generated by
patents in the developing world is actually invested to develop the medicines needed by the
poor; and (b) whether the granting of patents in developing countries, under conditions
substantially similar to those applicable in developed countries, is essential to provide
incentives for industry's global R&D activities467".
Many drugs are important for both developed and developing countries. However,
developing countries also have different needs than developed countries for many
other diseases. The diseases of the poor attract very little investment by large
pharmaceutical companies, since they are not promising sources of profit. Between
1975 and 1997, only 13 of 1223 new chemicals entities, or 1% were for the treatment
of tropical diseases468 . "Of the annual health-related research and development
worldwide, only 0.2% goes for pneumonia, diarrhea and tuberculosis - yet these
account for 18% of the global disease burden469". Moreover, the contribution to R&D
arising from less developed countries or regions is negligible in global terms:
"For instance, Africa - one of the regions where the problems of access to drugs are more
severe - only accounts for around 1.3% of world pharmaceutical sales470".
Moreover, there is increasing evidence that global welfare is not improved under a
uniform world-wide system of pharmaceutical product patents. Indeed, Professor F.
M. Scherer's analysis reveals that
"global welfare is maximized by letting low-income nations free-ride on the patented
inventions of first-world nations over a wide range of negative new product development
467 Carlos M. CORREA, « Public Health and Intellectual Property Rights », paper partially based on the
study prepared by the author for the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 2001, p.9.
468 Id.
469 Id.
470 Id., p.14.
139
impacts if one accepts the reasonable premise that the marginal utility of income is appreciably
higher in poor nations than in rich nations471 ".
Other authors are claiming that IP rewards beyond what is necessary to spur
innovation, and even that IP may be a drag to innovation:
"One complaint is that intellectual property rewards inventors beyond what is necessary to spur
innovation. Another is that intellectual property is a drag to innovation, rather than a spur,
since it prevents inventions from being used efficiently, especially in creating further
innovations. A third complaint is that some inventions should not be protected at all but,
instead, be supported by public sponsors472".
Thus, these authors have identified alternative mechanisms to reward innovation, such
as public funded research and prizes473 . From a long-term perspective, the use of
compulsory licensing, whether to supply a national market or for exports, may not be
enough to ensure universal access to essential medicines. The use of the terms
"exceptional circumstances", "national emergency", or "extreme urgency", plus the
fact that importing countries need to justify themselves through notification, according
to the August 3(jh Decision, clearly demonstrate the exceptional character of those
measures
474
. However, even if the bureaucratic burden can prove to be rather heavy,
public health safeguards provided in TRIPS and the Doha documents need to be fully
used for the time being, before another mechanism is agreed on by all the stakeholders
and is implemented where people need it. Because India, the largest provider of cheap
medicines to the developing world, needs to comply with TRIPS starting in 2005, the
use of this public health safeguard will become crucial for the treatment of millions of
people, since Bangladesh is the only country not subject to the WTO until 2016 that is
able to produce generic drugs for the developing world475 . Since India was supplying
medicines to about 50% of the AIDS-inflicted people in the developing world,
471 F. M. SCHERER, «A Note on Global Welfare in Pharmaceutical Patenting », (2004) 27 The World
Economy, 1127-1142, 1137.
472 Nancy GALLINI and Suzanne SCOTCHMER, «Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive
System? », (2002) 2 Innovation Policy and the Economy, Adam Jaffe, Joshua Lerner and Scott Stern,
Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 51-72.
473 See id., and Steven SHAVELL and Tanguy VAN YPERSELE, « Rewards versus Intellectual
Property Rights", (200 I) 44 Journal ofLaw and Economics, 525-547.
474 Marie CARPENTIER and Rene cort, « La Declaration de Doha sur la sante publique : la bonne
prescription? Vne perspective historique sur Ie debat concernant la protection par brevet des
medicaments », (2005), 46 Les Cahiers de Droit, no.3, 746.
475 THE INDEPENDANT, "Bangladesh eyes huge medicine market in Africa", business news, available
at: http://independent-bangladesh.com/news/mar/29/29032005bs.htm#AO.
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countries like Bangladesh will not be able to take over entirely its production of
generic drugs. Developing countries will need WTO members to produce cheap
generic medicines and make them available as soon as possible under TRIPS public
health safeguards.
Other reward-based mechanisms must be put in place to replace the patent system, at
least regarding essential medicines. In the U.S. H.R. 417, or the Medical Innovation
Prize Fund Act, is a new bill that would separate the markets of innovation and of the
provision of essential pharmaceutical products by creating a fund to compensate new
inventors when they make available a new and useful product for consumers. H.R.
417 "would change the paradigm for financing medical R&D and pricing prescription
drugs in the United States":
"Rather than rely on high drug prices as the incentive for R&D, the bill would directly reward
developers of medicines, on the basis of a drug's incremental therapeutic benefit to consumers,
through a new Medical Innovation Prize Fund.... The Bill, by rewarding only truly innovative
products that provide new therapeutic benefits to consumers, would also dramatically reduce
wasteful expenditures such as those on research, development and marketing of me-too
drugs,,476.
This legislation, if adopted, would prevent massive expenditure on marketing
pharmaceutical products and on me-too drugs, which bring very little net social
benefits, and instead adequately reward truly innovative medicines. Innovators would
be rewarded from the Fund, which would be financed by 0.5% of U.S. GDP, and
products would become generics immediately following FDA approval. Inventors
would still obtain a patent and be free to use it, until the FDA approves a new
medicine477 . Breaking the link between drug prices and R&D would greatly increase
equitable access to medicines. H.R. 417 would also provide minimal funding for
orphan drugs, thus fixing another major flaw in the current patent system.
476 HR. 417 - The Medica/Innovation Prize Fund Act, Summary by the Office of Rep. Sanders,
available at: http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/hr417/hr417-summary.pdf.
477 Id.
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Moreover at the international level, numerous experts from different fields formulated
a proposal for a new global medical R&D treaty in 2002. Among other things, this
R&D treaty would seek to prevent
"A growing web of multilateral, regional, bilateral and unilateral trade agreements and policies
[that] focus nearly exclusively on measures that expand the scope and power of intellectual
property rights, or reduce the effectiveness of price negotiations or controls,,478.
This draft treaty479, which is a work in progress, represents a collaborative effort over
the past two years. At its core is an obligation to finance medical research and
development, linked with a country's GDP. The proposed treaty would provide
minimal financing for neglected diseases. It would also provide drastic changes for
financing R&D:
"While virtually all of today's trade agreements focus exclusively upon purchase of medicines
at high prices as the sole method of financing R&D, the Draft R&D Treaty takes a much
broader view. Acceptable methods of finance include such items as direct public funding, tax
credits or other expenditures, philanthropic spending, research funding obligations imposed on
sellers of medicines, purchases of relevant medical products (to the degree that such
expenditures induce investments in medical R&D), and innovation prizes (to the degree that
such prizes induce investments in medical R&D),,480.
This draft treaty would work similarly to the Kyoto Treaty on climate change, since it
would assign credits for socially important projects. Excess credits could be traded
between states to satisfy the treaty obligations. Credits could be granted for a wide
range of projects, such as R&D for neglected diseases and priority projects, free and
open source public databases, technology and capacity transfers to developing
countries, preservation and dissemination of traditional medical knowledge, and
exceptionally useful public goods481 . Such a mechanism would reduce inequities in
biomedical research funding between diseases prevalent in rich countries and those
prevalent in poor countries.
478 Request to Evaluate Proposal for New Global Medical R&D Treaty, Letter to the World Health
Assembly Executive Board and the World Health Organization Commission on Intellectual Property
Rights, Innovation and Health, February 2005, p.2, available at:
http://www.cptech.org/workingdrafts/24feb05WHOen.pdf.
479 NewGlobal Medical R&D Treaty available at: http://www.cptech.org/workingdrafts/rndtreaty4.pdf.
480 Request to Evaluate Proposalfor New Global Medical R&D Treaty, 00. cit., note 456, p.2
481 Id., p.3.
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"An estimated 93 percent of the world's burden of preventable mortality (measured as years of
potential life lost) occurs in the developing world. Yet, of the $30 billion global investment in
health research in 1986, only 5 percent or $1.6 billion was devoted specifically to the health
problems of developing countries. For each year of potential life lost in the industrialized
world, more than 200 times as much is spent on health research as is spent for each year lost in
the developing world,,482.
However, such radical changes for financing innovation brought by this draft treaty
and by its counterpart at the national level, H.R. 417, although they both work towards
increasing the respect of the right to health and other human rights, are difficult to
adopt, considering that such a global treaty needs to be negotiated by the state parties.
For now, considering the urgency to make treatments available for HIV/AIDS, malaria,
tuberculosis and other diseases affecting poor countries, we may need to improve the
current system with Doha while working on further changes to be brought to
innovation and patent protection rules.
The TRIPS public health safeguards are very important because of the symbol they
represent. Since international trade is increasingly integrated in international
development and international relations in general, market forces undoubtedly affect
an increasing number of other fields, where they are in breach of other rights and
entitlements. Regarding the case of international trade of essential medicines, it is the
right to health and access to essential medicines that is affected. What makes the
access to patented essential medicines an issue more than a symbol is that a huge
proportion of humankind believes it is totally unacceptable to let millions of people die
without treatment only in order for transnational corporations to increase their already
enormous profits. TRIPS public health safeguards and, more importantly, their further
interpretation through the Doha documents constitute an express recognition that when
free trade rules negatively affect human rights, an amendment to these trade rules is
necessary, thus giving consideration to human rights in a forum exclusively devoted to
international trade. Such reasoning may lead to the consideration of other fields in the
international trade forum and the formulation of trade rules, such as culture and
environment protection. This would seem obvious and natural since free trade and the
482 COMMISSION ON HEALTH RESEARCH FOR DEVELOPMENT, "Health Research: Essential
Link to Equity in Development", Oxford University Press, London, 1990, p.29.
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WTO were believed to be intended to spread democracy, human rights, and good
western values around the globe.
In order to ensure that human rights are respected, follow-up devices could be put in
place, such as universal human rights indicators. These human rights indicators could
work similarly to those used by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
to calculate the level of human development in different countries. In order to carry
out their evaluation, the UNDP uses four simple indicators: life expectancy at birth, the
adult literacy rate, school enrollment rates, and the average annual income per
483 A d' h h . h . d'person . ccor mg to an aut or, uman rIg ts m lcators
" ...could show the status of a particular human rights situation, reveal whether a situation is
getting better or worse owing to a policy change, and guide the formation of better policy,,484.
Developing indicators for human rights compliance may not be simple, considering the
difficulty to conceptualize human rights, political and cultural divergences, and lack of
resources for a state to implement and to monitor measures promoting human rights.
States are reluctant to submit their human rights behavior to scrutiny by other states,
and vice-versa.
"It is not obvious that the rich normative concepts of human rights can be turned into policy
evaluation tools that are adequately responsive to the complexities of policy-making
situations,,485.
Concerning the right to health and the access to essential medicines, we propose that
the pricing of essential medicines (which is directly linked to intellectual property and
public health safeguards), amongst others, should constitute an essential indicator to
assess the extent of the compliance to the right to health in a given jurisdiction.
What remains certain is the fact that access to essential medicines, like ozone depletion
and global warming, is a problem that initially needs to be addressed globally, since
483 Kate RAWORTH, "Measuring Human Rights", in Sofia GRUSHIN, Michael A. GRODIN, Georges
J. ANNAS, and Stephen P. MARKS, Perspectives on Health and Human Rights, Taylor and Francis
Group, New York, 2005, p. 393.
484 Id., p.395.
485 Id.
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different members of the international community are either responsible or the victims
of high prices of essential medicines. This is where the proposed international treaty
on R&D and the TRIPS/Doha public health safeguards stand. And then, states of the
international community have room to adopt measures consequent with the right to
health, such as HR 417 - The Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act and others like
those adopted by Canada, the European Union, Brazil, India, and South Africa that we
saw in parts IV and V of this analysis. To favor the adoption of those two levels of
measures, we propose that the bridge between human rights law and international trade
law be established or strongly reinforced, depending whether one considers that this
bridge is already established or not. This might be done by delineating the extent to
which developed countries are responsible towards developing states concerning the
implementation of the right to health and other human rights.
It is an evident fact of state practice that states do routinely finance foreign projects for
promoting health and other aspects of social welfare486. For example, one author
mentions that "each year donor states plan how much they shall disburse abroad in
health aid; this information is then shared with recipient states, who budget that same
amount as revenue for their domestic health budget,,487. The author further concludes
that such practice equals to a tacit acceptance of a duty to assist internationally488.
Moreover, article 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights states that the state parties must
"... take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation... to the
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization
of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including
particularly the adoption of legislative measures".
However, according to another author, article 2 makes the ICESCR "a catalogue of
imperfect obligations and nevertheless establishes duties to specify, without undue
delay, what steps will be taken, and when; what forms of assistance will be sought and
from whom; what resources will be allocated; and at what pace the right will be
486 A. ATIARAN, loc. cit., note 451, p.34.
487 Id., p.34.
488 Id., p.35.
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progressively realized,,489. We have two observations concerning what is mentioned
above about the responsibility or the duty for a state to act in order that the right to
health is adequately implemented in another state. First, it seems that the "duty to
assist internationally" other states is not limited to foreign aid but also includes the
formulation of policies that do not prevent the respect, the protection and the
fulfillment of the right to health in other countries490 . The second observation is that
since neither the Security Council nor the United Nations in general is a party to the
ICESCR, economic sanctions could hardly be undertaken legally as a human rights
violation491 . Because the ICESCR provides no sanctions of its own in case of non-
compliance to its provisions, their efficient implementation remains difficult to
achieve.
In order to cope with this situation, the concepts of human rights and development
should be joined. Since human rights are about the normative constraints on power
relations to ensure human dignity and the elimination of repressive and oppressive
processes, and development objectives focus more on material conditions and
distributional arrangements that allow people to benefit from economic processes to
improve their condition, human rights and development have evolved on parallel and
non-intersecting tracks492 • However, the introduction of human rights in development
can be justified in numerous ways. An interesting rationale supporting this assumption
is social justice, as defined by the Human Rights Council of Australia, for which
primary importance is given to eliminate social disparities and inequalities in access to
health. A human rights based approach to development may be explained such as
following:
" ...a body of human international rights law is the only agreed international framework which
offers a coherent body of principles and practical meaning for development cooperation,
[which] provides a comprehensive guide for appropriate official development assistance, for
the manner in which it should be delivered, for the priorities that it should address, for the
489 Stephen P. MARKS, "Human Rights in Development: The Significance for Health", in Sofia
GRUSHIN, Michael A. GRODIN, Georges J. ANNAS, and Stephen P. MARKS, Perspectives on
Health and Human Rights, Taylor and Francis Group, New York, 2005, p.99.
490 Id., p.l 00.
491 Stephen P. MARKS, loc. cit., note 62, p.371.
492 Stephen P. MARKS, loc. cit., note 489, p.95-96.
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obligations of both donor and recipient governments and for the way that official development
assistance is evaluated,,493.
Since current development is carried out globally through trade and the access for a
local industry to foreign markets, it seems to us that the application of the human rights
based approach to the international trade framework is perfectly valid. This would
inculcate some humanity and democracy into the legal framework for international
trade. Applied to the case of access to essential medicines, it would constitute a solid
base for an increased utilization of the TRIPS/Doha public health safeguards, as well
as a further reform of the patent system concerning essential medicines.
We hope that this analysis will further and enhance the influence of human rights law,
and especially the right to health, in international and national policymaking, since
article 14 of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights of October
19th, 2005, reaffirms that health is "essential to life itself," and that it "must be
considered as a social and human good,,494.
493 THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, The Rights Way to Development: A Human
Rights Approach to Development Assistance, Sydney, Australia, 1995.
494 Subject to linguistic and editorial modifications, the Declaration is available at:
http://www.unesco.org/shs/bioethics.
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